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# AGRICULTURAL FINANCE REVIEW

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AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF  
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS  
AND RESEARCH IN THE FIELD  
OF FARM CREDIT, FARM INSUR-  
ANCE, AND FARM TAXATION



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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LIST OF AVAILABLE PUBLICATIONS AND REPORTS,  
RELATED TO AGRICULTURAL FINANCE

<u>Title</u>	<u>Series and number</u>	<u>Date issued</u>
<u>Printed Bulletins:</u>		
Agricultural Loans of Commercial Banks .....	U. S. D. A. Tech. Bul. 521	1936
Federal Seed-Loan Financing and Its Relation to Agricultural Rehabilitation and Land Use .....	" " " 539	1936
Demand Deposits of Country Banks .....	" " " 575	1937
Farmer Bankruptcies, 1898-1935 .....	" " Cir. 414	1936
A Graphic Summary of Farm Taxation .....	" Misc. Pub. 262	1937
A Graphic Summary of Agricultural Credit .....	" " " 268	1938
A Suggested Plan for Cotton-Crop Insurance .....	House Document No. 277, 76th Congress, 1st Session	1939
Country Banking in Wisconsin During the Depression .....	U. S. D. A. Tech. Bul. 777	1941
Farm-Mortgage Credit Facilities in the United States .....	" Misc. Pub. 478	1942
Financing Production of Food for Freedom .....	" " " 488	1942
State and Local Government Finance in Wartime .....	The Farmer and the War-No.4	1942
<u>Bulletins Published in Cooperation with Other Bureaus:</u>		
Fire-Protective Construction on the Farm .....	U. S. D. A. Farm. Bul. 1590	1938
Safe Use and Storage of Gasoline and Kerosene on the Farm .....	" " " 1678	1938
<u>Processed Reports and Releases:</u>		
An Experimental Analysis of Factors Affecting the Collectibility of Cotton-Production Loans .....	Oct. 1934	
Farm Real Estate Tax Delinquency in Selected Counties, 1928-33 (Individual State Reports) .....	1935	
Crop Insurance - Excerpts and Selections .....	Oct. 1936	
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Farm-Mortgage Debt and Farm Investments of Life Insurance Companies .....	Feb. 1940	
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Lender Distribution of Farm-Mortgage Recordings .....	Nov. 1940	
Average Size of Farm-Mortgage Recordings of Selected Lender Groups .....	Nov. 1940	
Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2, Vol. II, Nos. 1 and 2, Vol. III, Nos. 1 and 2, Vol. IV, Nos. 1 and 2 .....	1938-41	
The Agricultural Situation in Relation to Banking, Vol. I, Nos. 1,2,3, and 4 .....	Jan., Apr., July, Oct. 1941	
Agricultural Loans (Individual State Reports) .....	1941-42	
Farm Property Taxes and Their Relation to Parity Determinations .....	Nov. 1941	
Financing Peanut Production for Oil in Georgia and North Carolina .....	Mar. 1942	
Financing Small Turpentine Gum Farmers .....	May 1942	
Interest Charges Payable on Farm Indebtedness in the United States, 1910-40 .....	Aug. 1942	
The Prevention of Accidents on Farms and in Homes .....	Sept. 1942	
Farm Real Estate Taxes in 1941 and Outlook for the Years Ahead (Also releases for earlier years) .....	Nov. 1942	
Farm Bookkeeping and the Federal Income Tax .....	Jan. 1943	

For list of articles in recent issues of the Agricultural Finance Review, see inside of back cover.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
 Bureau of Agricultural Economics  
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ERRATA

Page 75, Table 2,-Substitute the following data for the columns headed "Agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration":

Corn Belt States

	Amount 1000 dollars	Index 1937 = 100
1937	56,897	100.0
1938	59,935	105.3
1939	65,274	114.7
1940	68,347	120.1
1941	74,934	131.7
1942	78,003	137.1

Cotton Growing States

1937	68,094	100.0
1938	69,386	101.9
1939	69,264	101.7
1940	73,607	108.1
1941	77,234	113.5
1942	83,569	130.1

Range States

1937	72,086	100.0
1938	71,750	99.5
1939	65,949	91.5
1940	66,584	92.4
1941	64,682	89.7
1942	62,812	87.1

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THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE REVIEW WHICH HITHERTO HAD  
BEEN ISSUED SEMIANNUALLY WILL FOR THE DURATION OF  
THE WAR BE ISSUED ONLY ONCE EACH YEAR. THE PRECEDING  
ISSUE OF THIS PUBLICATION WAS DATED NOVEMBER 1941

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## NEW PUBLICATIONS

Since the release of the last issue of the Agricultural Finance Review, the following publications in the field of agricultural finance have become available:

Farm Mortgage Credit Facilities in the United States	M.P. No. 478
State and Local Government Finance in Wartime	The Farmer and the War-- No. 4
Financing Production of Food for Freedom	M.P. No. 488
Farm Bookkeeping and the Federal Income Tax	(Printed)
Financing Peanut Production for Oil in Georgia and North Carolina	(Processed)
Financing Small Turpentine Gum Farmers	(Processed)
Interest Charges Payable on Farm Indebtedness in the United States, 1910-40	(Processed)
The Prevention of Accidents on Farms and in Homes	(Processed)
Farm Real Estate Taxes in 1941 and Outlook for the Years Ahead	(Processed)

Copies of these reports may be obtained from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics upon request.



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# AGRICULTURAL FINANCE REVIEW



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## "FINANCING" AGRICULTURE'S WAR-PRODUCTION PROGRAM

Donald C. Horton <sup>1/</sup>

Most of the immediate problems of wartime agricultural production are necessarily physical in nature. They involve using the limited resources and manpower available to agriculture as efficiently as possible to produce on schedule those things most needed to help win the war.

But the physical side of wartime agricultural production must be worked out largely within an existing institutional framework that includes titles to property, contractual obligations, other formal and informal controls over the uses made of our productive resources, and our habitual peacetime ideas on good farming practices. As a major part of this complex institutional pattern had its origin in, and was expected to facilitate, national objectives far different from those that must be emphasized under wartime conditions, it could hardly be expected that all of these existing arrangements would be consistent with immediate war objectives. Regardless of how highly we may prize many of these conventional arrangements from the viewpoint of long-run national objectives, there is little doubt that some of them act in the short run somewhat as "the dead hand of the past" in relation to immediate wartime production objectives.

It would be a mistake, therefore, to view the war-production job in agriculture as entirely a physical problem of farm operations. Existing institutional arrangements, financial as well as nonfinancial, in many cases are as influential in determining the uses made of our productive resources in agriculture as are the physical characteristics of these resources. In attempting to describe the distinctive role of financial policy in connection with agriculture's war-production job, one of the principal tasks is to appraise the contributions that financial measures can make in the adaptation of our peacetime institutional arrangements to the meeting of wartime needs for farm products.

### 1. The Bearing of Financial Policy on Wartime Agricultural Production

As a starting point in an appraisal of the place of wartime financial policy in relation to agriculture under present circumstances, it is necessary to take a somewhat broader view of "finance" than is sometimes

<sup>1/</sup> Senior Agricultural Economist.

done. It is difficult to distinguish finance clearly from the other features of our economy that relate to money, but most of us have a fairly clear notion of what we mean by financial transactions. Most of such transactions involve transfers of funds that are not directly associated with a transfer of goods and services. The transfer of control over funds through a financial transaction is usually followed by, and is intended to bring about, a change in the control over goods and services; but in the first instance the one who gives up funds receives in return only such things as a general creditor's claim, a note, a bond, a release from an existing debt, a discharge from tax liability, or some other "paper" compensation.

Financial transactions, whether public or private, thus are essentially "one way" flows of money purchasing power which, in the short run, affect the distribution of immediate claims to goods and services. But in addition to these actual transfers of control over funds, there are many supplementary devices to facilitate and promote such transfers which are sometimes considered to be financial in nature. For example, the assumption of risks by government do not involve an immediate shift of funds from government to others, but such an arrangement often provides the conditions under which private financial operations can be carried on without undue risk to the parties immediately concerned. By carrying a part of the risks the government thus participates in an important phase of such private financial transactions.

If "finance" in wartime is thus viewed broadly as an instrument for helping to place money, and ultimately, physical resources at the disposal of those best able to use them in the war-production job, it is apparent that it includes a wide range of public and private financial transactions and facilitating devices. Some of these transactions and facilitating devices involve arrangements for obtaining or retaining economic control, and others involve arrangements for relinquishment of economic control, over manpower and other resources needed in war production. Thus when viewed separately, the lending of money by public and private agencies and the granting of public subsidies both operate directly to retain or place additional claims to resources in certain hands; and the various measures which absorb financial risks of farmers, or of those that lend money to them, operate indirectly in the same direction. On the other hand, paying additional taxes and increasing the rate of saving in such forms as war bond purchases and debt liquidation involve additional relinquishments of claims to resources. Such financial operations are an established part of our peacetime economy machinery that can be adapted to special wartime jobs not only in the field of public finance but also in that of private finance.

To the extent that the redistribution of money claims through such financial operations results in price changes for certain goods and services, shifts in control over physical resources and manpower are correspondingly modified. A rise in the prices of those things for which the demand is increased by the transfers of funds makes these funds less effective in shifting physical resources than they would be under stable prices. If financial operations are to be most successful in shifting control over resources, it becomes necessary to adopt measures to bring about extensive relinquishment of money claims in those sectors of the economy that tend to compete for the resources most needed for war production.





The results of the operations of the usual financial mechanisms are modified also by various direct authoritative controls such as price fixing, rationing, priorities, and allocations. It is possible for these direct controls either to facilitate or to hamper the operations of the wartime financial program. Likewise, it is possible for the financial program either to facilitate or to hamper the operations of the more direct controls. The goal, of course, should be to merge both the financial and the direct control mechanisms into a harmonious national program designed to reshape the entire production pattern of the Nation along lines required for the war.

Because direct governmental allocation of productive resources has been used much more extensively in the present war than in World War I, some have been led to conclude that finance has been relegated to an unimportant place in the production phases of our present war economy. It is true that our greater reliance on direct public allocation of productive resources in this war has resulted in greater emphasis in the field of financial policy on the use of financial mechanisms merely to facilitate such direct allocation of control over resources. This means correspondingly less emphasis on the more conventional uses of the financial system to shift control over resources indirectly through the usual market processes. But the need to place purchasing power in the hands of those whom we wish to have control over productive resources and manpower, and the need to withdraw purchasing power from others, would give financial policy important functions to perform even in a more rigidly controlled wartime economy than now exists.

The modifications that have been made in the usual peacetime functions performed by finance can be described also in terms of the greatly increased significance of what is sometimes called "coupon money" and the correspondingly reduced significance of "ordinary money." In some kinds of transactions coupon money is necessary to validate the use of ordinary money to buy in the market.<sup>2/</sup> Thus the farmer must have permission before he can buy some of the things needed in agricultural production. His ability to obtain control over these resources is determined by his ability to obtain both coupon money and ordinary money. Issuance of the necessary coupon money to him by the government, however, does not necessarily mean that he will be both able and willing to acquire the resources needed to expand or alter his production. Ability to finance his farming operations with ordinary money, and prospects of receiving adequate income in this form, still perform essential functions in a wartime economy.

But with respect to a large part of the resources used in agricultural production, permission to buy even now is not required. For example, the farmer is able to buy many supplies in the usual retail markets. At public auctions livestock, farm equipment, feed, etc. are still distributed according to willingness and ability to buy with ordinary money. Likewise, the farm real estate market is still free from direct governmental restrictions. Allocation of these essentials of agricultural production among different farmers is still carried on largely through the market, and in respect to such resources the financing of agricultural production still operates along lines similar to those followed in peacetime.

<sup>2/</sup> The term "coupon money" is used here to refer to all governmental permits to buy goods or services regardless of whether they are evidenced by ration coupons, priority ratings, or some other form of permission.

## 2. The Problem of Guides for Wartime Agricultural Finance Policy

To state in schematic fashion the several functions of finance in wartime is of assistance in visualizing the place of finance in the war effort, but such a statement does not provide public policy guides for the use of particular financial measures under present conditions. Even though we may recognize in a general way that financial measures can be used both to add to and to subtract from the claims that different producers can make on our limited productive resources and manpower, the crucial problem still remains as to how these several measures can best be used to help get the most for the war effort out of the resources and manpower available to agriculture. To answer the question of public policy guides it is necessary to look beyond the mechanisms of agricultural finance to the inherent economic necessities of a wartime agricultural economy. It is necessary to inquire as to what scheme of resource allocation agricultural finance policies should attempt to facilitate.

Although the problem of setting up guides for financial policy in this field is mainly one of wartime agricultural production economics, it is not entirely so. Many believe that agricultural finance policy should attempt to achieve other objectives in addition to, and sometimes in conflict with, the most effective use of agricultural resources to help win the war. But as few would deny that in case of conflict the war-production objectives must take precedence over other desirable objectives, primary attention is given in this paper to the agricultural finance guides that appear to be consistent with this major national goal.

Greater Emphasis Under Wartime Conditions on Short-Run Productive Efficiency: To recognize that in financing agriculture's war-production program it is necessary to emphasize efficiency in agricultural production is an important first step. But this is of only limited help unless "productive efficiency" can be defined in such a way that it has definite meaning in a wartime setting. We want more of certain agricultural products and we want many of them promptly. This means that wartime efficiency in agricultural production must meet the test not only of giving us what we want but also of giving it to us when we want it. It means also that with productive ability limited, we must be prepared to forego the production of certain kinds of agricultural products. Even a very high degree of physical efficiency in the production of things that we do not urgently need in the war, or in the production of things that will be available only in the distant future, is of little immediate help in winning the war.

Thus short-run efficiency in the production on schedule of those agricultural products that are most needed may mean that we shall find it in the national interest to be "inefficient," in a physical sense, in some of our agricultural operations. Even though to continue to use certain land, equipment, and labor in the same way that they have been used in the past may meet the usual tests of physical efficiency, this may still be inefficient from the viewpoint of short-run results. One important function of financial policy in wartime may thus be to facilitate changes in the production programs of farmers that will give more emphasis to a short-run standard of productive efficiency.

Emphasis on Short-Run Efficiency Makes "Sunken Resources" Out of More of Our Agricultural Resources: When it becomes necessary to alter sharply the direction of agricultural production, a much larger proportion of our land, improvements, equipment, and farming skills become somewhat in the nature of "sunken resources." From the point of view of immediate usefulness for war production it is necessary to look upon some of our agricultural plants and farming skills in somewhat the same light that we look upon the existing right-of-way, tracks, bridges, etc. of a railway operating in a partially abandoned area. It is true that some of our specialized productive resources, whether in agriculture or in industry, become much more useful in wartime, whereas others lose a part of their former usefulness. Those that come to have the greatest significance in terms of immediate production objectives must be used most economically if we are to achieve maximum production of the things we need. Others that are equally valuable by long-run standards nevertheless may become relatively plentiful in the short run and may have to be used accordingly if short-run productive efficiency is to dominate our agricultural production program.

Many of the resources that temporarily have become very useful are available for the time being only in limited quantities and thus are very scarce in relation to the greatly increased need for them. From the national viewpoint of efficient wartime production, the uses to which such scarce resources are put must emphasize maximum output of things vitally needed in relation to the amount of scarce resources so used. If an expansion of certain kinds of production is needed, then the goal is to get the expansion at a minimum additional "scarce resource cost." The additional cost of the increased output can perhaps be stated even more realistically as the production of other things needed in the war that must be foregone.

As compared with normal times, therefore, relatively less emphasis can be given in the short run to productive efficiency as measured by our customary standards of physically efficient use of specialized land, farm equipment, and farm labor. The inflexibility of some of these specialized resources in adapting to more important uses may mean that for the time being they will become abundant. "Full employment" of all such temporarily abundant agricultural resources may not be very important from the viewpoint of war production, because failure to use them fully in their specialized field may not retard immediately the volume of urgently needed production. Thus a utilization pattern for such specialized resources and manpower that, by our usual standards, might seem inefficient, might well be very efficient in view of the reduced relative importance of these resources for immediate war production.

Relative Profitability of Production an Imperfect Guide for Wartime Agricultural Finance Policy: In part because the availability and market prices of some productive resources are controlled, and in part because even the prices of those resources that are not controlled directly cannot always reflect their short-run importance for wartime agricultural production, the usual tests as to the prospective profitability of using more labor, fertilizer, land, etc. cannot be relied upon as the sole wartime guide for agricultural finance policy. To a considerable extent our national economy must be operated during the war on the basis of a schedule

of valuations stated largely in terms of physical requirements. We must operate in part by guides that are sometimes designated as "extra market valuations" of productive resources and final products. Even the market prices that are determined immediately by market conditions are often influenced indirectly by general price controls, by allocations of manpower as reflected in the selective service system, by allocations of critical materials, and by many other wartime controls. Moreover, the market values for durable production goods and land, unless controlled, can be expected to reflect longer run post-war income prospects as well as the immediate short-run importance of these resources in war production. This situation may lead either to market overvaluation or to market undervaluation of such resources in terms of their immediate usefulness, depending on the circumstances surrounding particular cases.

These various influences that ultimately are reflected in farm expenses, farm prices, and prospective farm income may undermine the reliability of anticipated profits from farming operations as the basic guide for wartime agricultural financing. It is as if we had packed ice around the thermostat controlling the operations of a heating plant. This is not to say that some of the cost and price relationships do not still provide partial public policy guides for agricultural financing. But additional tests may have to be applied before such a guide can safely be accepted in all cases.

Agricultural Finance in Wartime May Involve More Than Agricultural Credit: In addition to the usual kinds of agricultural credit transactions that help to distribute productive resources among farmers, still other financial devices may be required to secure the most effective use of scarce agricultural resources and manpower. On the one hand, a farmer may be in a position to add to the supply of needed agricultural products at a relatively low cost of scarce resource, but he may not be able to meet the usual requirements for credit. In such cases there may be a place for direct public subsidies, guarantees of production expenses and capital investment, public ownership and leasing of some kinds of farm equipment, or other similar financial arrangements to insure that such farmers will obtain immediate use of the resources needed to produce farm products urgently needed in the war. On the other hand, the mere fact that a farmer can furnish adequate security for a loan may not mean in all cases that he can make the best wartime use of the additional scarce resources and manpower he could control with borrowed funds. To the extent that more and more of the productive resources come to be allocated directly, the farmer in the latter situation presumably would be restricted directly in obtaining scarce resources. But to date only a small part of the resources used in farm production are allocated specifically to certain farmers.

In addition to the above-mentioned arrangements to supplement loans with subsidies and in addition to special arrangements for absorbing risks and for restricting those uses of credit that would lead to uneconomical uses of resources, there is also an important place for measures which will influence the uses made by farmers of their current income and past savings. Since redirection of production rather than over-all expansion is the essence of a wartime economy, withdrawing funds from some is of equal importance along with placing additional funds in the hands of others. Some

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farmers probably can help more to win the war by using such funds to buy war bonds and pay debts, and otherwise helping to finance other phases of the war effort than by using them to expand their own farming operations. How farmers should use their wartime income and accumulated savings thus is not an independent question of farm financial management, but rather it is one of several interrelated questions that arise in the general field of wartime agricultural finance policy.

### 3. Some Specific Problems of Wartime Agricultural Finance Policy

The foregoing brief sketch of some of the changes that the war has brought about in the scope and functions of agricultural finance suggest the need to reexamine some of the traditional financial guides that have been followed in the past. Few would go so far as to suggest that all peacetime credit institutions and policies be supplanted by others for the duration of the war. Credit and other financial arrangements are also a part of a peacetime institutional framework that most people expect to function again after the war in somewhat the same way as before. The problem is mainly one of adapting this part of the framework to special needs and of providing supplementary financial arrangements to the end that the agricultural finance program as a whole will satisfactorily perform its wartime functions.

One of the recurring problems in periods of national emergency is whether existing credit institutions should attempt to adapt their own policies to the new conditions, or whether supplementary credit facilities should be set up to perform most of the emergency credit functions. In the past both methods have been followed. Changes in the policies of governmental credit agencies that involve restriction of credit are difficult to make fully effective because a large part of the agricultural credit is furnished by nongovernmental lenders. Moreover, several of the governmental credit agencies operate under legal restrictions that make it difficult for them to adapt their operations to the task of shifting control over resources by measures which reach beyond the usual credit operations.

As in the national emergency in the early 1930's, any extensive use of the financial mechanism to facilitate special wartime allocation of productive resources probably will require special financial facilities that can be liquidated later when the war needs have passed. To the extent that these emergency functions can be associated with special wartime agencies, it will be somewhat easier to treat any special costs incurred in connection with the operation of these agencies as war costs which can be distributed along with the other costs of the war.

Aside from the general problems of providing special wartime agricultural finance facilities, many specific problems impinge directly on the operations of the regular agricultural credit agencies. What attitude, for example, should be taken with regard to variable payment plans and other arrangements to facilitate payment of debts ahead of schedule? To what extent should farmers with debt contracts written on variable payment plans be encouraged to use increased income to finance expanded production of needed agricultural products rather than to pay debts ahead of schedule?

Can any standards be set up to distinguish between those farmers that should place primary emphasis on reduction of their liabilities and those that should be encouraged to use their increased income to increase their investment in physical assets? If it is the interest of the Food for Freedom Program to encourage some farmers to follow the latter policy, what financial safeguards are needed to encourage them to use their income in this way and to prevent such farmers from assuming more than their share of the risks of losses in the post-war readjustment period?

If we could be sure that those farmers who should reduce their debts to avoid possible dangers of post-war financial hardships are also the farmers who cannot make the best temporary use of additional scarce resources in the Food for Freedom Program, then we could safely encourage all farmers with heavy debts to reduce them rapidly out of increased income. Likewise, those in a strong financial position could safely be encouraged to take most of the risks of shifting and expanding production. But in a situation in which the demand for different products is changing sharply, it may be that some farmers who could make a very good wartime use of additional land, capital, or labor happened to come into the war period in a weak financial position. Likewise, some who are well able to take financial risks may not be in a position to make the best use of additional resources and manpower.

Similar problems arise when integration of the national war bond sales program into the financial programs designed to facilitate the Food for Freedom Program is considered. What principles should guide the setting of war bond quotas for individual farmers? Should the objectives of the Food for Freedom Program be reflected in such quotas or should bond quotas be made relatively rigid in relation to farm income and family status, with other financial arrangements designed especially to facilitate the Food for Freedom Program taking care of the agricultural phases of war production? These are partly questions of administrative expediency, and perhaps it makes very little difference which approach is adopted so long as the net effect is to place and retain physical resources in the hands of those farmers who can make the best use of them for the war. That is the ultimate test of the desirability of the policy adopted.

Many problems arise in the use of subsidies to promote needed agricultural production. At what points in the movement of farm products from the farm to the consumer can subsidies be best used? Administrative complications are reduced if such subsidies are given at the processing or wholesale level, because of the smaller number of parties immediately concerned. But blanket subsidies of this kind may not be sufficiently selective to reach the particular farmers most in need of them to cover their costs. Our experience with subsidies has been concerned largely with relief of depression-induced hardships, and only to a limited extent has it been concerned with promotion of short-run productive efficiency. This is one of the most challenging fields of wartime agricultural finance policy.

Still other problems arise when consideration is given to proposals to curb land value speculation and increasing farm indebtedness. To what extent do land value changes reflect changes in the relative importance of

different kinds of land in agricultural production and thus operate in part to promote efficient wartime uses of land? At what point are the benefits of land value changes overbalanced by their disruptive effects? In attempting to restrict the use of mortgage credit to prevent dangers of post-war financial hardships, is there a danger that certain transfers of farms and other transactions that are related to efficient use of land resources will be unduly hampered? Can excessive production debts, which later may become liens against farm real estate, be held in check without hampering the use of credit to distribute resources among farmers?

These and other related problems of agricultural finance will require continuous study so long as adequate production continues to be a serious problem. The answers are not likely to be found in easy generalizations, and provisional answers may have to be revised from time to time. Perhaps one of the main requirements for the development of a sound agricultural finance program in wartime is frank recognition that first things must come first. Putting first things first in agricultural finance programs is much easier said than done, but in this respect agricultural finance does not stand alone.

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Canadian Farm Loan Board in 1941-42. - The Report of the Canadian Farm Loan Board for the year ended March 31, 1942 shows a further reduction in the demand for first- and second-mortgage loans made by this Board. The amount of applications received decreased from 5.5 to 3.5 million dollars; the amount of loans paid out from 2.7 to 2.1 million; only \$80,000 of the latter were second mortgages. On the other hand, principal repayments totaled 2.7 million. As a result, the principal amount of loans outstanding decreased for the first time since 1929-30, when the Board began its lending operations; the decrease amounted to \$692,000. On March 31, 1942 there were outstanding 21,333 loans on first mortgages totaling 33.7 million and 4,947 loans on second mortgages totaling 1.6 million.<sup>1/</sup>

Interest payments on first mortgages improved, but those of second mortgages were less favorable. On March 31, 1942 interest arrears on first mortgages amounted to only 1.075 percent of the outstanding principal, but on second mortgages to 8.939 percent (1.389 percent and 6.348 percent respectively at the end of the previous year). The interest charged is 5 percent on first-mortgage loans and 6 percent on second-mortgage loans; the former are made for terms up to 25 years; the latter are repayable in five annual installments.

The funds used in the lending operations of the Board are provided by the Dominion Government. They consist of 5.1 million advances of the Dominion Government (on which 3.5 percent interest is payable), a capital stock of 2.3 million, 0.4 million statutory reserves, and 29.2 million 3.5 percent bonds. During the year 1941-42 bonds totaling \$1,000,000 were retired and no new bonds were issued.

<sup>1/</sup> The Board also is authorized to make loans to fishermen, but only \$24,000 of such loans were outstanding on March 31, 1942.

## WARTIME TAXATION AND THE FARMER

Gerhard J. Isaac 1/


Taxation in time of war is dominated by the tremendous revenue requirements of the Federal Government. But wartime taxation by the Federal Government has more than one function to perform. The most obvious purpose, of course, is to raise revenue. Another, and perhaps more fundamental, objective is to help modify and direct economic forces in the interest of the war effort. Thus Federal fiscal measures affect farmers directly in amounts of taxes paid and indirectly through the diverse interrelationships among all segments of the economy. A general presentation of the implications of Federal fiscal policy for farmers is outside the scope of this paper, which is concerned primarily with taxation at the State and local level. Attention is given, however, to those Federal taxes which directly affect farmers and to certain other fiscal actions that influence taxation on the State and local level.

The farmer's chief direct contact with taxation before World War I was through the property tax levied by State and local governments. Stimulated in part by that war, citizens during subsequent years called upon their State and local governments to undertake a great variety of new functions, and to expand many old functions. The increased revenue needs could not well be met from property taxes and so led to the adoption of many new taxes. The most spectacular example in recent history of a parallel development of services and revenues is the expansion of expenditures for highways and the concurrent spread of gasoline and motor vehicle taxation. The addition of new taxes was also stimulated by the fiscal stresses engendered by the depression years of the 1930's. As a result, the taxes which now touch the farmer are numerous.

Despite the great variety of taxes levied, the property tax is still the most important tax so far as direct payments by farmers are concerned. The great diversification in present taxation, however, has the result of making the property tax less responsive to certain war influences than was the case in the past. Thus tax levies on farm real estate for the country as a whole have not yet responded to the general rise in prices as was the case at a corresponding period in World War I (fig. 1). It should be noted, however, that at the beginning of the earlier war farm real estate taxes had been following an upward trend for more than a decade; a trend which became even more sharply upward during and immediately after that war. By way of contrast, farm real estate taxes have fluctuated between rather narrow limits since 1934. The reasons for this relative stability are numerous, but the one outstanding reason is that State and local governments are using other taxes for important portions of their revenue needs. Furthermore, some of the newer taxes, notably retail sales and gasoline taxes, produced exceptional revenue yields during the last few years because of the greatly stimulated economic activity arising from the armament program.

1/ Agricultural Economist.

FARM REAL ESTATE TAXES PER ACRE AND PER \$100  
OF VALUE, UNITED STATES, 1910-41



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

FIGURE I

REG. 39891 BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

State sales tax revenues increased materially during the period immediately before our entrance into the war, as the high level of consumer income influenced retail trade. A large number of consumers apparently used their augmented income for the purchase of goods, often of luxury or semi-luxury type, which they previously had been unable to afford. This was reflected in increased collections of retail sales taxes. But evidence is now appearing which suggests that sales tax revenues may have reached a peak. The use of income for the less essential goods is becoming more difficult as the production of many types of civilian goods has been curtailed or stopped and retail inventories are rapidly disappearing. Curtailment has been most pronounced in the durable goods field. As a result, revenues from taxes on the retail sales of new automobiles and accessories, refrigerators, radios, and the like have become almost negligible. As rationing of production or consumption is extended to more and more classes of consumer goods, sales tax revenues may be further restricted.

Gasoline tax revenues have been going through a somewhat similar development during the last few years. In general, the first effect of the greater business activity was to stimulate the use of gasoline. As a result, gasoline tax revenues continued their long-time upward trend and in 1941 reached the highest point in history. But with the introduction of restrictions on automobile and tire replacements over the entire country and gasoline rationing in the northeast, gasoline tax revenues began to fall off. With Nation-wide gasoline rationing in effect, revenues will fall still further. Also affected, but to a lesser extent, will be revenues from automobile registration fees. It is to be expected that increasing numbers of automobiles will be retired from service for various reasons and only a very few replacements will be possible from the "stock pile" of new cars.

#### Changes in Revenue Needs

Revenue needs of State and local governments, as well as their tax collections, are influenced by certain nonfiscal actions of the Federal Government. Reference is made to the use of priorities and allocations in directing the flow of raw materials. Neither materials nor manpower are available for many projects which State and local governments normally would include in their budgets. In other words, there will be less opportunity to make expenditures for certain classes of projects than has been true in the past. It is reported that many governmental bodies are reaching the end of current fiscal periods with surplus funds because of inability to start projects originally planned before the present restrictions were applied. These governments, it should be noted, have in such surplus funds a cushion that can be used either to reduce current levies or to absorb increased costs of continuing functions. In fact, cases of each kind have been reported. In addition, if such surpluses continue to occur, it may be possible for some of these governments to accelerate debt retirement or to build up reserves in anticipation of needs during the post-war reconstruction period.

For the present it is probably safe to assume that State and local governments as a whole will not be likely to increase their services to any great extent or to carry out capital improvement programs as in the past. Construction activities in general will be restricted or eliminated by the unavailability of materials and labor. Retrenchment in highway expenditures will follow from this and from the decline in receipts from gasoline and motor vehicle taxation. Maintenance work will take precedence over new construction. In some cases the prior claim of highway debt service upon automotive tax funds will leave little or no margin for either maintenance or construction work. War needs will dictate that such funds as are available be used first of all to maintain highways of strategic importance. It may even become necessary to revert to more widespread use of levies on property for road work if transportation restrictions cause automotive tax revenues to shrink still further.

Federal Taxes and the Farmer

APR 27 1943  
MAY 1943

In the past Federal taxation was a matter of relatively little direct concern to farmers. The major direct Federal tax, that on individual incomes, was levied with such high personal exemptions that relatively few farmers achieved a sufficient net income to require the payment of any tax or even to subject them to the necessity of filing a return. Probably only during the boom years of World War I did any appreciable number of farmers pay Federal income taxes. Many of the excise taxes, of course, were paid by farmers to the extent that they bought the articles taxed. Examples are the tobacco and liquor excises. For the most part, however, the Federal taxes affecting farmers were such that they were merged into the costs of goods bought and were not separately shown in any way. Currently, excises are more numerous, have higher rates, and more of them apply in ways that call the farmer's attention to their existence as, for example, the annual automobile use tax.

The individual income tax now is levied at higher rates and with smaller exemptions than ever before. In addition there will soon be the victory tax, which, in effect, is an additional income tax. As both of these taxes are based on net income, farmers will not necessarily pay more merely because their gross receipts have increased. But net incomes of farmers are also increasing and it is to be expected that the combined income and victory tax liability of farmers will be substantial during the war years.

Wartime Tax Burdens

Tax burdens, or tax effects, cannot be measured solely in terms of the number of dollars abstracted from an individual or groups of individuals. Neither can the effect be explained solely in terms of changes in the relationship between amount paid and such factors as income, property value, and the like. Basically taxation is but one manifestation of fiscal policy, and it is fiscal policy as a whole which is a major determinant of the distribution of the real burden of the cost of government. Thus the wartime tax burden of farmers is actually the net result of the interaction of a variety of complex factors.

In a conventional sense it is true that the burden of farm property taxes can be said to be decreasing at the moment because the levies have been relatively stable at the same time that farm income was reaching new highs. This burden is not likely to increase in the next year or two, as gross farm income can be expected to increase somewhat, and probably net income also. At present, governmental bodies are restricted in their ability to spend for certain activities such as construction programs, and cost increases for those activities still carried on often are moderate. So long as this situation prevails the general level of property levies probably will change slowly.

The amounts paid in retail sales taxes generally will increase as the income, and more particularly the spending, of farmers rises. If income available for spending rises at the same rate as the prices of things bought, it can be said that the real burden of the sales tax is unchanged. A reduction in the quantity of consumer goods available would tend to reduce the amount of sales taxes paid unless price rises should lead to aggregate dollar expenditures for such goods of about the same amount.

Some of the changes that can be expected in the amounts of Federal taxes paid by farmers have been mentioned. But the specific amounts actually are less important than are the general effects of Federal fiscal policies. While national policies are aimed primarily at directing our economy to a maximum production of war materials, they also affect both the amount of State and local tax levies and the farmer's ability to meet them. Thus wartime tax burdens must be viewed in the light of the general economic setting.

Probably the outstanding economic fact of today is the Federal Government's need for vast quantities of war materials. If we are to preserve the essential characteristics of our economic structure as we have known it, it is necessary for the Federal Government to buy and pay for the goods needed in the prosecution of the war. There are only three ways in which this can be done. The Government can obtain the funds through taxation, borrowing, or printing currency. The alternative to buying and paying for goods, of course, is expropriation. As a Nation, we are committed to maintaining the institutional framework within which the country has grown to its present stature, and this alternative is not treated here.

If the Government is to buy and pay for the goods it uses, it must decide upon techniques for raising the necessary funds. The particular techniques selected may not affect the aggregate economic burden of the war, but they do have much to do with the distribution of both the immediate and the ultimate burdens. If, for example, the war costs are met in full from current taxes, all of the burden can be said to be upon the taxpayers reached by the particular taxes used. It is they who would be deprived of a portion of their income or wealth. The distribution of the burden would be the same if borrowing were the sole revenue device and these same persons lent the Government the same amount as they paid in taxes under the previous assumption. On the other hand, the ultimate burden might have a quite different incidence, depending on the particular combination of taxes used to finance the retirement of the war debts.

Thus it can be seen that national fiscal policy will affect farmers in various ways. There may be a direct loss of spending power either currently or at a future time, because of taxes. Or, if inflationary devices are used, the farmer may seem to gain income temporarily and lose later as expenses also rise. In a period of inflation State and local governments face the same sort of race between rising income and rising expenses. Even without inflation both individuals and governments may find themselves restricted in their activities during the war, because of the unavailability of materials or manpower. Such restrictions may arise from either fiscal or nonfiscal actions of the Federal Government. But in any event the taxes levied by State and local governments will, in part, reflect their ability to carry on various functions in time of war. The scope of their activity will be strongly influenced by factors not within their control. Thus it can be seen that State and local taxes in wartime will be affected by broad national policies designed in the first instance to facilitate and stimulate the production of things needed for war purposes, and that the real burden of wartime taxation depends on the net result of the effects of the broader policies on the amounts of the taxes and on the resources from which the farmer pays them.

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Experience in Workmen's Compensation Insurance Among "General" Farmers.<sup>1/</sup> - Experience in workmen's compensation insurance, in the "general farm" classification in the United States, indicates a rather significant difference by areas in "pure" premiums, or the amount of claims paid per \$100 of total pay roll.

Based on total pay rolls of more than a billion dollars during the 10-year period 1929-38, claims paid per \$100 of pay roll, by areas, were as follows: East \$2.64; Central \$3.08; West \$2.91; and South \$2.08. If these data were "loaded" according to a commonly used "rule of thumb" procedure,<sup>2/</sup> they would represent average premium rates two-thirds higher than those shown.

Differences in the amount of claims made are affected by the scale of payments provided under State laws and the charges made for medical services, as well as by the frequency and severity of accidents. The amount of pay roll is affected by wage scales as well as the number of workers employed. That machinery is used more widely in the Midwest than in the South may increase the relative frequency and severity of accidents and may account for some of the difference in the rates as between the two areas.

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<sup>1/</sup> Analyses by the National Council on Compensation Insurance; data cover only one classification, general farming (code No. 0006).

<sup>2/</sup> Overhead costs are said to absorb about 40 percent of gross premium receipts.

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## WARTIME RISKS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

John D. Rush and Earl E. Miller<sup>1/</sup>

Risk-bearing in agriculture, already recognized as an economic problem of serious proportions, has taken on added public significance because of the war. The nature and scope of hazards arising in wartime agriculture are influenced by the production goals established and the particular methods used to reach them. Also involved is a determination of the degree to which these hazards should be borne by the public and by individual farmers.

This discussion is limited to the new hazards which stem directly from the impact of the war upon available physical resources and those which stem indirectly from the war through adjustments made in the national economy to meet these new situations. These new hazards, regardless of source, will be reflected through changes in the pattern of risks and the incidence of risk-bearing.

Because of the relatively important place that agricultural production holds in time of war, these new hazards become of special public significance. Hazards discourage production and promote scarcity of things vital for the war. A decline in the importation of certain agricultural products makes necessary an expansion of domestic production under conditions that involve added risks for the producers.

A diminution of producer goods, needed by farmers as a result of the shutting off of imports and the difficulties of producing or locating substitutes, also imposes restrictions on agriculture that are reflected in part in added production risks. The strains imposed on the existing economic structure by the reallocation of available manpower, raw material, and producer goods between the normal needs of the country and the war needs likewise are reflected in increased risks for the farmer.

Meeting the risks of agricultural production peculiar to war conditions requires joint action by farmers and Government. Ordinarily the farmer would be expected to bear or insure against all risks associated with his business, as any other entrepreneur, and to organize his farm plans accordingly. However, with essential resources limited and with farm production more or less directed, all the attendant risks should not be saddled on the farmer. To the degree that rights of individual producers are subordinated to national interests in the war program, measures for dealing with hazards increasingly become a function of the national Government rather than the individual farmer. Not a small part of the problem exists in the ability and the will, at both levels, to recognize the nature of the hazards and to collaborate in the task of meeting them in the most effective way.

1/ Assistant Agricultural Economists.

Recognition of the necessity of sharing with farmers some of the hazards in the Food for Freedom Program is already evidenced in a number of wartime programs undertaken by the Government. In addition to a continuation of the current plan of working toward parity of economic opportunity for farmers, the following steps have been taken by the Government to insure production and to reduce risks: (1) Putting into operation a plan to assure adequate farm labor; (2) assurance of price supports, through loan and purchase programs; and (3) conducting educational programs for assisting farmers to make the necessary adjustments to the war program.

A farmer's cultural background has much to do with his concept of how best to meet risks. Usually he tries first of all to eliminate or reduce the danger of loss by personal action directed principally at the cause. Risks that cannot be eliminated or transferred to others must be assumed. These may be shared jointly with the farmer's family and perhaps with neighbors. It is characteristic of farmers to depend on their relatives and neighbors to work out or harvest their crops if they should become incapacitated.

Decisions by farmers as to methods of meeting risks are also influenced by other persons or groups in advisory or educational capacities. Specific examples of influences may be cited: Information on critical shortages by war boards, machinery companies, and farm organizations, with suggestions as to how best to meet them; visits to the farm to discuss the need for, and production of, critical crops, by AAA committeemen, men from the Extension Service, etc.; practical training of farm laborers for different jobs on some State university farms; and advice by creditors, both public and private.

Other specific risks lend themselves to actuarial treatment and the sharing of costs through organized insurance. In these cases the probability of a loss is calculated and the premiums that are collected provide funds for indemnification of losses. Private companies usually insure only against certain specific hazards, so the vagaries of war leave farmers without "coverage" for many of the transitory risks arising from the war. Changes in the probability of losses, which have occurred as a result of the war, have been met in part by expanded types of insurance coverage.

Risk-bearing is a production cost which the individual farmer seldom treats in terms of ledger accounts, nevertheless any increased hazards normally require a strengthening of the profit motive or an equivalent incentive if production is to be maintained. One way by which farmers may be induced to grow needed war crops, therefore, is to provide for governmental guarantees which perform the same function as prospects of increased income. In our production program to date we have used both increased-income prospects and reduction of costs associated with risks as incentives for increasing production.

In a total war we have no choice but to meet, or attempt to meet, these new hazards as they come, even though a basis for estimating the extent of the risk is lacking. We can at best gather experience as we progress, but must realize that there is inevitably a lag between the analysis of the experience behind and use of this information in meeting the risks ahead.

The hazards affecting agricultural production are recognized as being in three general classes. Although they overlap in many respects, these are: (1) Risks in terms of human lives, (2) risks associated with production, and (3) risks involved in financing. This classification is used to describe the elements of the problem as it has been approached here. Each of these classifications is treated separately.

#### Human Risks

Risks involving personal casualties that in any way deprive farmers, members of their families, and employees, of ability to continue their work are significant economically and socially. Principles of the common law recognize the community interest in at least one phase of the matter by placing legal responsibility on farmers in case of accidents to employees. Of most importance in time of war is the loss by injury, illness, or death of farmers who have managerial ability, for this affects production and the status of families and employees.

In great measure the risks involving the eventuality of death, injury from accidents, illness, unemployment, and insecurity in old age, are assumed by individual members of the farm group. In only a minor degree have these kinds of risks been transferred and that principally through the use of insurance. Yet there is a general financial inability of individual farmers to meet these hazards adequately.

Farming as an enterprise has been forced to bear a disproportionately large share of these risks as compared with other industrial fields. The reasons are found largely in the nature of agriculture, its independence, and its isolation. The significance of these risks has been recognized, but the inability of farmers to deal with their risks within the framework of modern forms of social security has been principally due to the peculiar and difficult administrative problems involved.

Protection against unemployment and destitution due to old age was provided by the Social Security Act of 1935, but only to "protected" employees, which does not include farmers. Liability protection and compensation for farmers and their employees, respectively, were provided through the Workmen's Compensation Acts of most States; but, unless farmers and their employees voluntarily elect to become "covered," by subscribing to the required insurance, they are generally excluded from the compulsory provisions. Therefore, few have qualified.

Risks involved in increasing agricultural production with fewer workers are likely to be reflected in increased loss of life or loss of time caused by accidents and diseases. Large numbers of skilled farm workers have shifted into industrial production of vital war materials with resulting farm-labor shortages. Inexperienced recruits, many from the cities with no farm background, respond to the need and attempt to take the place of experienced farm hands. Older and younger persons, including many women, are helping. In all such cases the hazards of injury are increased. This year many farm people will work longer hours, subjecting themselves to excessive fatigue, thus increasing the chances of accidents.

An increasing number of accidental deaths, and increased injuries to farm workers, many permanently disabling, may be expected. Advanced mechanization will no doubt play a large part in this accident toll. Then older machinery, patched up and used because new machines are hard to get, will constitute a greater-than-normal hazard as they will be more difficult to handle safely.

Difficulties in human adjustment to a reorganization of the agricultural economy are recognized. An experiment is being conducted by the Farm Security Administration in which available farm labor from marginal areas or where labor is plentiful is being transferred to areas in which labor is lacking and the land is more productive. Educational facilities have been provided under these experimental plans to train these workers in new practices in order to lessen the risks involved in making these shifts.

In this country there has been a steady increase in the amount of life insurance in force but relatively little is known about the extent of farmer participation.

Studies of farm-family expenditures, based on samples, indicate the degree of participation in life insurance and other specified types of insurance by income groups.<sup>2/</sup> They indicate a high correlation between income and the proportion of families having insurance expenditures, as well as the average amount spent. The data for 1941 are shown in table 1. As an example of the fragmentary nature of available information it is noted that an analysis of 12,499 sales of ordinary life insurance in May 1942 shows that 5 percent of the number of sales were to farmers and farm hands.<sup>3/</sup>

So far as the immediate war effort is concerned, it is probably most important to prevent interference with the production program by eliminating accidents, so far as possible. To this end, an accident-prevention program is being outlined by the Department of Agriculture to encourage farmers to use every safeguard in order to do their jobs safely. Especial emphasis is placed on safety instruction for recruits who, working in agriculture for their first time, are not familiar with the hazards.

#### Production Risks

Risks in the production of food and fiber under war conditions are affected by limitations on the availability of resources needed for the job at hand. The approach, therefore, to a mitigation of loss is partly in the ability to utilize the factors of production on the most efficient basis and partly to diffuse the cost of risk-bearing through insurance and thus convert it into a cash expense item chargeable to the enterprise.

Risks exist in the methods evolved to meet such situations as (1) shifts in farm organization and (2) shortages in producer goods and manpower.

<sup>2/</sup> Bureau of Home Economics, Study of Family Spending and Saving in Wartime, unpublished data.

<sup>3/</sup> Analysis of 1942 Buyers, Best's Insurance News, September 1942, p. 15.

Table 1.- Percentage of families paying premiums for specified types of insurance, and average expenditures per family, by net money income classes, rural farm families, 1941<sup>1/</sup>

Net money income class	Families paying premiums for specified types of insurance					Average expenditures per family for premiums for insurance of specified types <sup>2/</sup>						
	Pct.		Pct.		Pct.		Life, endowment, annuity		Fire, tornado, other insurance on home		Furnishings	
	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Dol.	Dol.	Dol.	Dol.	Dol.	Dol.
0 to \$499 .....	35	7	19	9	5	5	8.94	.67	2.43	1.84	.17	
\$500 to \$999 .....	51	7	38	25	9	21.84	.84	6.48	5.40	.50	.50	
\$1,000 to \$1,499 .....	57	10	39	38	9	28.37	2.05	6.85	8.46	.75	.75	
\$1,500 to \$1,999 .....	63	19	42	52	24	46.24	3.98	8.03	13.27	1.82		
\$2,000 to \$2,999 .....	72	26	48	75	23	66.93	11.33	9.30	22.65	1.92		
\$3,000 and over .....	68	17	44	71	20	124.96	4.09	12.46	30.65	2.33		
All rural farm families <sup>3/</sup>	50	11	33	31	11	30.48	2.35	5.96	8.51	.91		

<sup>1/</sup> Includes only families who reported expenditures for the full period.

<sup>2/</sup> Averages are based on the total number of families giving expenditure schedules, regardless of whether they had expenditures for premiums for insurance of the specified types.

<sup>3/</sup> Includes a few families with negative incomes that are not shown separately.

Bureau of Home Economics, Study of Family Spending and Saving in Wartime, unpublished data.

Hazards associated with the development and use of new techniques that have to be learned in converting farm organizations to new kinds of crops more essential to the war are, of course, recognized. Changes such as shifting from an intensive to an extensive type of farm organization may be necessary in cases in which farmers can secure the necessary equipment but cannot secure the labor. Such a shift may mean that a farmer has a smaller production.

As farm machinery breaks down, it will become increasingly difficult to secure replacement parts or repairs and such incidents at critical times in farm production may have serious effects. Complications are involved when tractors wear out and have to be discarded. In switching from motors to horses, many farmers will be handicapped in trying to adapt their heavy cultivating and harvesting equipment to the draft limitation of animals.

Even though farmers devise substitutes and utilize discarded machinery, the net effect of such shifts is to weaken their ability to produce. Farmers who grow crops that must be harvested within limited periods must have at least the minimum required labor and equipment or they may lose a considerable part of their harvest, after the crop has been brought to maturity.

Production risks in wartime not only involve natural forces operating upon growing crops and livestock and the use of labor and property in producing and storing, but also the danger of exposure to actual warfare. Farmers have access to insurance covering losses to crops and property, including the recent war-damage coverage, but war has affected the replacement of property and thereby the degree of protection. Thus the war affects both the function of insurance and its use.

#### War-damage insurance

Shortly after entrance into the war, the Government made it possible for farmers to insure their property or growing crops against loss or damage resulting from enemy attack or from action by our military forces in resisting attack. Official data are not yet available to indicate the volume of this insurance that has been taken by farmers but a recent item indicates that a number of companies have sold very little to farmers and that which was sold was taken principally in coastal areas, where the danger of attack has been considered greatest.<sup>4/</sup> War-damage insurance may have been taken by farmers in our island possessions, but reports are not yet available to show the extent to which these farmers have participated.

#### Federal crop insurance

The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation in its wheat and cotton programs has ruled that crop losses caused by invasion forces or the Nation's defenders are covered under the original insurance contracts. The interpretation has been made that since such losses are "unavoidable" they are

<sup>4/</sup> Little War Damage Sold to Farmers Outside Coast Area, The National Underwriter, Sept. 17, 1942, p. 3.

covered, just as are the losses due to drought, hail, insects, and the like. Under the wheat and cotton insurance programs, farmers must stand the first 25 (or 50) percent loss in yield from all causes, including war damage. Coverage extends up to the time of harvest, so the farmer's stored crop is not included under the insurance contract.

Regulations outlining the procedure for adjustment by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation of losses attributable to the inability of farmers to perform their usual cropping practices because of wartime shortages were established in the spring of 1942. For example, if a farmer normally used a certain quantity and kind of fertilizer and, because of wartime conditions, was unable to obtain and apply it, that fact would not preclude him from being indemnified for the resultant loss in yield; however, the cost of the fertilizer would be deducted from his indemnity, together with any savings in production cost that would normally have been expended in mixing and applying the fertilizer.

It is impossible at this time to estimate what effect higher prices and the inclusion of these "war provisions" have had on participation in the crop insurance programs for wheat and cotton.

#### Hail insurance

Experience of private carriers with insurance against losses to crops by hail has indicated an increase in the use of this form of crop protection attributable mostly to higher prices and, therefore, attributable indirectly to the war. One company that writes a rather large amount of hail insurance throughout the country reported a 20-percent increase in premiums in 1942 over 1941. The explanation given was that good growing conditions, good crops, and good prices in many sections encouraged the farmers to take out an increased volume of hail insurance.

#### Fire insurance

Insurance of farm buildings against loss by fire constitutes probably the largest volume of coverage of any kind used by farmers. Possibility of loss of farm buildings and their contents is more serious in wartime because of the increased need for farm production and because farmers might not be able to replace the buildings. Replacement value of farm buildings has increased, too, because of the increased cost and scarcity of building materials and labor.

Burned farm buildings and machinery are a national loss. To replace them places a drain upon our natural resources which competes with the demands of the war program. If shortages of automobiles, tires, gasoline, and personnel should force insurance companies to curtail their loss-prevention and risk-inspection activities, fire losses might increase. At the joint meeting of the agricultural committee of the National Fire Waste Council and the Farm Fire Protection Committee of the National Fire Protective Association in November, a representative of the stock fire insurance companies stated that these companies do not expect to reduce their inspection work although inspections may not be made as quickly as before.

### Livestock insurance

Great expansion has taken place in the livestock industry as a result of the war. More horses and mules are needed because tractor production has been curtailed and more meat animals are needed because of the food requirements of the Army and the lend-lease commitments for beef, pork, mutton, dairy products, poultry, and eggs.

During World War I several new insurance companies were organized to insure livestock, especially slaughter animals, but these dwindled away rapidly after the war, when the demand for meat subsided and prices fell. Since this war began the volume of livestock insurance has increased, but it is doubtful that there will be a material wartime increase in the number of new livestock-insuring companies.

### Automobile insurance

The goal of efficient distribution in wartime gives rise to new problems in transportation. Because of the importance of automobiles and trucks in conducting the farm business, the risks associated with their use are of special significance. To the danger of damage to vehicles and the possibility of damages involved in using them, is added the danger of inadequate transportation. If new trucks are not available, or existing trucks cannot be properly repaired or equipped, farmers' produce may deteriorate on the farms or be unavailable when needed.

Probability of accidents as a result of collisions will be decreased by restrictions on travel, as the volume of traffic in general is reduced, and also by reductions in allowed speeds. But it may be that hazards per mile will increase because of old tires, machines in poor mechanical condition, blackouts, and fatigue from longer periods of duty. Qualified opinions indicate that accidents will decrease in frequency but increase in severity.<sup>5/</sup>

The effect of the war on the insurance of farm vehicles is a debatable question. Any changes are only partly applicable to farmers because farmers carry little auto insurance, as indicated by a special study which shows that only a third of the farmers who own cars carry policies on them.<sup>6/</sup>

Fewer new cars will be insured, but the less-than-normal rate of obsolescence on present cars will tend to maintain the current volume of insurance. Auto collision insurance probably will decline. In some cases liability-insurance rates on school buses used in transporting agricultural labor in California have been revised downward to less than one-third the former rates, with no restrictions on the number of trips per day.<sup>7/</sup> Automobile rates on comprehensive and collision coverage have also been reduced 10 percent or more by some companies to A card holders.

<sup>5/</sup> National Underwriter, Sept. 3, 1942, p. 18.

<sup>6/</sup> A. J. Fisher, Personal and Automobile Insurance Carried by Rural and Urban Groups. Agricultural Finance Review, Nov. 1940.

<sup>7/</sup> Article in U. S. Dept. of Agriculture War Board Activities, No. 31, Sept. 10, 1942.

Financial Hazards

Production of crops essential to the winning of the war places greater emphasis on the judicious use of capital. Risks arising from physical changes and those that accrue because of changed financial conditions are usually inseparable. If financial conditions permit, the farmer may bid for available factors of production. Changes in the financial requirements of production affect the farmer's risks in that they may result in improvised methods or material or they may change the investment of the farmer without guaranteeing a proportionate return, or both. The farmer's problem, then, is specifically, "Will it pay?" or "Will trying to make it pay add to the possibility of loss?"

To meet the production goals farmers will have to make many changes in farm organization. Shifts in production may mean long-term investments which seem economically feasible under present price relationships; but changing conditions may leave the farmer with an obsolete investment. The option of redeeming a commodity credit loan enables the farmer to take advantage of prices above loan values and reduces the risks of price fluctuations.

Production of crops essential to the winning of the war places greater emphasis on cash crops and tends to make self-sufficing areas more commercial in aspect. Not only will farmers in such areas need more farm labor than formerly but because of the scarcity of laborers they will bid higher for them. Both increase the farmers' need for capital. Higher prices of material and supplies will also increase farm expenses and add to the risk of a farmer in financing a crop.

Operating expenses and investments required to produce, or convert to the production of, war crops may dictate that farmers be furnished capital by improvised criteria that will be predicated more upon war needs than upon formerly recognized credit standards.

Conclusions and Questions

War has pointed up the problem of risks and of risk-bearing, from the angle of the national interest in food production. One net gain from this experience doubtless will be a clarification of issues involved in risk-sharing. Then perhaps methods will be put in use by which these problems may be more successfully attacked in the future.

Realization of the extended rights of others in the things that farmers produce will help to clarify some of the clouded issues as to risk-bearing in the conventional theory of production. In a total war the incidence of risks transcends the civil rights and responsibilities of those who produce; it involves also those who are dependent upon these products. As farmers and consumers become more dependent on each other, the feeling of joint responsibility in matters of risks and risk-bearing becomes more pronounced.

As a group, our farmers are willingly making sacrifices to help win the war and are utilizing their resources, which are considerable, in adapting themselves to a war-gear economy. It is possible that a plan to insure the farmers' recovery of costs of production in connection with the growing of war crops might alleviate some of the within-season hazards. Financial guarantees and insurance cannot, of course, assure the production and harvesting of a crop if laborers are not available. Central labor-control systems may have to be resorted to in order to allocate workmen for essential jobs such as harvesting crops.

Farmers could also be protected against the special risks of wartime production by nonrecourse loans provided for the growing of specified war crops. These loans would represent cash costs of production and could be budgeted in advance and made available at such times as funds were needed. This plan would eliminate those risks involved in making cash outlays and would tend to encourage farmers to continue operations at any phase of crop production. In effect, the latter plan would be insuring costs of production and would have the added advantage of excluding some of the administrative difficulties of the former plan. Production costs could then be determined on an individual basis rather than by applying area averages which seldom fit the actual situation. Expense of a check-up would be necessary only in the case of unpaid loans.

But other forces, not directly related to the war, are introducing changes in the fundamental purpose of schemes devised to deal with risks. New conditions that result from the use of certain governmental controls in wartime and other exigencies of war will have an indirect effect tending to accentuate evolutionary changes in agricultural insurance.

What role will Government play, in insurance matters during the war? Will the war bring out any weakness in insurance legislation enacted by the States indicating that the subject might be attacked from a Federal standpoint? Will new types of insurance be developed? Will insurance companies continue to write insurance principally by "lines," or will comprehensive policies be more widely issued?

Farmers and insurance companies are definitely interested in current governmental ventures in the insurance field. Programs for such ventures are planned by the War Damage Corporation, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, and the Life Insurance Bureau of the Veterans' Administration. Then the accident and health mutuals and the livestock insurance programs developed for governmental clients within the agricultural rehabilitation program, should be mentioned. The Farm Security Administration has also sponsored associations set up to insure life and property, and has sponsored veterinary groups as a form of health insurance on farm animals. Broader programs include social security, retirement plans, and price guarantees for producers of certain basic commodities.

A chief reason for insurance against war damage by the Government may be that assumption of the risk is in the national interest. That consideration raises the question, at what point do hazards to farm production become hazards to society to an extent that requires treatment by the Nation?

## INFLATION AND THE FARMER

Oscar Zaglitz/<sup>1/</sup>

The farmer's interest in the policies shaping the wartime economy in the United States is twofold in character. As a citizen he shares with other citizens the desire that our economic and financial policy be organized so as to make the greatest possible contribution to the conduct of the war and to the reconstruction of our economy afterwards. As a farmer he finds that, because of the greater rigidity of its economic and social structure, agriculture is highly dependent on stable economic and financial conditions; therefore, he must wish that our policies aim at securing such stability. From both viewpoints he does well if he gives attention to the problems of inflation and inflation control because economic and financial stability during and after this war depends on an adequate solution of these problems.

The experience of the last war must be considered as a warning. In the inflation which developed during and after that war, prices in general and those of farm products and farm real estate in particular went up, only to drop heavily during the depression which followed, and farm indebtedness increased tremendously. Many of the financial difficulties which were encountered by farmers in the years between the first and the second World War resulted from these price fluctuations and the inflationary increase in farm indebtedness.

Bearing this experience in mind, in the first part of this article, we shall examine the character of inflationary developments; in the second part their effect on agriculture; and, in the third part, problems of inflation control.

### I. Inflation and Its Effect on Agriculture

This part deals with the following problems: (1) Wartime contrast between expanding national income and contracting production of consumer goods; (2) repercussions upon farm and nonfarm prices; (3) trends toward runaway inflation.

#### Wartime contrast between expanding national income and contracting production of consumer goods

This war, like the last one, has made necessary an enormous expansion of Federal expenditure for the purposes of warfare; and this, in turn, has led to a sharp increase in the dollar volume of national income.

<sup>1/</sup> Agricultural Economist.

Latest estimates<sup>2/</sup> of total Federal expenditure for the current fiscal year were 84 billion dollars inclusive of net outlays of Government corporations but exclusive of disbursements for trust funds. Of this total, 78 billion or 93 percent are war expenditures. In the event of a prolonged war, Government expenditures will probably increase still further. They are expected to reach a total of more than 100 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1944, assuming that the war will last throughout that year.

The rapid expansion of our war production has been accompanied by an increase in the volume and value of the gross national product<sup>3/</sup> far beyond any level reached in the past. Even though further price rises should be prevented, the gross national product of the current fiscal year will probably exceed 165 billion.<sup>4/</sup> As our production continues to expand, it is to be expected that the volume of the gross national product would reach an even higher level during a prolonged war.

On the other hand, the production of consumer goods is decreasing as a result of converting as much productive capacity as is feasible to the war effort. Up to now, this decrease has been moderate. Measured in constant dollars, the volume of consumer spendings appears to have dropped by about 5 percent from the middle of 1941 to the middle of 1942 (fig. 1).<sup>5/</sup> But the curtailment in the output of consumer goods will be greater month by month even though it may never become so incisive as has been the case in European countries.

This shrinking in the output of consumer goods is in sharp contrast to the increases in employment and in monetary incomes. Civil nonagricultural employment increased from June 1941 to June 1942 by 2.5 million persons,<sup>6/</sup> the number of family and hired workers on farms also increased

<sup>2/</sup> Second revision of Federal Budget Estimates, October 1, 1942.

<sup>3/</sup> The concept of "gross national product" is more comprehensive than that of "net national income." The latter is usually understood to comprise only the distributive shares in the national product which are received by the factors of production in the form of wages, salaries, interests, rents, royalties, and net profits. The concept of "gross national products" comprises in addition those shares in the national products which either flow to the Government through the payment of business taxes or are retained in the business enterprises through depreciation and depletion charges, credits to reserves, charges of capital outlays to current expenses, or changes in the valuation of inventories. The "gross national product" can therefore be defined as the total of all final products produced by the Nation. Milton Gilbert (War Expenditures and National Production, in Survey of Current Business, March 1942) rightly has claimed that the "gross national product" offers a better basis for estimating the magnitude of Federal war expenditures than does the "net national income."


<sup>4/</sup> Estimates made by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce put the gross national product at 167 billion for the fiscal year 1943; of this total consumer expenditure would amount to 80.5 billion, private capital formations to 2 billion and Federal, State, and local Government expenditures to 84.5 billion. (In calculating the last-mentioned figure deductions have been made for transfer payments, offshore payments, and other items that do not absorb part of the gross national product.)

<sup>5/</sup> The indices charted in fig. 1 have been calculated on the basis of data received from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce on the actual amount of consumer spendings and on the volume of such spendings if measured in average 1939 dollars. See also the article by Milton Gilbert and Robert Bangs on "National Income and the War Effort - First Half of 1942," Survey of Current Business, August 1942.

<sup>6/</sup> The nonagricultural employment totaled 39.3 million persons in June 1941 and 41.8 million in June 1942, according to the Bureau of the Census.

## CONSUMER EXPENDITURES, UNITED STATES, 1939-42

INDEX NUMBERS (1939=100)



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Figure 1

in this period, though only slightly.<sup>7/</sup> The total disposable income of individuals in the United States increased 20 percent between the second quarter of 1941 and the second quarter of 1942.<sup>8/</sup>

#### Repercussions upon farm and nonfarm prices

In a free competitive market prices tend to rise if production is curtailed and consumer income increases. In the present war the influence of competitive forces upon prices has been altered by Government measures; some of these measures were designed to change the relationship between various categories of prices, such as the legislation aiming at the reestablishment of the so-called parity relation between farm prices and nonfarm prices; others aimed at the stabilization of prices and, more recently, of wages.

For a long time it has been a goal of agricultural policy to regain "parity prices" for farm products - that is, prices which would give these products an exchange value, for commodities bought by farmers, equivalent to that which prevailed in the years before the First World War. Farm

<sup>7/</sup> 11,929,000 persons were employed on farms in June 1941 and 12,009,000 in June 1942, according to the Farm Labor Report of Nov. 16, 1942.

<sup>8/</sup> The seasonally adjusted annual rate was 86.0 billion for the second quarter of 1941 and 103.0 billion for the second quarter of 1942. (See the article by Gilbert and Bangs quoted above.)

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prices had dropped far below their pre-war ratio to prices paid by farmers in the depression of the early thirties (fig. 2). Subsequently, farm prices improved absolutely and relatively to prices paid by farmers until the goal of price parity was reached in January 1937. But in the next month the index of prices received by farmers again dropped below that of prices paid and it remained substantially below the latter until the outbreak of the war in Europe. Between August 1939 and the beginning of 1941 this unfavorable gap was only slightly narrowed. Between March and August 1941 this gap was being closed; and, since that date, the index of prices received by farmers has remained on or above parity to the index of prices paid by farmers. However, the general trend of prices already had been upward since fall 1940; in this situation the gap between prices received and prices paid by farmers was, and could only be, closed through an increase of farm prices in excess of the rise in nonfarm prices.

Increases in farm prices were a factor in the upward trend of the general price level. But the influence of this factor should not be overrated because the competitive situation in the commodity and labor markets would have forced the general level of prices and wage rates up even though farm prices had remained at their old level. This is illustrated by the fact that, from the early part of 1940 on, wage rates have increased more than costs of living. Moreover, the increases in prices and wages which took place during the first part of the war were, on the whole, not out of proportion to the changes in the economic and financial situation which took place in this period; and to some degree they have been useful in alleviating and accelerating these changes.

#### Trends toward runaway inflation

By now, however, a considerable part of the shift toward war production has been made, and many price and wage adjustments have taken place. The further the conversion of our economy from peace to war progresses, the less will unrestricted increases in prices and wage rates have the character of adjustments of the relationships between the various kinds and groups of prices and wages; and the more will it take the form of a spiraling upward movement of the general level of prices and wages.

If prices and wages should continue to increase freely, sooner or later secondary forces would accelerate this trend. These secondary forces are unleashed by the efforts of people to protect themselves against the danger of further reduction in the purchasing power of the currency.

In the period before the setting of general maximum prices many consumers were making commodity purchases in advance of needs, not only because they expected scarcities to develop but also because they were afraid of price increases. If the Government had not set maximum prices, the repercussion of these developments, and particularly their coincidence with a progressive shrinkage in production of consumer goods, would have caused sharper and sharper price increases. Sooner or later anxieties would have developed also with regard to the purchasing power of savings, and people

might have begun to shift from monetary forms of investment, such as bonds and savings accounts, to what has been called "investments in kind" (common stock, real estate, and any kind of storable commodity).<sup>9/</sup>

Such repercussions of an upward spiraling of prices and wages cause undesirable dislocations in our economic system and thereby impede the adequate use of national resources for the war and for supplying consumers with needed commodities. In a short war, the detrimental effect would be of a limited size. If, however, the war should be a long one, the efficiency of our war economy would become seriously handicapped. Moreover, the farther up the spiraling of prices and wages is permitted to go, the harder becomes the task of checking this trend. It is true that stringent deflationary measures can stop even the worst kind of inflation, but inevitably such measures must be paid for by depression and distress.

## II. Effect of Inflation on Farmers

It has been recognized that the general price movement is of less importance for agriculture than the changes in the ratio between prices received and prices paid by farmers. Similarly, the changes in the nominal amount of farm income are of less importance than the changes in the purchasing power of this income. The effect on the farm debt situation is somewhat different insofar as an increase in the nominal amount of farm income facilitates the repayment of old debts; but a reduction in old debts resulting therefrom is, to a larger or smaller degree, counterbalanced by increases in new borrowings caused by the repercussions of inflation.

We deal first with the effect of inflation upon farm prices and farm income and then with its effect on the farm debt situation.

### Effect on the price and income situation of farmers

The effect on prices and on farm income is different in each cycle of inflation and deflation because of differences in the economic and financial situation, as well as in government policies. If specific influences of this kind do not change the trend, and if the inflation-deflation cycle follows the pattern which in general is typical for business cycles,<sup>10/</sup> the repercussions of inflation and deflation may cause a sequence of three different tendencies to follow each other: In the early stages of an inflationary price spiral, prices received by farmers tend to increase more than prices paid; in the later stage of it, prices paid tend to increase more than prices received; and, during the subsequent deflationary price fall, prices received tend to decrease more sharply than prices paid. The result of a development of this kind is that the ratio of prices received to prices paid - which indicates the net effect of prices upon the purchasing power

<sup>9/</sup> Large-scale shifts to investments in kind characterized the inflations which took place in Central European countries during the last war and the period following it, and they increased considerably the difficulties that arose in the economies of these countries.

<sup>10/</sup> This pattern is characterized by a more-than-average increase in the prices of primary products in the early upswing, a more-than-average increase in retail prices in the late upswing, and a more-than-average drop in the prices of primary products in the downswing.

of farm income - increases only in the early stage of an inflationary development but decreases in the later stage as well as in the deflation that follows.

An analysis of the agricultural price trends during and after the last war offers an example in which this sequence of tendencies actually prevailed. As shown in the lower part of figure 2, the ratio of prices received to prices paid tended to improve from 1915 to 1917; then it deteriorated moderately from 1917 to 1920, although the general price trend remained upward; finally from 1920 to 1921 it dropped sharply when the general level of prices fell under the influence of deflationary measures.

Figure 3 shows that the nominal amount of farm income followed in general the trend of prices received, and the purchasing power of this income followed the trend of the ratio of prices received to prices paid. An exception was the period from 1917 to 1918, in which the purchasing power of farm income increased in spite of a 1-percent drop in the ratio of prices received to prices paid; the reason is that this 1-percent drop was more than offset by an increase of nearly 6 percent in the volume of farm production (crops and livestock). But from 1915 to 1917 the purchasing power of farm income increased with the increase in the ratio of prices received to prices paid and from 1918 to 1921 this purchasing power decreased to conform with that ratio, although up to 1920 the general price trend continued to be upward. In particular it may be noted that from 1918 to 1919 the purchasing power of farm income decreased by 5.4 percent although the nominal amount of this income increased by 8.5 percent as a result of higher prices of farm products.


In analyzing current conditions, we find that the improvement in the ratio of prices received to prices paid between August 1939 and August 1941 was followed by a period in which the main trend of these two groups of prices remained parallel (August 1941 to April 1942). Then the freezing of most of the nonagricultural prices resulted in some further improvement in the ratio of prices received to prices paid. The exact course which this ratio would have taken without such interference obviously cannot be determined. But it is probable that, if an inflationary spiraling of prices were not impeded, this ratio would sooner or later tend downward,<sup>11/</sup> because civilian supplies of many manufactured goods are being progressively reduced under the impact of the war, whereas in the case of foods, either civilian supplies have remained relatively ample or the effect of shortages upon the market is counterbalanced by the rationing of consumption.<sup>12/</sup>

Therefore, if the green light were given to an inflationary spiraling of prices and wages, the improvement in the farm situation attained in recent years might be offset to a greater or smaller extent by a shrinkage in

11/ In this connection it must not be overlooked that farmers' costs of production are being increased by rising farm wage rates. The index of the latter reached 220 percent in October 1942, as compared with an index of 169 percent for prices received by farmers. The growing scarcity of labor and industry's ability to pay higher wages threaten further to increase farm wage rates and thereby to raise farmers' costs of production.

12/ Outside of the realm of food, consumption has been rationed only in the cases of gasoline and of some durables of which not more than insignificant amounts are now produced for private consumption.

PRICES RECEIVED AND PAID BY FARMERS, INDEX NUMBERS,  
UNITED STATES, 1910-42




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Figure 2  
CASH FARM INCOME AND ITS PURCHASING  
POWER, UNITED STATES, 1910-42\*

INDEX NUMBERS (1910-14=100)



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

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the purchasing power of farm income similar to that which occurred in the latter part of the boom period of World War I. Furthermore, if such a runaway inflation should be stopped by severe deflationary measures in the post-war period, the resulting large-scale unemployment and curtailment in consumer spendings might again cause a rapid dwindling of cash farm income and of the purchasing power of this income.

#### Effect on farm indebtedness

In a period of inflationary war financing, increases in the nominal amount of farm income usually result in an acceleration of the payment of outstanding debts of many farmers; on the other hand, production shifts and higher costs of production force other farmers to resort to new and larger borrowings. The latter trend becomes stronger if the expansion of farm production and the improvement of farm income is followed by an increase in the demand for farm land and in the prices of such land. Increased expenditures for machinery and equipment may also become a reason for larger borrowings.

In the inflation of World War I the final result of various influences of this kind was a considerable increase in farm indebtedness in the United States. The weight of the increased debt burden caused severe distress among many farmers when deflation decimated farm income in the early 1920's.<sup>13/</sup>

In the present war the development of farm indebtedness in the United States has, up to now, been more favorable than in the last one. The decrease in the farm-mortgage debt, experienced in preceding years, continued during 1941 and probably also during 1942. Short-term farm indebtedness, as measured by the amount of short-term loans held by selected private and Government agencies<sup>14/</sup> had increased for several years prior to this war; it continued to increase from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942. But the rate of increase in these 12 months (3 percent) appears to be moderate if compared with the 14-percent increase in the volume of farm production which took place in 1942.

If the present tendency to accelerate farm-debt repayment and to avoid heavy new borrowings should prevail in spite of a progressive expansion in the currency circulation, the effect on the farm debt situation would be favorable; yet the subjective attitude of farmers is not always the decisive factor in determining this trend. In a majority of cases farm debts are not incurred lightheartedly but because of needs for capital resulting from a given economic situation. If the general level of prices

<sup>13/</sup> In the European countries in which runaway inflations were experienced, the severe depreciation of the currencies resulted in a considerable reduction in the weight of farm indebtedness; but the improvement in the farm debt situation did not last. When those inflations were stopped, the volume of farm debts began to increase again, and in many countries the increase was so rapid that after a relatively short period the weight of the farm debt burden upon farm income became heavier than it had been in 1914. Among the main reasons for this development were: The need to restore worn-out farm capital at high prices, the detrimental effect of inflation on consumer income, and thereby, indirectly on the market of farm products, and the sharp increase of interest rates which resulted from the inflationary destruction of the purchasing power of monetary savings.

<sup>14/</sup> Insured commercial banks, agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration, and Farm Security Administration.

and wages should be permitted to increase progressively, and if real estate values should follow suit, many farmers might again find it necessary to borrow large amounts and the volume of farm indebtedness might again increase. And if, after the war, stringent deflationary measures should sooner or later stop such an inflation, thereby forcing the general level of prices and wages down, the burden of increased farm debt might again cause distress among many farmers.

To sum up: The recent improvement in the price, income, and debt situation of farmers would be endangered by the repercussions of an uncontrolled upward spiraling of prices and a subsequent sharp deflation. It would appear in the interest of farmers that such dangers be averted; but this goal will be achieved only if the Government's anti-inflationary measures are effective enough to prevent not only an increase in the prices of consumer goods but also a deterioration in the price-cost relationship of agriculture, a deterioration which, at least in some instances, might hamper the Food for Freedom Program.

### III. Problems of Inflation Control

Four categories of devices must be combined to establish inflation controls which are effective and still preserve needed flexibility in the economic system: (1) Price and wage controls; (2) allocations and rationing; (3) taxation as an anti-inflationary measure; (4) voluntary and compulsory savings.

#### Price and wage-rate controls

Price controls are often thought of only as an instrument for combatting rising costs of living. If price controls should be directed only at this goal, they would essentially be a measure of consumer protection. Moreover, by aiming only at the maintenance of a given level of retail prices irrespective of changes in the conditions and goals of war production, price controls might become an impediment to the maximum production effort needed to win this war. To avoid such an undesirable consequence and to make them a useful instrument of our war economy, price controls must be comprehensive as well as flexible.

They must be comprehensive, because any prices or wages are costs to those who have to pay them as well as income to those to whom they are paid. The control of only a certain group of prices or of prices alone and not of wages cannot achieve more than a temporary success. Sooner or later, increases in uncontrolled prices and wages raise the costs of production of goods whose prices are being controlled with the result that the controlled prices also must be permitted to increase.

Price controls must not aim at preserving a given price-cost structure but must be flexible because changes in the price-cost structure may be needed in order to facilitate the utilization of less productive resources and in order to make adjustments in cases in which an insufficient

margin between the price and the costs of a product is an obstacle in obtaining war production goals or an impediment in shifting resources to a more needed use. The need for flexibility of price controls has been indicated by the fact that Great Britain, Canada, Germany, and other countries have found it necessary to introduce such flexibility in their control systems.

If carried out on a comprehensive scale and in a flexible manner, price and wage controls can operate without having a negative effect upon the volume of production. By preventing the overbidding for scarce resources, effective price controls can give important assistance in the organization of our war economy. This effect is of particular importance in the case of resources the distribution of which is not directed by allocation or rationing.

In addition to checking the upward spiraling of prices and wage rates, effective price and wage controls strengthen the confidence in the maintenance of the purchasing power of money; and thereby help to prevent commodity purchases in advance of needs or for investment purposes, reduce the pressure of demand upon the market, and operate as an encouragement to saving. Wage controls also have a direct curtailing effect upon consumer purchasing power.

On the other hand, insofar as such controls prevent the upward spiraling of prices, they also prevent an absorption of the additional purchasing power resulting from larger Government spendings and higher monetary incomes, whereas in free competitive markets such surplus purchasing power would be absorbed by means of price increases. These controls alone therefore do not suffice as inflation checks, but they must be supplemented by measures which directly result in curtailing nonessential demands on scarce resources.

#### Allocations and rationing

The common purpose of allocations and of rationing is to direct the distribution of scarce resources in accordance with the administrative rating of the various war and civilian demands competing for these resources. Allocations give priority in the use of scarce resources to needs more important and more urgent in wartime over less important and less urgent needs. Rationing is used to secure an adequate distribution of scarce supplies among consumers.

Among the needs for which allocations are made, airplanes, ships, guns, munitions, and other materials directly needed for warfare must rank first; but, in addition, allocations are made for tools and equipment needed under the war-production program or the Food for Freedom Program. Without curtailing, or even discontinuing the production of all dispensable gadgets, less of the scarce resources would be available for the production of war materials, farm machinery, etc.

Allocations and rationing operate to keep demands in balance with available supplies. By preventing a pressure of excessive demands upon the markets of these commodities, they also facilitate the task of maintaining price ceilings for these products. On the other hand, the restrictions which they place upon the buying of allocated and rationed commodities lead to greater demands for such other commodities as can be used as substitutes. If such demands should increase too much, they would make it necessary to expand the system of priorities and rationing to an increasing number of commodities and services. On the other hand, since the demand for the goods which remain available without restrictions has its natural limitation, it seems probable that the restrictions of buying imposed by allocations of rationing will result not only in an increase of substitute purchases but also in an increase of current savings.

#### Taxation as an Anti-Inflationary Measure

The Revenue Act of 1942 is expected to bring in about 7.7 billion dollars additional revenue in a full year of operation.<sup>15/</sup> During the current fiscal year the new taxes will yield less, because they have been effective only during part of the year. No official estimate has been published of the increase of revenues during the fiscal year 1943 which may be expected from the new tax law since this law has been enacted. It would, however, appear probable that altogether the net receipts of the Treasury in the current fiscal year will come close to 23 billion and the net receipts from trust accounts to about 2.5 billion, which would leave 58.5 billion to be borrowed from the public.

In view of the need for such enormous borrowing, questions such as these are often asked: "Why do we not levy taxes sufficiently high to 'pay as we go' for the wartime Government expenditures?" Or, "Why do we not finance the war entirely out of tax revenues in order to eliminate any danger of inflation?" Undoubtedly it is desirable that war expenditures be paid out of tax revenues, up to the maximum feasible limit. This is desirable not only for reasons of an anti-inflationary policy but also because - insofar as this is done - it constitutes a final settlement of the financial burden of the war, whereas payment for the war with borrowed money results in an increase in the Federal debt and in the interest payable on this debt. However, to pay all wartime Government expenditures out of current tax revenues would require an increase in the tax burden (inclusive of social security taxes) to about 300 percent of the amount payable under the 1942 tax law; and, as the tax rates on high incomes are close to 100 percent, those on low incomes would have to be increased still more. Such a multiplication of taxes would dangerously upset the budgets of a great number of taxpayers. Therefore, if a severe disturbance of the financial situation of such persons - unwelcome at any time for social reasons and detrimental to our war effort - is to be avoided, only a part of the war expenditures can be financed through further increase in taxes, and whatever deficit remains after exhausting the means of taxation to the feasible limit must be financed by borrowing.

<sup>15/</sup> The U. S. Treasury estimated the net revenues exclusive of refunds at 6.882 million in a full year of operation. Post-war refunds have been estimated at 800 million for the refundable taxes paid in a full year of operation.

### Voluntary and Compulsory Savings

The main problem of wartime Treasury borrowing centers around the question to what extent funds will be obtained from current savings, and to what extent recourse must be had to banks although this recourse will cause a further expansion in the means of payment. Opinions differ with regard to this question, but on the basis of the present rate of national savings, it is in general expected that rather less than 50 percent of the Treasury borrowings in 1943 may be obtained from current savings. Every effort therefore must be made (1) to increase the rate of current savings still further and (2) to obtain the largest part of these savings for war financing.

The efforts made in this direction have been mostly on a voluntary basis. In the Revenue Act of 1942, recourse has also been had to compulsory borrowing by levying the victory tax and the excess profit at a higher rate and providing for the refund of part of it after the war. The post-war refunds to be made on the 1943 and 1944 revenues from these two taxes have been estimated at 500 and 800 million dollars respectively.<sup>16/</sup> On the basis of present estimates it appears that not more than 0.6 percent of the Government's expenditures (exclusive of corporation outlays and trust funds) in the current fiscal year, and not more than 0.8 percent in 1944, will be obtained from refundable taxes.

Moreover, the post-war refunds are being made irrespective of whether the taxpayer paid his refundable, and other, taxes out of current income or out of accumulated savings. In other words, the refundable taxes in the Revenue Act of 1942 are a means only for "compulsory borrowing" but not for "compulsory savings." Refundable taxes of the compulsory-borrowing type have, however, a more adverse effect on voluntary savings than outright (nonrefundable) taxes have.<sup>17/</sup> Therefore, if recourse should be had to refundable taxes on a large scale, these taxes would have to be chosen and arranged in such a way that the adverse impact on voluntary savings is kept within narrow limits. This might be done best by making refunds only to those taxpayers who during the year for which the tax is paid have not reduced the total volume of their accumulated savings.


It cannot be foreseen to what extent refundable taxes will become an additional source of Treasury financing in this war, but it is improbable that this new device will be used extensively enough to eliminate the need for a further increase in voluntary savings. Increasing the rate of these savings, therefore, will remain one of the most important tasks of war financing.

The war savings campaign is based primarily upon appeals to patriotism. In addition, more and more stress is being put upon appeals to the personal interest which people have in the accumulation of savings. Incentives to savings which have proved effective in the past, such as the need for old age protection and protection of dependents, have retained their importance or have become even more important in this war; and, in spite of

<sup>16/</sup> The refunds in question can be absorbed currently if the taxpayer fulfills certain Requirements.

<sup>17/</sup> In view of the unfavorable effect of "compulsory savings" on the rate of voluntary savings, some economists have suggested reliance on enforcing more savings indirectly by limiting spending possibilities by a system of over-all rationing, which would prevent people from buying consumer goods in excess of available supplies; but within such limits it would leave them more freedom than large-scale enforcement of savings.

## INTEREST-BEARING PUBLIC DEBT, UNITED STATES, 1910-42



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

NEG. 42385 BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

Figure 4

social insurance and government action against unemployment, it is still useful for the individual to accumulate reserves for illness, accident, or changes in his economic and financial situation. Under the conditions of all-out war, attention of the people must also be focused upon the fact that "bidding up" for the reduced supplies of consumer goods will not increase the limited quantities available, but it will necessitate more rationing and will make price control more difficult. On the other hand, those who save will be able to use their savings - after the war and the reconversion to civilian production has been completed - for the purchase of many now unavailable goods in improved qualities.

The betterment of the income situation of farmers has made it possible for them to increase their savings substantially. However, in view of the task of expanding food production, some farmers need most of the funds which they save, or more, for investments on their own farms required to reach production goals set under the Food for Freedom Program. Farmers who do not need to make such investments but are heavily indebted may well use wartime savings to reduce their debts. In addition, farmers should try to accumulate liquid reserves through purchases of war bonds. Liquid financial reserves will be of great value in meeting adversities such as crop failures, illness, or death; in addition, they can be resorted to for education of children, and post-war improvements on the farm, such as replacement of worn-out machinery and implements, or rebuilding and repair of home and out-buildings. For such reasons, the purchase of war bonds must in general be considered as a better investment of wartime savings of farmers than land speculation or other speculative undertakings which encounter the danger of losses during periods of low income and low prices.

In appraising the possibilities of financing a large part of war expenditures out of current savings it must also be borne in mind that the restrictive influence of price controls on costs of living facilitates consumer savings. The curtailment of possibilities for consumer spending by way of rationing and curtailment of investment possibilities operates to a large extent as an indirect enforcement of savings. Increases in taxation have a negative effect on the rate of current savings, because they reduce the amount of income from which such savings may be made; but the revenue derived from new taxes is, in general, substantially larger than a reduction in current savings which they may cause. On the whole, therefore, price controls, allocations, rationing, taxation, and the war savings campaign are measures, each of which has a different purpose in the fight against inflation. To what extent inflation will be kept under control will depend on the adequate combination and the effective carrying out of all these measures.

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HOW TENANT-PURCHASE BORROWERS OF THE FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION  
ARE MEETING THEIR PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST PAYMENTS  
UNDER A VARIABLE-REPAYMENT PLAN

Paul V. Maris 1/

The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, passed by the Congress in 1937, contained a section reading "The Secretary may provide for the payment of any obligation or indebtedness to him under this Act under a system of variable payments under which a surplus above the required payment will be collected in periods of above normal production or prices and employed to reduce payments below the required payment in periods of subnormal production or prices."

This is the most definite and tangible evidence in our time of recognition by Congress that farming as a business is characterized by ups and downs and that debt-paying ability rises and falls correspondingly. However, the following quotation from the code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon about 2250 B. C., suggests that the ancients took into account the ever-shifting fortunes of farmers in developing their credit policy: "If a man owe a debt and storm inundates his field and carry away the produce, or, through lack of water, grain hath not grown in the field, in that year he shall not make any return of grain to the creditor, he shall alter his contract tablet and he shall not pay the interest for that year."

Information is lacking as to how Hammurabi's flexible credit policy worked out 4,000 years ago, but records are now beginning to tell the story of how a similar flexible arrangement is working out currently among tenant-purchase borrowers of the Farm Security Administration. Only a few borrowers obtained loans in 1938. Therefore, only a few had principal and interest payments falling due December 31, 1939. As additional borrowers obtain loans each year, a larger number faced a settlement with Uncle Sam on December 31, 1940, and a still larger number had that experience on December 31, 1941. The biggest payday of all will follow the close of 1942.

Of the years listed above for which returns are in, the year 1941 was exceptionally good; that is, the farmers' debt-paying ability was unusually high. It therefore put to a crucial test the paramount questions related to the workability of a variable-payment plan, viz.: Will borrowers pay more liberally on their farm debts at the end of a good year? No one has ever doubted their willingness to pay little or nothing following a bad year. Let us first consider then the record of variable-payment borrowers for this good year 1941.

1/ Director, Farm Ownership Division, Farm Security Administration.

If all tenant-purchase borrowers in the United States operating under the variable-payment plan had paid precisely the amount required annually to amortize their debts over the 40-year loan period, they would have paid in 1941, \$2,360,485. However, they paid \$3,314,729, which is \$954,244 or 40.4 percent more than "schedule." This record of payment of real estate debt was not made by pyramiding non-real-estate debt. Nor were extra payments included in these calculations; that is, payments derived from the sale of mortgaged property, such as timber, gravel, minerals, etc. Extra payments for all borrowers, fixed and variable, were \$962,522 in 1941. The payments "ahead of schedule" were derived from ordinary earnings.

The 1941 average for the country as a whole, which is well on the plus side, includes many borrowers whose payments were on the minus side. A study of table 1 shows the record for regions and States.

Region IX, embracing California and a group of southwestern States, has the most favorable record from a percentage standpoint. The number of borrowers in some of those States was few, and the amounts due were small. States in which borrowers in the aggregate paid more than twice their annual installments of principal and interest in 1941 were Arizona, California, North Dakota, Tennessee, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and portions of the States of Oklahoma and Kansas embraced in Farm Security Administration's Region XII. The Territory of Hawaii falls in this group. Incidentally, 20 percent of the Region XII borrowers stood 2 years or more ahead of schedule at the end of the year 1941. That means that if 2 bad years, such as have not been wholly lacking in that country, should strike again, the borrowers making up this 20 percent could pass two annual payments entirely and still be as far along with the retirement of their debts as if they had paid a fixed amount every year, good and bad.

It will be noted that 12 States paid less than the equivalent of 1 year's 4.326 installment in 1941. Among them were Maryland, Ohio, West Virginia, Florida, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Some of these States have at least partial alibis because 1941 was for them a bad crop year. This applies particularly to the States of Mississippi and Louisiana and in both those States prepayments already made in the year 1942 suggest that a considerably better record is in prospect.

The total record for all variable-payment borrowers from the inception of the program down to and including the year 1941 is favorable, however, by a margin of \$548,240 or 12.6 percent; under a fixed-payment plan amortizing the debt in 40 years the borrowers would have owed \$4,339,602. They paid, exclusive of extra payments, \$4,281,362.

It may be stated categorically that the position of the States with respect to the amounts paid in comparison with amounts that would have been due under a fixed schedule is not wholly in keeping with ability to pay. The way in which the variable-payment plan has been administered in the field has had much to do with this outcome. Human nature manifests itself in borrowers' reaction to debt payments in a characteristic manner. The farm supervisor who is the collecting agent for the Farm Security Administration often sympathizes with and is influenced by the borrowers' point of view.

Table 1.- Actual payments on tenant-purchase loans in 1941 by variable-payment borrowers compared with amounts that would have been due under a fixed 4.326 schedule

Region and State	Actual payments by variable-payment borrowers 1)	Amount due under 4.326 fixed schedule 2)	Net amounts greater or less than 4.326	
	Dollars	Dollars	Dollars	Percent
United States ..	3,314,729	2,360,485	954,244	40.4
<u>Region I</u> .....	53,428	53,379	49	.1
Connecticut .....	0	0	0	.0
Delaware .....	285	285	0	.0
Maine .....	535	714	-179	-25.1
Maryland .....	2,915	4,926	-2,011	-40.8
Massachusetts .....	194	380	-186	-48.9
New Hampshire .....	112	158	-46	-29.1
New Jersey .....	1,745	1,649	96	5.8
New York .....	18,010	18,850	-840	-4.4
Pennsylvania .....	27,184	23,862	3,322	13.9
Rhode Island .....	300	192	108	56.2
Vermont .....	2,148	2,363	-215	-9.1
<u>Region II</u> .....	255,916	131,590	124,326	94.5
Michigan .....	43,065	28,942	14,123	48.8
Minnesota .....	164,868	79,671	85,197	106.9
Wisconsin .....	47,983	22,977	25,006	108.8
<u>Region III</u> .....	412,213	289,708	122,505	42.3
Illinois .....	117,160	77,894	39,266	50.4
Indiana .....	92,002	56,319	35,683	63.4
Iowa .....	37,755	20,450	17,305	84.6
Missouri .....	142,906	112,117	30,789	27.5
Ohio .....	22,390	22,928	-538	-2.3
<u>Region IV</u> .....	528,919	347,047	181,872	52.4
Kentucky .....	116,317	74,854	41,463	55.4
North Carolina .....	137,895	105,646	32,249	30.5
Tennessee .....	177,223	79,267	97,956	123.6
Virginia .....	74,219	62,878	11,341	18.0
West Virginia .....	23,265	24,402	-1,137	-4.6
<u>Region V</u> .....	520,734	479,433	41,301	8.6
Alabama .....	210,736	184,230	26,506	14.4
Florida .....	17,066	20,893	-3,827	-18.3
Georgia .....	196,277	174,646	21,631	12.4
South Carolina .....	96,655	99,664	-3,009	-3.0
<u>Region VI</u> .....	236,495	253,448	-16,953	-6.7
Arkansas .....	104,727	85,618	19,109	22.3
Louisiana .....	36,394	51,654	-15,260	-29.5
Mississippi .....	95,374	116,176	-20,802	-17.9

Continued

Table 1.- Actual payments on tenant-purchase loans in 1941 by variable-payment borrowers compared with amounts that would have been due under a fixed 4.326 schedule - Continued

Region and State	Actual payments by variable-payment borrowers 1/	Amount due under 4.326 fixed schedule 2/	Net amounts greater or less than 4.326	
	Dollars	Dollars	Dollars	Percent
<u>Region VII</u> ....	493,725	279,883	213,842	76.4
Kansas .....	140,428	96,899	43,529	44.9
Nebraska .....	152,297	87,456	64,841	74.1
North Dakota ..	114,563	42,753	71,810	168.0
South Dakota ..	86,437	52,775	33,662	63.8
<u>Region VIII</u> ....	490,713	355,724	134,989	37.9
Oklahoma .....	133,242	116,613	16,629	14.3
Texas .....	357,471	239,111	118,360	49.5
<u>Region IX</u> ....	88,959	26,507	62,452	235.6
Arizona .....	3,257	1,169	2,088	178.6
California ...	43,082	9,731	33,351	342.7
Nevada .....	353	0	353	.0
Hawaii .....	36,525	12,013	24,512	204.0
Utah .....	5,742	3,594	2,148	59.8
<u>Region X</u> ....	59,890	42,065	17,825	42.4
Colorado .....	31,066	23,956	7,110	29.7
Montana .....	24,893	15,587	9,306	59.7
Wyoming .....	3,931	2,522	1,409	55.9
<u>Region XI</u> ....	48,201	36,813	11,388	30.9
Idaho .....	25,116	14,115	11,001	77.9
Oregon .....	12,793	12,583	210	1.7
Washington ...	10,292	10,115	177	1.7
<u>Region XII</u> ....	125,536	64,888	60,648	93.5
Colorado .....	16,008	9,269	6,739	72.7
Kansas .....	17,167	6,517	10,650	163.4
New Mexico ...	14,937	8,729	6,208	71.1
Oklahoma .....	8,287	1,402	6,885	491.1
Texas .....	69,137	38,971	30,166	77.4
<u>Region XIII</u> ....	0	0	0	.0
Puerto Rico ...	0	0	0	.0

1/ All tenant-purchase collections from variable-payment borrowers except refunds on loans, proceeds from sale or lease of mortgaged property, and payments in full or repossessed farms.

2/ Amounts which would have matured on all tenant-purchase loans held by variable-payment borrowers which would retire the loan in 40 years at 3 percent interest.

To begin with, tenant-purchase borrowers are so greatly in need of better tools, equipment, livestock, clothing, household furniture, etc., that there is an almost overpowering impulse to use money available to correct these deficiencies rather than to pay ahead of schedule on the tenant-purchase debts. In a certain county, for example, there were 22 tenant-purchase borrowers who estimated that they would have gross incomes totaling \$29,000 in 1941. They actually had incomes totaling \$47,709. They did not, as might be assumed, see the wisdom of transferring to the variable-payment plan and applying at least a portion of their extra earnings to getting ahead of schedule on their tenant-purchase loans.

Contrast this with the case of a group of borrowers in another county who planned at the beginning of the year to pay \$4,421 in 1941 on their tenant-purchase debts. Income exceeded expectations and they actually paid \$20,111. They were variable-payment borrowers and in the aggregate they built up a \$15,680 margin of safety on their real estate debts in a single year.

Farm Security Administration tabulated quite complete data on 13,942 borrowers at the end of 1941. The farm plans made at the beginning of the year for these borrowers contemplated an average gross income per borrower of \$1,642. The actual income was \$2,031 or 24 percent above the estimates. The farm-operating expenses were 28 percent greater than the estimates and the cash family living expenses were 21 percent greater than the estimates. As the year 1941 was a year of rising prices neither of these increases can be considered much out of line.

The significant fact, however, is that the borrowers increased their capital expenditures 91 percent over the amounts planned for such purposes. In this figure is involved the human element upon which the success or failure of the variable-payment plan rests. It must be remembered, of course, that desirable and justifiable alterations in farm and home plans are authorized at any time to meet changing conditions. If this were not so, plans would be intolerable "straight jackets" inviting either violation or rebellion among borrowers. In speaking of increased capital expenditures, I am speaking in general of expenditures that should, in keeping with the spirit of the variable-payment plan, have been discussed and authorized before they were made.

The figures quoted up to this point relate to variable-payment borrowers only. The actual payments of principal and interest of all tenant-purchase borrowers, fixed and variable, up to December 31, 1941, amounted to \$8,153,380. This is \$640,045 or 8.5 percent ahead of what would have been paid by all borrowers at the annual amortization rate of 4.326. In other words, all borrowers disregarding \$1,633,536 of extra payments were 8.5 percent ahead of schedule. The 1941 record for all borrowers, including fixed and variable, was the payment of \$5,090,412 principal and interest, which was \$1,034,872 ahead of schedule, or 25.5 percent. When the non-real-estate as well as the real estate payments are taken into account \$10,092,100 was due to be paid against all these debts. Delinquencies which were more than offset by the payments ahead of schedule by nondelinquent borrowers amounted to \$532,530 or 5.3 percent.

As the extra payments are large, a word of comment about them may be appropriate. They include refunds on unused portions of loans. They also include proceeds from sales of mortgaged property, and extra payments made out of income by fixed-payment borrowers who enjoy no offsets against future amounts due even when they make these extra payments. In other words, if a borrower desires to avail himself of the benefits of the variable-payment arrangement, he is also required to accept the obligations. The fixed-payment borrowers accept no obligations to pay more in good years; their scheduled amounts are not reduced in bad years.

Let us turn now from the statistical record and consider what the Farm Security Administration variable-payment plan is in some detail and what some of the significant problems are that have arisen in working it out:

The plan contemplates that net cash income above family-living and farm-operating expenses and chattel depreciation offset shall be applied to debt retirement. Repair and maintenance of buildings, taxes, insurance, etc., are all classed as allowable farm-operating expenses. Such a net cash income plan is made possible by the fact that each tenant-purchase borrower keeps a family record book in which the income from all sources and family-living, farm-operating, and other expenses are recorded. If the borrower has no cash income after meeting family-living and farm-operating expenses as above defined, he makes no payment whatsoever on his tenant-purchase debt. This suggests that borrowers need to keep their family-living and farm-operating expenses within reasonable bounds. In the absence of careful planning, the family income might be "lived up," leaving little or nothing for debt retirement.

The farm and home plan prepared with the family sets up reasonable allowances for family living and farm operations. An income and expense report is submitted at the end of the year by each borrower. Reasonable deviations from the planned expenditures are, of course, allowed, but unreasonable expenditures are not allowed, and each borrower is fully advised with respect to this policy. If he spends his income for unplanned purposes, he may be billed for the amount he could have paid if he had not made the unauthorized expenditures.

The county supervisor of the Farm Security Administration checks over the borrower's annual income return and determines what the annual payment should be. In case of dispute between the borrower and the supervisor as to this amount, the tenant-purchase county committee, consisting of three farmers, is called in for consultation and they file their recommendations with the regional director of the Farm Security Administration who determines what the payment shall be. Disputes have very seldom arisen. The facts in the case are that borrower and creditor are working together to achieve a common purpose which is distinctly in the borrower's interest.

In its instruction on the variable-payment plan, the Farm Security Administration states its basic policy in these words: "In carrying out the provisions of a variable payment plan it is not the intention of the Farm Security Administration to deprive any borrower of the privilege of

utilizing the full period agreed upon for the retirement of his debt. On the contrary the aim is merely to assist the borrower in creating a margin of safety to protect his loan at all times against delinquency." An effort is made to get two payments ahead as quickly as possible; that is, as quickly as possible consistent with good husbandry, attaining Food for Freedom goals, and maintaining acceptable standards of living. After the 2-year margin of safety is attained, the check on the borrower's expenditures for family living and farm operating is greatly relaxed.

Until July 1, 1941, each borrower obtaining a tenant-purchase loan was permitted to choose between a fixed and a variable plan of repayment. While the optional arrangement prevailed about half chose the fixed-payment plan and half chose the variable-payment plan.

By 1941, evidences were overwhelming that borrowers needed the benefits of a flexible repayment schedule. Therefore, all borrowers obtaining loans after July 1, 1941, have been required to sign the variable-payment agreement.

Experience has demonstrated the necessity of a rather definite formula for determining how the borrower's income which remains after family-living and farm-operating expenses have been met should be distributed as between building up operating capital, repayment of chattel debts, repayment of real estate debts, and expanding operations through the purchase of livestock, tools, equipment, etc.

The figures quoted earlier show strong tendencies to use the surplus income for capital investments. It is easy to understand this tendency. The grain farmer feels that if he has a combine harvester he will be in a much better position to operate for all his remaining years. A dairyman feels that by investing in a milking machine he can reduce his labor costs. It is hard for any borrower to pay his tenant-purchase principal and interest installment in January when he needs money with which to make a crop in March or April. True, he may have been in the habit of operating on borrowed capital in the past, but he just hates to apply money in hand toward the payment of a real estate debt and then turn around in a few weeks and borrow operating capital. Of course, if a borrower should defer his real estate debt payments until all other wants are fully satisfied, a variable-payment plan simply would not work. So there must be some rules for resolving these conflicting interests.

Not only borrowers but supervisors who represent the Farm Security Administration are in need of principles to guide them in making wise decisions on questions of this character.

The Farm Security Administration has therefore issued instructions designed to clarify its collection policy. In a general way they establish collection priorities; that is, they tell what comes first and what comes next in debt-paying obligations. This is done with the very explicit understanding that no formula can be a substitute for the exercise of sound judgment in dealing with these perplexing questions of money management. The following are pertinent paragraphs from the Farm Security Administration instruction on this subject:

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"For variable payment borrowers, income remaining after family living and farm operating expenses have been met should be applied:

- (1) First, to pay annual installments on chattel or other old debts, including agreed payments on adjusted debts. Such installments should be adjusted reasonably to cover the useful life of the chattels. If the current installment on old debts is less than the estimated amount of chattel depreciation, an expenditure for new chattels, if needed, in an amount sufficient to make the combined outlay for old debts and new chattels roughly equivalent to chattel depreciation may be allowed. If there are no chattel or other old debts, an expenditure for new chattels, if needed, roughly equivalent to chattel depreciation may be allowed.
- (2) Second, to pay the scheduled annual installments of principal and interest on real estate debt or to bring the borrower up to schedule when he is behind schedule on such debts.
- (3) Third, the remaining income should go to--
  - (a) get the borrower ahead of schedule on his real estate debt; or
  - (b) speed up the retirement of the chattel or other old debts; or
  - (c) build up cash operating capital so that less money will have to be borrowed for this purpose; or
  - (d) buy war bonds or make capital investments necessary to increase food production or that will result in sound and justifiable expansion of operations or improve living conditions."

"Since the payment of the annual installment of principal and interest on the real estate debt is last in the priority of fixed current debt obligations, it will naturally be the unpaid debt when there is not enough income to meet all fixed debt obligations. The real estate debt, therefore, under the variable payment plan, should be the first to benefit when income exceeds the amount required to meet approved family living and farm operating expenses plus other fixed annual debt obligations. The aim should be to work toward getting and maintaining the real estate debt at least two years ahead of schedule by larger payments in good years. This may be done in a single very good year or in three or four somewhat better than average years."

Before the reader of the above instructions can interpret them correctly it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the collection policy dovetails in with the Farm and Home Management Plan, in which adequate provision is made for operating the farm to its maximum capacity, with stress placed upon war necessities. Necessary family-living and farm-operating expenses come first. In the long run this is thought to be a sound collection policy.

The reader may be impressed in these wartimes by the low position which the purchase of war bonds occupies in the priority list. It appears, however, in the first general category after scheduled debt payments are made. This is in harmony with the general theory that meeting scheduled debt obligations is a first lien on income and that purchase of war bonds is a first lien on savings. The above formula is applied to borrowers who owe a debt to the Federal Government. When payments on this debt are made as scheduled they go into the Government's treasury and serve as good a purpose as income derived from the sale of war stamps and bonds. The borrower can, however, under the above formula, buy war savings stamps and war bonds as well as meet his fixed debt obligations.

The year 1942 promises to be the present generation's all-time high in debt-paying ability. Farm Security Administration is hoping for and expecting larger payments ahead of schedule in 1942 than in 1941. If the goals are reached according to present prospects, the fact that farm purchasers can, under the variable-payment arrangement, build up a margin of safety that will tide them over bad years and prevent their loans from getting in arrears will have been demonstrated.

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War damage insurance.— Since July 1, 1942, farmers may, at a small cost, insure their farm properties against loss or damage resulting from enemy attack or from action by our own military forces in resisting attack. The coverage, which is purely voluntary, may be obtained through insurance companies or their agents which are authorized to act for the War Damage Corporation. A farmer may insure his property and buildings (and their contents) for 10 cents per \$100 or insure his crops and orchards for 5 cents per \$100. A minimum premium of \$3 per policy applies to farm property insured for less than \$3,000 and to crops and orchards insured for less than \$6,000. If he elects coverage under both policies, there is a minimum charge of \$6. The agent who completed the application is allowed 5 percent of the premium payment, with a minimum fee of \$1 per policy. An additional  $3\frac{1}{2}$  percent goes to the company which issued the policy, with a minimum fee of 50 cents per policy. Several crops maturing at the same time or at different times, may be covered under one policy, but the maximum term of one policy is 1 year. A farmer may take any amount of insurance up to the full value of his property or crops. In case of a loss or damage, he need not bear a part of the loss himself. In case of a loss due to damage, the farmer will file a claim with his insurance company which through its claim adjustment business will investigate the claim and report to the War Damage Corporation for payment or further investigation.

## FARM-MORTGAGE DEBT CONTINUES TO DECLINE DURING 1941

Farm-mortgage debt for the United States as a whole continued to decline during the calendar year 1941 and reached the lowest level for any year since 1918. The total as of January 1, 1942 is estimated to be \$6,713,835,000, or \$110,291,000 below the total at the beginning of 1941 (table 1). Loans on farm real estate outstanding at the beginning of 1942 were only about 78 percent of the amount held at the beginning of 1933 and about 62 percent of the peak amount on January 1, 1923.

The greatest decline in farm-mortgage debt during 1941 occurred in the North Central States, the Mountain States, and the South Atlantic States where debt reduction was 2 percent or more of the amount outstanding at the beginning of 1941 (appendix table 5). In several States - North Dakota, Kansas, Wyoming, and Tennessee - debt reduction exceeded 4 percent of the amount outstanding at the beginning of 1941.

A further small increase in farm-mortgage debt occurred in the New England States, the rise being only 0.6 percent as compared with an increase of 1.4 percent in 1940. Individual States showing increases of 2 percent or more were New Hampshire, Delaware, and Connecticut.

Among the factors contributing toward debt reduction in 1941, principal repayments continued to be the most important, showing a substantial increase over the previous year. For instance, the Federal land banks and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation reported repayments amounting to \$128,704,000 and \$76,373,000 respectively, representing an increase over the preceding year of 32.1 percent and 24.8 percent. The improved income position of the farmer undoubtedly has been reflected in increased payments to other lenders also. Continued low interest rates have contributed somewhat to the ability of the farmer to repay debts, although these same low rates may also have provided an incentive for some farmers to increase their debts (fig. 1). Forced sales and related defaults have continued to decline with a corresponding decrease in their importance as a factor in debt reduction. For the year ended March 15, 1942, they were estimated to be 9.3 per 1,000 farms as compared with 13.9 per 1,000 for the previous year. Farm-debt adjustment likewise had less influence on the trend of farm-mortgage indebtedness than in previous years.

Certain factors tending to increase farm-mortgage debt were more active during 1941 than in the previous year, but were not substantial enough to offset the factors tending to decrease the total debt. Increased activity in land transfers was reflected in loans closed and mortgages recorded by principal lender groups. Total recordings amounted to \$834,000,000 in 1941 as compared with \$772,500,000 in 1940. Voluntary sales and trades of farms for the 12 months ended March 15, 1942 were estimated to be 41.7 per 1,000 of all farms as compared with the 1941 figure of 34.1 per 1,000. This

increased activity was also reflected in land values which increased 7 percent during the 12 months ended March 1, 1942. Farm real estate inventories of the principal lending agencies decreased considerably during 1941 as the volume of sales increased. The Federal land banks and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation reduced their combined real estate holdings 31.6 percent and life insurance companies reduced theirs 11.3 percent. Thus, the farm real estate held by these agencies, the acquisition of which had previously reduced farm debts, again was replaced in many cases by farm mortgages.

The combined farm-mortgage holdings of the Federal land banks and the Land Bank Commissioner amounted to \$2,350,346,000, or approximately 35 percent of the total farm-mortgage debt on January 1, 1942 (table 1). The amount held by these agencies was approximately 6 percent under the previous year and accounted for much of the reduction of the total debt during 1941. Loans of the Federal land banks accounted for about three-fourths of the total loans of these agencies. Mortgage loans held by the Federal land banks amounted to \$1,755,233,000 on January 1, 1942 as compared with \$1,841,572,000 at the beginning of 1941, a decrease of approximately 5 percent. Farm-mortgage loans held by the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation were reduced almost 8 percent from \$646,660,000 on January 1, 1941 to \$595,112,000 on January 1, 1942.

A decrease of 1.5 percent occurred in the farm-mortgage investments of insured commercial banks during 1941 after showing increases in each year since 1936. These investments on January 1, 1942 were \$535,212,000 as compared with \$543,408,000 at the beginning of 1941, and represented approximately 8 percent of the total farm-mortgage debt.

The joint stock land banks continued to reduce their loan accounts as liquidation of these organizations has progressed. As in earlier years, the liquidation process has involved some transfers of loans to other lending agencies. During 1941 their holdings decreased approximately 31 percent and on January 1, 1942 amounted to only \$33,441,000, or less than 1 percent of the total farm-mortgage debt. By January 1, 1941 liquidation of their farm-mortgage loans had been completed in five States and during 1942 liquidation was completed in three additional States. A miscellaneous group of lenders classified as "others" also reported a slight decrease in their farm-mortgage portfolios during 1941. In addition to individual lenders, this group includes mortgage companies, State credit agencies, and miscellaneous lenders. The State credit agencies of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota, combined, showed a net decrease in their farm-debt holdings; however, the Rural Credit Board of South Dakota reported an increase as a result of purchase-money mortgages acquired in the disposal of their farm real estate inventories.

For the second successive year, life insurance companies increased their investment in farm mortgages. On January 1, 1942 this lender group held 13.5 percent of the total farm-mortgage debt, or \$907,141,000, the largest amount since January 1, 1937. Approximately three-fourths of the mortgage debt held by these companies was located in the North Central States. Insurance companies increased their farm-mortgage holdings in all geographical areas except the East South Central and Pacific areas, where slight decreases occurred.

Table 1.— Total farm-mortgage debt and amounts held by selected lender groups,  
United States, January 1, for selected years, 1910-42<sup>1/</sup>

Year	Total farm-mortgage debt <u>1,000 dollars</u>	Federal land bank and Land Bank Commissioner <u>1,000 dollars</u>	Joint stock land banks <sup>2/</sup> <u>1,000 dollars</u>	Life insurance companies <u>1,000 dollars</u>	Banks <sup>3/</sup> <u>1,000 dollars</u>		Farm Security Administration <sup>4/</sup> <u>1,000 dollars</u>	Others <sup>5/</sup> <u>1,000 dollars</u>
					Banks <sup>3/</sup> <u>1,000 dollars</u>	Farm Security Administration <sup>4/</sup> <u>1,000 dollars</u>		
1910	3,207,863				386,961	406,248		2,414,654
1915	4,990,785				669,984	746,111		3,574,690
1920	8,448,772	296,386	60,038	974,826	1,204,383		5,913,139	
1925	9,912,650	923,077	446,429	1,942,624	1,200,456		5,400,064	
1930	3,630,768	1,185,765	626,980	2,105,477	997,468		4,715,078	
1935	7,785,971	2,501,824	255,931	1,258,900	498,842		3,270,474	
1936	7,638,867	2,853,966	175,677	1,054,770	487,505		3,066,949	
1937	7,389,797	2,888,912	133,499	936,454	487,534		2,943,398	
1938	7,214,138	2,835,962	104,163	895,470	501,450	3,615	2,873,478	
1939	7,070,896	2,723,022	87,362	887,336	519,276	15,169	2,838,731	
1940	6,909,794	2,583,901	65,719	883,414	534,170	38,565	2,804,025	
1941	6,824,126	2,488,232	48,766	890,516	543,408	72,538	2,780,666	
1942	6,713,835	2,350,346	33,441	907,141	535,212	119,811	2,767,884	

<sup>1/</sup> Excludes Territories and possessions.

<sup>2/</sup> Includes joint stock land banks in receivership.


<sup>3/</sup> 1935-42, insured commercial banks; prior to 1935, open State and national banks.

<sup>4/</sup> Includes loans for construction of farmstead improvements and tenant purchase and development.

<sup>5/</sup> Includes individuals, State credit agencies, mortgage companies, and other miscellaneous lenders.

APR 27 1942  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

CASH FARM INCOME, FARM-MORTGAGE DEBT, AND VALUE PER ACRE OF  
FARM REAL ESTATE, INDEX NUMBERS, UNITED STATES, 1910-42



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

NEG. 38014

BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

FIGURE I

Farm-mortgage loans by the Farm Security Administration expanded substantially during 1941, the increase amounting to more than 65 percent of the amount outstanding at the beginning of the year. On January 1, 1942 these mortgage loans totaled \$119,811,000. Farm real estate loans made by this organization were largely tenant-purchase and development loans, but the figures also include loans made for the construction of farmstead improvements.

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\*           **FARM REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS OF LENDING AGENCIES SHOW SUBSTANTIAL**

\*           **REDUCTION DURING 1941**

\*           **\*\*\*\*\***

Increased sales combined with reduced requirements during 1941 resulted in a substantial net reduction in the farm real estate inventories of the principal lending agencies. The book value of their farm real estate holdings amounted to \$791,081,000 on January 1, 1942 as compared with \$938,-225,000 a year earlier, a reduction of almost 16 percent (table 1). During 1940 the decrease was only 7 percent.

Life insurance companies continued to be the most important single holder of farm real estate. On January 1, 1942 it is estimated that their investment in farms totaled \$597,796,000, or approximately 11 percent less than at the beginning of 1941. The reduction from their peak holdings on January 1, 1937 was approximately 16 percent. In comparing the book value of farm real estate held by life insurance companies with that of other lending agencies, it should be kept in mind that the insurance company figures include the book value of farms sold under contract of sale. No complete data are available as to the amount of these contracts, but information for some of the larger companies indicates that on January 1, 1942 about one-fifth of their farm real estate holdings consisted of farms already sold under contract. This proportion compares with about one-eighth on January 1, 1939 and about one-twelfth at the beginning of 1935.

The combined investment in acquired farm real estate by the Federal land banks and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (excluding contracts) amounted to \$91,816,000 on January 1, 1942. This is \$42,364,000 less than their investment a year previous, a decrease of 31.6 percent. The Federal land banks' investment in farm real estate amounted to \$73,599,767 on January 1, 1942 as compared with \$109,066,459 a year earlier. During 1941, 12,473 farms (in whole and part) were disposed of by the Federal land banks as compared with 11,170 during 1940. Only 14,578 farms and sheriffs' certificates were held at the end of 1941 as compared with 21,337 held at the end of 1940. The Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation had an investment of \$18,216,702 in 5,204 farms and sheriffs' certificates at the end of 1941 as compared with \$25,113,358 in 7,503 farms and sheriffs' certificates a year earlier.

Joint stock land banks (in liquidation) reduced their farm real estate inventories 30.5 percent from the amount held at the beginning of 1941. The investment on January 1, 1942 amounted to \$25,130,000 as compared with \$36,172,000 a year earlier. The peak investment in farm real estate by joint stock land banks was reached in 1934 when the investment amounted to \$85,740,000. Farm real estate held by insured commercial banks declined 31.6 percent during 1941, the investment decreasing from \$33,373,000 on January 1, 1941 to \$22,841,000 on January 1, 1942. Since data on farm real estate holdings of commercial banks became available in 1936 a decrease has occurred during each year.

The three State credit agencies - Department of Rural Credit of Minnesota, Bank of North Dakota, and Rural Credit Board of South Dakota - as a group, continued to reduce their farm real estate inventories during 1941. One of the agencies, the Bank of North Dakota, however, increased its investment in farm real estate during the year.

Table 1.- Acquired farm real estate held by selected lending agencies,  
agencies, January 1, 1930-42

Year	Federal land banks and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation 1/	Life in- surance companies 2/	Joint stock land banks 3/	Insured commercial banks 4/	Three State credit agencies 5/
	1,000 dol.	1,000 dol.	1,000 dol.	1,000 dol.	1,000 dol.
1930	29,517	120,020	19,685	6/	26,860
1931	36,865	151,229	22,202	6/	33,511
1932	53,588	219,947	37,957	6/	39,008
1933	83,158	316,931	71,741	6/	47,454
1934	96,632	465,072	85,740	6/	56,094
1935	96,666	600,873	81,700	6/	60,270
1936	119,864	646,280	78,204	1/ 74,166	61,531
1937	134,754	713,166	72,781	69,525	68,444
1938	132,038	705,207	62,030	56,311	72,040
1939	139,229	702,861	53,885	49,143	71,846
1940	155,237	700,530	46,827	42,045	68,324
1941	134,180	673,600	36,172	33,373	5/ 60,900
1942	91,816	597,796	25,130	22,841	53,498

1/ Investment. Includes sheriffs' certificates and judgments, but excludes prior liens. Excludes Puerto Rico.

2/ Investment - partially estimated. Includes farm real estate sold under contract of sale.

3/ Carrying value. Includes sheriffs' certificates and judgments. Real estate held by banks in receivership included at book value.

4/ Book value.

5/ Investment. Department of Rural Credit of Minnesota, Bank of North Dakota, and Rural Credit Board of South Dakota.

6/ Data unavailable. 1/ June 30. 5/ Revised.

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\* FARM-MORTGAGE RECORDINGS SHOW SLIGHT DECLINE \*  
\* \*\*\*\*\*

Farm-mortgage recordings of all lenders during the first 6 months of 1942 were \$146,900,000 as compared with \$152,500,000 in the same period of 1941, according to estimates by the Farm Credit Administration (table 1). This decrease of \$5,600,000 was the first to occur since the first 6 months of 1939 when mortgage recordings were \$2,800,000 smaller than in the first half of 1938. Slightly more than one-half of the total amount of farm mortgages placed on record during the first 6 months of 1942 were recorded in the North Central States and approximately one-fifth in the South Central States.

Loans closed by the Federal land banks and the Land Bank Commissioner in the first half of 1942 amounted to \$53,900,000, which is a decrease of approximately 10 percent from the total for the first half of 1941. Approximately two-thirds of this amount represented loans closed by the Federal land banks. Farm mortgages recorded by commercial banks also declined about 10 percent; for the first 6 months of 1942 their recordings totaled \$108,300,000 as compared with \$119,100,000 during the same months of 1941.

Increases in farm-mortgage recordings occurred in the case of three lender groups. Life insurance companies showed the greatest increase with approximately 5 percent more recordings in the first half of 1942 than in the same period of 1941. Total recordings by life insurance companies for the first 6 months of the year have increased each year since 1934; for the first half of 1942 their recordings amounted to \$97,300,000 compared with only \$20,800,000 for the first half of 1934. Individuals increased their recordings 3.3 percent, having recorded \$135,600,000 in the first 6 months of 1942 as compared with \$131,100,000 for the same period in 1941. Miscellaneous lenders recorded mortgages amounting to \$51,800,000 during the first half of 1942, which is a 3.2 percent increase over recordings in the comparable period of 1941.

In recent years each lender group has remained in approximately the same relative position with respect to the volume of its mortgage recordings. For the first half of 1942, individuals recorded 30 percent of the total recordings, whereas commercial banks accounted for 24 percent, insurance companies 22 percent, Federal land banks and the Land Bank Commissioner 12 percent, and miscellaneous lenders 12 percent. Since 1938 only small changes have occurred in the percentage distribution of mortgages recorded by lender groups. In the first half of 1938 individuals accounted for approximately 33 percent of the total recordings, commercial banks 28 percent, insurance companies 19 percent, Federal land banks and Land Bank Commissioner 12 percent, and miscellaneous lenders 8 percent.

In comparing the relative importance of a lender group in one year with another year, it should be kept in mind that a small shift in the proportion of all recordings accounted for by that lender does not necessarily

indicate that there has been little or no change in the absolute amount. In years in which total recordings of all lenders increase, for instance, any lender group may account for a smaller proportion even though it has increased the absolute amount of its recordings. Also the volume of mortgages recorded does not necessarily reflect the amount of mortgages held by a lender group. Some lenders, such as banks and individuals, make loans for short terms of years and consequently a large proportion of the mortgages they record are renewals of existing loans. Banks, for example, recorded approximately 25 percent of the mortgages placed on record during the first half of 1942; whereas, on January 1, 1942 they held less than 10 percent of the total debt outstanding. On the other hand, Federal land banks and the Land Bank Commissioner recorded only 12 percent of the mortgages; but held 35 percent of the total debt outstanding.

Table 1.- Amount of Federal land bank and Land Bank Commissioner loans closed, and estimated amount of farm mortgages recorded by other lenders, by 6-month periods, 1934-42

Year and period	Loans closed 1/		Estimated amount of mortgages recorded 2/					Total all lenders
	Federal land banks	Land Bank Commis- sioner	Indi- viduals	Commer- cial banks	Insur- ance com- panies	Miscel- lanous	Total	
	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	
1934								
Jan.-June	433.0	309.9	115.8	56.6	20.8	45.1	238.3	981.2
July-Dec.	297.1	243.1	103.8	54.3	24.9	35.7	218.7	758.9
1935								
Jan.-June	151.8	125.0	141.3	85.0	37.6	36.7	300.6	577.4
July-Dec.	95.8	70.9	116.5	79.9	38.8	35.0	270.2	436.9
1936								
Jan.-June	67.9	48.1	134.9	94.0	56.6	36.2	321.7	437.7
July-Dec.	40.7	28.8	120.4	92.1	58.5	24.2	295.2	364.7
1937								
Jan.-June	36.3	23.4	145.3	116.7	69.4	27.1	358.5	418.2
July-Dec.	26.5	16.3	117.6	96.1	58.8	24.2	296.7	339.5
1938								
Jan.-June	28.9	16.8	131.7	108.9	74.5	30.8	345.9	391.6
July-Dec.	22.4	12.3	102.4	101.1	62.9	30.5	296.9	331.6
1939								
Jan.-June	28.6	15.3	122.1	112.5	74.5	35.8	344.9	388.8
July-Dec.	22.9	11.9	104.6	105.3	63.5	32.0	305.4	340.2
1940								
Jan.-June	32.8	18.2	119.5	116.3	86.0	40.8	362.6	413.6
July-Dec.	31.1	18.2	106.1	103.6	59.5	40.4	309.6	358.9
1941								
Jan.-June	38.0	21.8	131.1	119.1	92.6	50.2	393.0	452.8
July-Dec.	26.7	15.6	116.5	102.2	67.8	52.4	338.9	381.2
1942								
Jan.-June	34.8	19.1	135.6	108.3	97.3	51.8	393.0	446.9

1/ Excludes Puerto Rico.

2/ Based on reports from counties including from 31 to 49 percent of the farms in the United States.

**LOAN OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL LAND BANKS AND THE  
FEDERAL FARM MORTGAGE CORPORATION**

Operations of both the Federal land banks and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation during the year ended September 30, 1942 have been characterized by the continued decline of the unpaid balance of their farm-mortgage loans. On September 30, 1942 the total of loans outstanding for these agencies was only \$2,207,000,000 as contrasted to \$2,411,000,000 a year earlier. These figures, however, do not include purchase-money mortgages or sales contracts which have increased somewhat as a result of a more favorable market for their real estate holdings. Purchase-money mortgages on September 30, 1942 for both agencies totaled about \$54,782,000 compared with \$54,284,000 on the same date a year earlier, and real estate sales contracts and notes receivable went up from \$76,168,000 to \$84,170,000 during that year. The decrease in outstanding loans reflects not only a general decrease in the amount of new loans made but of even more importance, increased principal repayments.

### Loans Closed

In the first three quarters ended September 30, 1942, new loans closed by the two agencies were \$15,144,943 less than for the same quarters of 1941, a decrease of 17.6 percent. As long as farmers' incomes remain high, principal repayments may be in sufficient volume to continue the downward trend in outstanding loans for some time.

### Principal Repayments

Principal repayments in the first three quarters of 1942 show substantial increases over the same period of 1941, totaling \$197,304,000 and \$138,561,000 in these two respective periods. This increase is even more significant in view of the reduction which occurred in outstanding loans. The principal repayments in the first three quarters of 1942 were 8.4 percent of loans outstanding at the beginning of the year, whereas such payments in the corresponding period of 1941 were only 5.6 percent of loans outstanding.

Other evidences of the increased debt payments are the decreased delinquencies of both interest and principal and increased amounts of advance payments made by borrowers. On September 30, 1942 the amount of delinquent installments, advances, etc. for both agencies was only \$27,050,000 as compared with \$38,266,000 on September 30, 1941. Between these same two dates,

borrower funds held by these two agencies in the form of trust accounts<sup>1/</sup> and as payments received from borrowers on unmatured items<sup>2/</sup> increased from \$12,509,000 to \$25,990,000. The increase in advance payments stems largely from the policy inaugurated by the Farm Credit Administration (in September 1941 for the Federal land banks and January 1942 for the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation) of paying interest on certain prepayments at the same rate as is charged on the borrowers' indebtedness. While these prepayments, identified as "conditional payments," are included in the total of trust accounts and advanced payments on unmatured items mentioned above, they are of sufficient current interest, because of the amended policy, to be considered further.

The Farm Credit Act of 1937 authorized the Federal land banks to accept conditional payments from borrowers, but only \$412,600 of these payments was held by the banks on September 30, 1941; by September 30, 1942, however, the amount held was \$10,596,000 (table 1). During the first 9 months of 1942 the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation received \$1,690,000 in conditional payments and of this amount \$1,383,000 was still outstanding on September 30, 1942.<sup>3/</sup>

In addition to the acceptance of conditional payments from borrowers, the banks provide means whereby some loans may be repaid on a variable-payment basis, which encourages increased payments by farmers on their indebtedness in years of high incomes and permits reduced payments in periods of low income. Current records of the Farm Credit Administration, however, do not provide a comparison of the amount of payments made by borrowers on this basis with that which would have matured had the fixed amortization plan been in effect.

#### Real Estate Activities

As mentioned previously there has been, during the last fiscal year, a substantial increase in purchase-money mortgages and sales contracts held by the Federal land banks and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. On September 30, 1941 they had an investment in real estate, sheriffs' certificates, etc. amounting to \$108,000,000. On September 30, 1942 these items amounted to only \$62,817,000, a drop of more than 40 percent. This drop represents the net effect of acquiring fewer farms during the period and selling more of those already held. The investment in loans called for foreclosure, judgments, etc. on September 30, 1942 was only 67 percent of the investment in these items on September 30, 1941.

1/ This account represents funds collected from insurance companies on fire losses on properties securing loans, deposits made by purchasers in connection with pending real estate sales, and any other special payment received by the bank to be used for a specified purpose.

2/ These funds represent partial payments of either principal or interest on mortgages, contracts, notes, and extensions, which are received in advance of installment due dates.

3/ Conditional payments made during the month of October 1942 for these agencies amounted to \$1,932,000 and the amount outstanding at the end of that month was \$13,730,000.

Table 1.- Federal land banks and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation: Conditional payments received and outstanding

FEDERAL LAND BANKS

District	Received during September 1942 Dollars	Received Oct. 1 through Sept. 1942 Dollars		Outstanding September 30, 1941 Dollars	Outstanding September 30, 1942 Dollars
		1941	1942		
Springfield	36,677	200,267	3,544	174,830	
Baltimore	21,494	181,411	3,104	159,386	
Columbia	35,509	349,558	8,096	291,385	
Louisville	95,273	79,212	6,434	636,545	
New Orleans	13,764	264,449	4,827	199,173	
St. Paul	182,863	2,259,111	166,863	1,726,960	
St. Paul	105,521	1,118,906	7,595	979,344	
Omaha	302,402	3,136,738	88,885	2,638,574	
Wichita	125,803	1,077,834	49,465	726,871	
Houston	196,195	1,803,101	11,183	1,294,140	
Berkeley	108,029	899,355	19,000	698,923	
Spokane	260,183	1,340,482	41,566	1,069,453	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,489,713</b>	<b>13,395,424</b>	<b>412,562</b>	<b>10,595,584</b>	

FEDERAL FARM MORTGAGE CORPORATION

District	Received during September 1942 Dollars	Received Jan. 1, 1942 through September 1942 Dollars		Outstanding September 30, 1941 Dollars	Outstanding September 30, 1942 Dollars
		1942	1941		
Springfield	13,686	37,426		36,961	
Baltimore	6,728	27,350		24,051	
Columbia	31,419	100,411		93,141	
Louisville	25,200	96,925		73,999	
New Orleans	5,139	16,386		13,898	
St. Louis	62,435	220,972		158,991	
St. Paul	39,471	184,161		161,584	
Omaha	52,673	253,707		220,501	
Wichita	41,834	131,135		111,707	
Houston	54,169	262,948		183,008	
Berkeley	46,147	171,990		139,188	
Spokane	69,147	187,012		165,861	
<b>Total</b>	<b>448,148</b>	<b>1,690,423</b>		<b>1,382,890</b>	

Farm Credit Administration.

APR 27 1942  
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION

ADDITIONAL DATA ON FARM-MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES IN  
1940 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE

The Bureau of the Census has recently made available data on farm-mortgage interest rates collected in the Sixteenth Census of the United States. These data represent rates charged on the first-mortgage debt of owner-operated farms and were collected as of April 1, 1940. They are presented by States and regions.

The census report shows by States the total number of full owners and part owners reporting the amount of their mortgage debt and the rate of interest. All owner-operators reporting the rate of interest are classified by interest-rate groups. The data also show the unweighted average, the weighted average, and the median interest rate. In calculating the unweighted average and median interest rates, those reported as "none" or "0" were included. In computing the weighted average, each rate group was weighted by the total amount of farm-mortgage debt reported for that group, including the debt represented by junior liens.

In the use of these data certain of their characteristics need to be kept in mind. The census report states: "The enumerator was instructed to report the interest rate specified in the first mortgage even though a lower rate was temporarily in effect. The rate was to be the annual rate and was not to include amortization or principal payments, commissions, or other extra charges. Data relating to the rate of interest were tabulated only for farms for which the amount of debt was also reported."<sup>1</sup>

But it is pointed out that "although the inquiry on the schedule called for the contract rate of interest on the first-mortgage debt it is probable that, where a temporary rate was in effect, this temporary rate may have been reported in a number of instances."<sup>2/</sup> In some cases, for instance, the temporary rate of interest paid on Federal land bank and Land Bank Commissioner mortgages may have been reported rather than the contract rate. In other cases rates may have been reported which covered a period less than a year; some may have included amortization or principal payments, commissions, or other charges.

The average interest rates for the United States were: unweighted, 5.3 percent for full owners and 5.2 percent for part owners; weighted, 4.9 percent for both the full and the part owners; and median, 5.0 percent for both of the groups of owners. In general the high interest rate areas were found in the South and West and low interest rate areas were North Central, New England, and Middle Atlantic States, which is consistent with earlier findings.

1/ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census - 16th Census of the United States, 1940, chapter IV, volume III, General Report on Agriculture, p. 4. (See pp. 60 and 62 for statistical data.)

2/ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Table 1.- Interest rates on first-mortgage debt on farms operated by full owners and part owners, by States, April 1, 1940

State and division	Average interest rates						Percentage of farms with interest rates of 6.5 percent or over		
	Unweighted average 1/		Weighted average 2/		Median		Full owner	Part owner	All owners
	Full owner	Part owner	Full owner	Part owner	Full owner	Part owner	Percent	Percent	Percent
Maine . . . . .	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.2	6.0	6.0	3.8	4.2	3.8
New Hampshire . . . . .	5.1	4.9	5.0	4.8	5.0	5.0	.3	1.0	.3
Vermont . . . . .	5.2	5.1	5.1	4.9	5.0	5.0	.1	.0	.1
Massachusetts . . . . .	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.5	5.0	.8	.7	.8
Rhode Island . . . . .	5.2	5.2	5.0	4.9	5.0	6.0	2.1	2.2	2.1
Connecticut . . . . .	5.1	4.9	5.0	4.7	5.0	5.0	.3	.6	.4
New England . . . . .	5.2	5.1	5.1	4.9	5.0	5.0	1.2	1.2	1.2
New York . . . . .	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	.2	.1	.2
New Jersey . . . . .	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.5	5.0	.3	.5	.4
Pennsylvania . . . . .	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.1	5.5	5.0	.4	.3	.4
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.5	5.0	.3	.2	.3
Ohio . . . . .	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.0	6.0	5.0	6.9	4.5	6.6
Indiana . . . . .	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.8	5.0	5.0	4.6	3.8	4.4
Illinois . . . . .	5.0	5.0	4.6	4.6	5.0	5.0	9.7	9.5	9.7
Michigan . . . . .	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	9.7	8.8	9.6
Wisconsin . . . . .	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.6	5.0	5.0	2.1	1.8	2.0
East North Central . . . . .	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.7	5.0	5.0	6.1	5.9	6.1
Minnesota . . . . .	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	3.8	3.1	3.6
Iowa . . . . .	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	1.1	.9	1.1
Missouri . . . . .	5.7	5.5	5.2	5.2	6.0	5.5	20.2	14.2	18.9
North Dakota . . . . .	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.6	5.4	5.5
South Dakota . . . . .	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	5.0	5.0	3.2	3.1	3.1
Nebraska . . . . .	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.7	5.0	5.0	2.3	2.2	2.3
Kansas . . . . .	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.4	4.6
West North Central . . . . .	5.0	4.9	4.6	4.7	5.0	5.0	7.5	4.9	6.6
Delaware . . . . .	5.6	5.7	5.5	5.4	6.0	6.0	.2	.5	.2
Maryland . . . . .	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.2	6.0	6.0	.2	.1	.2
District of Columbia . . . . .	5.7	-	5.7	-	6.0	-	.0	.0	.0
Virginia . . . . .	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.1	6.0	6.0	.6	.7	.6
West Virginia . . . . .	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.1	6.0	6.0	1.6	2.6	1.7
North Carolina . . . . .	5.4	5.6	5.3	5.4	6.0	6.0	.7	1.0	.8
South Carolina . . . . .	5.6	5.7	5.2	5.2	5.5	6.0	25.2	30.6	28.5
Georgia . . . . .	5.7	6.0	5.3	5.4	5.5	6.0	30.1	36.4	30.9
Florida . . . . .	5.7	5.9	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.5	22.7	28.1	23.4
South Atlantic . . . . .	5.5	5.7	5.2	5.3	6.0	6.0	11.2	13.3	11.5
Kentucky . . . . .	5.5	5.6	5.0	5.1	6.0	6.0	6.1	8.3	6.4
Tennessee . . . . .	5.5	5.7	5.1	5.3	6.0	6.0	8.0	12.0	8.7
Alabama . . . . .	5.9	6.2	5.4	5.6	5.5	6.0	32.4	40.4	33.8
Mississippi . . . . .	5.6	5.8	5.2	5.4	5.5	6.0	15.4	18.4	15.6
East South Central . . . . .	5.6	5.8	5.1	5.3	6.0	6.0	15.0	20.1	15.7
Arkansas . . . . .	6.3	6.5	5.4	5.5	6.0	6.0	34.1	38.4	34.9
Louisiana . . . . .	6.0	6.2	5.5	5.6	6.0	6.0	32.9	40.3	33.9
Oklahoma . . . . .	5.2	5.1	4.9	4.8	5.0	5.0	14.8	11.9	13.6
Texas . . . . .	5.4	5.4	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	17.4	16.9	17.3
West South Central . . . . .	5.7	5.5	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	22.7	19.3	21.8
Montana . . . . .	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.0	12.8	11.0	11.9
Idaho . . . . .	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.0	11.1	9.2	10.7
Wyoming . . . . .	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.0	5.0	16.7	12.6	14.9
Colorado . . . . .	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.5	5.0	17.4	13.2	15.9
New Mexico . . . . .	5.9	5.7	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.0	26.2	21.8	24.4
Arizona . . . . .	5.5	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.5	15.6	16.0	15.7
Utah . . . . .	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.3	5.0	5.0	17.5	20.8	18.3
Nevada . . . . .	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.0	13.2	9.8	12.7
Mountain . . . . .	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.0	5.0	15.5	13.6	14.8
Washington . . . . .	5.4	5.2	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.0	13.0	9.9	12.5
Oregon . . . . .	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.0	5.0	10.2	8.1	9.8
California . . . . .	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.2	6.0	5.5	14.9	13.6	14.7
Pacific . . . . .	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.1	6.0	5.0	13.3	11.1	13.0
UNITED STATES . . . . .	5.3	5.2	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.0	9.8	9.4	9.7

1/ An arithmetic average of the interest rates reported.

2/ Calculated by weighting each rate by the total debt reported for farms reporting that rate.

Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce.

A further regrouping of the census data shows the percentage of farms reporting an interest rate of 6.5 percent or higher (table 1). Of all farms reporting the amount of mortgage debt, 9.7 percent were paying an interest rate of 6.5 percent or over on their first mortgages. Of the full owners reporting, 9.8 percent were in this interest-rate grouping as compared with 9.4 percent for the part owners.

As would be expected, the areas in which the over-all interest rates were high are largely the same areas in which the percentage of mortgage loans with rates of 6.5 percent and over was large (fig. 1). The West South Central area had 21.8 percent of its loans in the 6.5 percent and over rate group, which was the largest proportion in any geographical area. Arkansas and Louisiana, both in this area, had the largest percentages of loans in this classification for any State, the percentages being 34.9 for Arkansas and 33.9 for Louisiana. Other areas having a larger than average percentage of their mortgages in the high interest rate group were: East South Central with 15.7 percent; Mountain, 14.8 percent; Pacific, 13.0 percent; and South Atlantic, 11.5 percent.




Figure 1

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\* FARMER BANKRUPTCIES \*  
\* \*\*\*\*\*

The number of bankruptcy cases filed by farmers in the United States continued to decline during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1941, totaling 2,334 as compared with 2,622 in the previous fiscal year, according to reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (table 1). This decrease of 11 percent in farmer bankruptcies was in contrast to an increase of almost 9 percent in the number of cases filed by all occupational groups, which totaled 56,893 for the fiscal year 1941. As a result of these contrasting trends, farmer cases represented only 4.1 percent of all cases filed during the 12-month period ending June 30, 1941 as compared with 5.0 percent for the previous 12 months.

The number of cases filed by farmers varied considerably by States, ranging from only 1 case in New Mexico to 324 in California. Much of this variation, of course, is accounted for by differences between States in the number of farmers rather than in the proportion of farmers resorting to bankruptcy. The largest decreases in the number of cases filed were evident in California, Texas, Iowa, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Missouri. Although the total number of cases filed by farmers during the fiscal year 1941 was less than for 1940, increases were experienced in one-third of the States, the largest increases occurring in North Dakota, Ohio, North Carolina, and Kentucky.

Increases in the number of cases filed by all occupational groups were particularly noticeable in Ohio, Alabama, Illinois, New York, and Wisconsin. The proportion of cases accounted for by farmers ranged from less than 1 percent of all cases filed in several States to almost 85 percent in North Dakota. Other States with more than 25 percent of all cases filed by farmers were North Carolina, Texas, Arkansas, Nebraska, Delaware, South Dakota, and Iowa. Although during the fiscal year 1941 farmers as a whole accounted for a smaller proportion of all cases filed than in 1940, in one-third of the States they accounted for a larger proportion. In three of the States where farmer bankruptcies have been a large proportion of all cases filed - North Dakota, North Carolina, and Nebraska - this proportion rose still higher during the fiscal year 1941.

The number of cases handled under Section 75<sup>1/</sup> of the Bankruptcy Act also declined during the fiscal year 1941, totaling 1,599 as compared with 1,748 in 1940 (table 2). As in other years, a large part of the cases handled under this section were concluded by dismissal. Extensions were relatively more important than in previous years, numbering 117 as compared with 105 in 1940. The amount of debts extended, however, totaled only

1/ Section 75 provides for the composition and extension of farmers' debts, and Subsection 75 (s), otherwise known as the Frazier-Lemke Act, provides for a moratorium if a satisfactory settlement cannot be reached.

Table 1.- Number of bankruptcy cases filed by farmers compared with total of all bankruptcy cases filed, by States, years ending June 30, 1940-41

State and division	Farmer cases						Farmer cases						Farmer cases						Number	
	Total cases filed		Farmer cases filed		as a percentage of all cases		State and division		Total cases filed		Farmer cases filed		as a percentage of all cases		Number		Number		Farmer cases filed	
	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941	1940	1941
Maine	384	372	29	18	7.6	4.8	South Carolina	.....	41	36	5	2	12.7	5.6	4	4	1,720	1,721	87	74
New Hampshire	82	78	4	2	4.9	2.6	Georgia	.....	1,721	1,721	87	21	5.1	4.3			241	242	11	21
Vermont	146	145	18	11	12.3	7.6	Florida	.....	241	242	11	21	4.6	4.6			6,022	5,283	287	291
Massachusetts	1,233	1,366	4	11	3	7.8	South Atlantic	.....	6,022	5,283	287	291	4.8	5.2						
Rhode Island	167	200	4	3	2.4	1.5	Kentucky	.....	908	937	19	36	2.1	3.8						
Connecticut	695	861	4	7	6	1.8	Tennessee	.....	2,90	2,679	75	37	3.1	1.4			5,633	6,495	34	48
New England	2,707	3,022	63	52	2.3	1.7	Alabama	.....	5,633	6,495	34	34	6.6	7			156	185	21	34
New York	7,159	7,585	110	106	1.5	1.4	Mississippi	.....	9,087	10,226	149	152	13.5	18.4			2,907	10,226	149	152
New Jersey	1,336	1,484	29	24	2.2	1.6	East South Central	.....	1,827	1,702	424	424	1.6	1.2			1,827	1,702	424	424
Pennsylvania	919	812	47	49	5.1	6.0	Arkansas	.....	168	149	55	46	32.7	29.9			168	149	55	46
Middle Atlantic	9,474	9,881	186	179	2.0	1.8	Louisiana	.....	279	388	31	36	11.1	9.3			279	388	31	36
Ohio	5,503	6,632	94	120	1.7	1.8	Oklahoma	.....	787	665	126	126	16.0	14.3			787	665	126	126
Indiana	532	622	69	61	12.9	9.8	Texas	.....	593	500	212	163	35.8	32.6			593	500	212	163
Illinois	3,487	3,925	70	52	2.0	1.3	West South Central	.....	1,827	1,702	424	424	33.2	33.2			1,827	1,702	424	424
Michigan	2,185	2,479	31	38	1.4	2.8	Montana	.....	130	111	15	15	11.5	13.5			130	111	15	15
Wisconsin	1,048	1,328	45	43	4.3	3.0	Idaho	.....	100	84	23	10	23.0	11.5			100	84	23	10
East North Central	12,736	15,056	303	286	2.4	1.9	Wyoming	.....	90	77	3	3	3.3	3.9			90	77	3	3
Minnesota	889	1,069	45	32	5.1	3.0	Colorado	.....	564	674	24	20	4.3	3.6			564	674	24	20
Town	319	263	108	67	33.9	26.5	New Mexico	.....	45	62	2	1	4.4	1.6			45	62	2	1
Missouri	968	1,204	118	89	12.2	7.4	Arizona	.....	74	98	4	5	5.4	5.1			74	98	4	5
North Dakota	179	259	144	220	80.4	84.9	Utah	.....	203	222	32	39	15.8	17.6			203	222	32	39
South Dakota	38	30	11	8	28.9	26.7	Nevada	.....	25	21	1	2	4.0	9.5			25	21	1	2
Nebraska	252	222	72	66	28.6	29.7	Mountain	.....	1,231	1,349	104	95	8.4	7.0			1,231	1,349	104	95
Kansas	329	482	72	37	11.2	27.7	Washington	.....	1,017	1,134	63	66	6.2	5.8			1,017	1,134	63	66
West North Central	2,974	3,229	235	219	18.0	14.7	Oregon	.....	833	1,040	43	29	5.2	2.8			833	1,040	43	29
Delaware	42	37	12	10	28.6	27.0	California	.....	4,500	4,321	459	324	10.2	7.5			4,500	4,321	459	324
Maryland	222	144	20	9	9.0	6.2	Pacific	.....	6,350	6,495	565	419	8.9	6.2			6,350	6,495	565	419
District of Columbia	197	127	0	0	0	0	United States	.....	52,368	56,893	2,622	2,334	5.0	4.1			52,368	56,893	2,622	2,334
Virginia	2,415	2,552	41	48	1.7	2.2	Territories and possessions	1/	209	188	56	33	26.8	17.6			209	188	56	33
West Virginia	901	853	15	12	3.7	1.4														
North Carolina	263	271	96	115	36.5	42.4														

1/ Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

Table 2.- Number of cases concluded under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, by States, year ended June 30, 1941

State and division	Compo- nents: Exten- sions	Subsec. 75(a)	Cases disposed		Cases disposed		Total cases con- cluded
			Number	Number	Number	Number	
Total for 1936		237	352	1/	4,685	5,274	5
Total for 1937		116	100	2,455	5,671	0	6
Total for 1938		49	103	124	2,428	2,704	2
Total for 1939		78	108	103	2,309	2,598	96
Total for 1940		57	105	185	1,401	1,748	3
Total for 1941		28	117	142	1,312	1,599	42
Maine		0	0	0	0	0	2
New Hampshire		0	0	0	0	0	1
Vermont		0	0	0	0	0	1
Massachusetts		0	0	0	0	0	10
Rhode Island		0	0	0	0	0	12
Connecticut		0	0	0	0	0	13
New England		0	0	0	0	0	26
New York		4	6	2	26	38	44
New Jersey		0	0	0	3	3	10
Pennsylvania		0	2	8	37	47	115
Middle Atlantic		4	8	10	66	88	135
Ohio		2	1	27	42	72	1
Illinois		0	1	3	30	34	7
Michigan		0	2	5	21	27	2
Wisconsin		1	0	0	11	13	15
East North Central		3	5	36	115	159	304
Minnesota		1	1	0	31	33	4
Iowa		3	0	7	31	41	0
Missouri		0	1	6	118	126	0
North Dakota		0	0	0	54	62	0
South Dakota		0	0	0	2	2	0
Nebraska		0	0	0	75	75	0
Kansas		0	0	0	21	21	0
West North Central		4	2	22	332	360	388
Delaware		0	0	0	0	0	0
Maryland		0	0	0	0	0	0
							65
							65

1/ Included with "Other."

\$1,126,015, whereas in the year ending June 30, 1940 they aggregated \$2,812,-179. Twenty-eight compositions were concluded during the 12 months ending June 30, 1941, affecting debts of \$342,040 2/ and involving payments of \$192,937.2/ During the previous fiscal year 57 compositions were concluded, affecting debts of \$767,810 3/ and calling for payments of \$454,145.3/ In terms of debts and payments involved, compositions were more important in Puerto Rico than they were in the entire United States. In the 25 cases concluded in Puerto Rico, \$567,991 of debts were composed and \$224,472 paid or to be paid. This is considerably more than in the previous fiscal year. In addition to the compositions and extensions, 142 cases were handled under Subsection 75 (s),<sup>1/</sup> all in the United States. This compares with 185 in the fiscal year 1940.

Most of the cases concluded under Section 75 were in the West North Central, West South Central, and Pacific States, these regions accounting for about two-thirds of the total number. The compositions were fairly well distributed throughout the country, but the extensions were largely concentrated in California and North Carolina. States having a relatively large number of cases concluded under Subsection 75 (s) were Ohio, Oregon, California, and Texas.

2/ Excludes amounts for one case in the western district of Tennessee.  
3/ Excludes amounts for southern district of Indiana and for Utah.

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\*      FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION EXPANDS LAND-PURCHASE LOAN PROGRAM      \*  
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The Farm Security Administration in recent months has broadened its land-purchase program to include not only tenant-purchase loans, but also farm-enlargement and farm-development loans. The Tenant Purchase Division is now known as the Farm Ownership Division.

The purposes of the farm-ownership program, as listed by the Farm Security Administration,<sup>1/</sup> are to make loans to: "(1) promote more secure occupancy of farms and farm homes by families who derive the major portion of their income from farming operations; (2) correct the economic instability resulting from some present forms of farm tenancy; (3) preserve the family-type farm in America; and (4) correct maladjustments of population to the land which result in wasted manpower, impoverishment of land and people, and decline of rural civilization."

1/ Farm Security Administration Instruction 600.1, October 12, 1942.

Both the tenant-purchase loans and the farm-enlargement loans are made from funds obtained under Title I of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act. The farm-development loans are made from funds made available for loans, grants, and rural rehabilitation.

The purposes for which tenant-purchase, farm-enlargement, and farm-development loans can be made are summarized in the following paragraphs taken from the instructions of the Farm Security Administration:<sup>1/</sup>

Tenant-Purchase Loans.— These loans are made "to eligible persons who do not own farm land. The proceeds of TP loans may be used to: (1) purchase family-type farms; (2) make such repairs and improvements on such farms as may be necessary to meet established standards of health, comfort and convenience, and otherwise to put them in livable and operating condition; (3) pay all authorized fees and expenses incident to the acquisition of the farm purchased with the proceeds of the TP loans; and (4) in certain specially defined cases, purchase headquarters units which when combined with adjacent lands, dependably available for long-time lease, will constitute economic, family-type units."

Farm-Enlargement Loans.— These loans are made "to eligible persons who own farms which are definitely too small to support an average family according to acceptable living standards. The proceeds of FE loans may be used to: (1) Purchase sufficient additional land to enlarge such inadequate farms into economic, family-type units; (2) make such repairs and improvements to the enlarged farm unit as may be necessary to meet established standards of health, comfort and convenience, and otherwise to put the unit in good living and operating condition; ... (3) refinance existing debts on farms to be enlarged provided such refinancing is incidental to the main purpose of acquisition of a family-type farm, and provided less than half the loan is used for this purpose; ... (4) pay all authorized fees and expenses incident to the acquisition of the farm enlarged with the proceeds of the FE loan."

Farm-Development Loans.— These loans are made "to eligible persons who own farms which, if properly developed and financed, would constitute economic, family-type units. No land purchase will be permitted in connection with these loans. The proceeds of FD loans may be used to: (1) Effect such clearing of timber, brush, stump, or stony land, draining of wet land, irrigating of arid land, leveling of rough land, terracing of land subject to erosion, preparation of land for permanent pastures, woodlot or orchard development, or carrying out such other land improvements as will result in increasing the production and earning capacity of the farm and facilitate the rehabilitation of the borrower; (2) repair, improve, or construct dwellings or farm buildings in a manner conforming with stated standards of the FSA; (3) refinance existing debts on the farms to be developed in order that the FD loan may be secured by a first lien; (4) provide for the installation of farmstead water facilities wherever it is not possible or desirable to obtain funds for these facilities through the Water Facilities Program; (5) purchase an irrigation water right or shares of stock in an irrigation

<sup>1/</sup> Farm Security Administration Instruction 600.1, October 12, 1942.

company wherever it is not possible or desirable to obtain funds through the Water Facilities Program; (6) participate in or construct necessary land drainage facilities; (7) pay any authorized fees and expenditures incident to making the loan; (8) none of the proceeds of an FD loan shall be used to purchase or refinance machinery, tools, equipment, livestock, and similar items not generally considered appurtenances to the land."

Tenant-purchase loan advances from the beginning of the program through October 31, 1942, totaled \$157,065,000. Of this amount, \$147,965,000 was outstanding as of October 31, 1942. A year earlier total cumulative advances amounted to \$111,445,000, and the amount outstanding was \$107,368,-000. Now included within the category of farm-development loans are the special real estate loans and the farm-and-home-improvement loans formerly made by the Farm Security Administration. The total cumulative amount of advances on October 31, 1942 for these loans was \$5,007,000 and the amount outstanding on this date was \$4,861,000. The farm-enlargement loans program is very new, and by October 31, 1942, applications for these loans had been received in county offices from 300 farmers.

LENDING ACTIVITIES OF THE PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS 1/

Since our entrance into the war the 530 production credit associations now in operation have expanded their lending activities to comply with the increased credit needs of farmers and ranchers. They made 239,048 loans totaling 472.8 million dollars during the 12 months from October 1, 1941 to September 30, 1942 compared with 228,752 loans totaling 398.5 million in the preceding 12 months. In spite of these expanded lending activities, the amount of loans outstanding on September 30 increased only from 207.6 million to 224.9 million during these 12 months. This shows that the increase in repayments was proportionately even larger than the increase in new borrowings.

Quotations that follow are from a recent pamphlet of the Farm Credit Administration which describes the principles applied in making production credit association loans. "To set up a loan that will properly meet the applicant's individual requirements throughout a production period requires a careful farm-management analysis of the applicant's operation by someone who knows what is necessary to successfully carry on such a business. Major consideration must be given to the repayment ability of the farming business as indicated by a well-considered projection of necessary costs and probable income from which debts can be repaid without requiring the sale of chattels

1 Based largely on The Production Credit System, Farm Credit Administration, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Kansas City, Mo., Oct. 1942.

essential to the continuation of the business. The practical knowledge of local farming enterprises possessed by association directors and other personnel is constantly being supplemented by intensive educational work designed to aid them in extending constructive credit service which will assist members to improve their financial position." A budgeted production credit association loan "serves the farmer in many ways. It saves greatly in interest, compared with borrowing the full amount for the full period; it saves bother and expensive trips, if small amounts are borrowed at different times; it sets up a program in which the farmer is sure that the funds will be available at a specific time so that he can make definite future plans, and it provides for orderly retirement of the loan as products are sold."

More than half of the production credit association loans were for less than \$500 and more than three-fourths were for less than \$1,000. The distribution of production credit association loans by size is shown in table 1.

Table 1.- Number of persons served by production credit associations, and percentage of number served, by size of loan groups, by districts, 1940

District	Size of loans by districts							
	Percentage of total number of persons served in 1940 whose maximum balances during the year were within specified ranges							
	Total number of persons served in 1940	\$100 or less	\$101 to 250	\$251 to 500	\$501 to 1,000	\$1,001 to 2,000	\$2,001 to 5,000	More than \$5,000
	Number	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.
Springfield	13,625	4.1	9.9	21.7	27.3	22.0	12.3	2.7
Baltimore	13,592	6.3	18.6	27.4	25.2	13.3	6.5	2.7
Columbia	45,904	14.9	36.7	28.7	11.3	3.6	2.7	1.1
Louisville	41,829	6.5	21.0	29.3	24.8	12.4	4.8	1.2
New Orleans	29,529	20.6	32.2	20.6	11.4	7.1	5.4	2.7
St. Louis	32,349	6.3	19.4	25.0	23.1	15.2	8.5	2.5
St. Paul	31,355	4.1	14.4	30.8	32.4	14.1	3.7	.5
Omaha	10,481	1.5	5.9	19.0	27.2	21.8	15.9	8.7
Wichita	12,589	4.8	14.9	21.6	22.6	16.7	11.7	7.7
Houston	13,524	5.4	16.6	20.5	20.9	16.3	12.0	8.3
Berkeley	7,659	2.4	5.5	12.4	20.3	22.3	20.3	16.8
Spokane	8,989	1.5	5.5	12.6	20.8	21.5	20.9	17.0
Total	256,425	8.3	21.0	25.2	21.4	13.0	7.5	3.6

"The total loan cost to borrowers including interest, inspection cost, searching chattel records, filing and recording fees, releasing mortgages, and other miscellaneous minor legal costs directly connected with closing loans, amounted in 1941 to 5.42 percent per annum on the average month-end balance of loans outstanding. This percentage figure compares with 5.56 percent in 1940 and 5.84 percent in 1939, which shows a gradual reduction in loan costs... In fact, in 84 of the associations the average

per annum cost is less than 5 percent, but there are certain small-loan areas in which the median loan is for less than \$250 and the loans are outstanding for a short period of time, where the total loan cost to borrowers on a per annum basis is higher."

The net worth of the production credit associations increased by 44 percent between December 31, 1935 and June 30, 1942. The changes in the composition of the net worth are shown in table 2.

Table 2.- Distribution of net worth of production credit associations on December 31, 1935 and June 30, 1942

	December 31, 1935		June 30, 1942	
	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Production credit corporation stock holdings .....	76,802,550	87.1	81,500,765	64.2
Farmers' stock holdings .....	8,410,885	9.5	21,632,867	17.0
Reserves .....	2,954,236	3.4	23,789,162	18.8
Total net worth .....	88,167,671	100.0	126,922,794	100.0

The pamphlet stresses that if production credit associations are to be available as efficient lenders in periods of credit stringency they must continue their lending activities through periods of easy money conditions as well. "Congress enacted legislation during an emergency period to enable farmers and stockmen to establish these associations, not as emergency agencies, however, but as permanent institutions in the short-term credit field. Safety and permanency could not be attained by the associations if they made loans only during periods of depression when many other lending agencies necessarily curtail their extension of credit, and then the associations ceased or greatly reduced their operations during periods of strong demand and good prices, when other credit sources are seeking fields for investment. The adoption of such a practice would mean that during favorable periods associations would require their member-stockholders to obtain credit elsewhere, and yet in periods of depression, when other credit facilities became unavailable, they would have to be in a position to finance these members and other farmers. Furthermore, the associations would be unable to retain trained and experienced credit men with intermittent employment and the fundamental contributing factor toward the extension of proper credit to meet the farmers' needs would be lost from the system."

The loan experience of the production credit associations has been good. "From their organization through 1941 the associations, including those in liquidation, have had net charge-offs of \$2,638,463, and as of December 31, 1941, had made provision for estimated losses in the amount of \$1,799,139... The total amount of cash advanced on loans by all associations from their organization through December 31, 1941, was \$1,714,708,756. The total losses on loans from organization to December 31, 1941, including charge-offs plus the total provision for estimated losses (valuation reserves), amounted to \$4,437,602 at the end of 1941. This represented 0.26 percent of the total cash advances from organization through December 31, 1941.

## CROP INSURANCE

The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation is completing its fourth year of experience with wheat, and its first year with cotton. Contracts were in force on approximately 397,000 insured interests in wheat and 176,000 insured units in cotton in 1942.<sup>1/</sup> Settlement of losses on the 1942 crop has not been completed, although it is nearer completion on wheat than on cotton. Preliminary reports indicate that wheat indemnities will exceed premiums by a little less than 2 million bushels (appendix table 24). Early reports on cotton loss settlements reflect small loss settlements in comparison to premiums collected, but latest figures show that indemnities will equal, if not exceed premiums.

The last closing date for acceptance of insurance on the 1943 winter wheat crop has passed, but spring wheat growers in some States have until March 15 to apply for insurance on their 1943 crop. Approximately 350,000 contracts had been written, covering about 460,000 farms, by November 1. As 450,000 farms had been insured at a corresponding date in 1941, it is expected that participation will exceed that for 1942. Complete data which show participation in the cotton-crop insurance program in 1943 are not yet available.

Crop insurance covers unavoidable risks not attributable to the operator, such as drought, excessive moisture, flood, hail, frost, plant diseases and insect injury. Shortages of labor, equipment, and supplies due to the war have been interpreted as unavoidable. Consequently, producers are not excluded from indemnification for crop losses caused by war-created shortages of these essentials to production, although savings in production costs effected because of inability to follow the usual practices are deductible.

A new procedure was introduced in 1942 whereby an operator who takes insurance signs a commodity note for the amount of his premium, which note matures about harvest time.<sup>2/</sup> The principal of the note is the premium in

<sup>1/</sup> The term "insured interest" applies to wheat and is defined as each individual's interest in the wheat crop on each farm. The comparable term for cotton is "insured unit," and is the interest of each individual on the acreage considered as a farm for the purpose of establishing an average yield and premium rate.

<sup>2/</sup> Prior to 1942, premiums were collected (commodity or cash equivalent) before the insurance went into effect. In 1939 the Secretary of Agriculture was permitted to advance to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation the amount of the premium for a farm out of payments to be earned by the farmer under the Agricultural Conservation Program. This provision was used in the spring wheat area in 1939 and for all areas in 1940 and 1941. The practice of signing a commodity note made this provision practically inoperative. Data showing the volume of advances are given in table 26, Agricultural Finance Review, May 1941, p. 78.

pounds of cotton or bushels of wheat. This feature enables the farmer to pay for his insurance out of his current production or to have it deducted from any indemnity that might be due him. It also eliminates the necessity of holding the premiums as a commodity reserve during the growing season, resulting in a substantial saving in operating costs.

Other technical changes involved, in 1942, the inclusion of all farms owned or operated by the same individual in a county under a single contract. Before that time, separate contracts were issued to landlord and tenant on each farm unit insured. The term "insured interests" is applied to each equity in separate units in 1943 and is comparable to "contracts" prior to 1942.

As the 1943 wheat contracts will be for 3 years, farmers who insure wheat in 1943 are insured also for 1944 and 1945. These long-term contracts are intended to avoid year-to-year selectivity and to reduce costs by eliminating the necessity of reselling insurance to producers every year. An annual contract will be used again for cotton insurance in 1943.

#### Wheat

Each year more farmers have insured their wheat crops. The number of contracts for 1940 was double that for 1939; and in 1941, was slightly more than in 1940. In 1942 the insurable interests covered by contracts in force (comparable to contracts in force in previous years) showed a marked increase. Indications are that participation in 1943 will exceed that for 1942.

Conditions immediately prior to the closing date for acceptance of applications affect the amount of participation. A good crop the preceding year combined with good seeding conditions reduces the feeling of need for insurance; the opposite conditions tend to increase participation, particularly in areas of high risk. The doubling of participation in 1940 took place largely in the hard red winter wheat area. There farmers saw crop insurance in operation in a year of less-than-average yields, and the seeding conditions in 1940 were below normal. There was a decrease in the number of contracts written in 1941 and a further decrease in 1942 and 1943 in the western part of the States in the southwest plains area (hard red winter) in part a result of good seeding conditions for 3 years. But there was more than an offsetting increase in the eastern parts of these States and adjacent States to the eastward (soft red winter) in 1942 partly as a result of heavy winterkill on the 1941 crop and a further increase in 1943 partly as a result of heavy losses on the 1942 crop due to excess moisture. Although insured acreage has not increased in the same ratio as the number of farmers, the insured production has about kept pace due to higher yields and coverage in the Central States.

In each of the first 3 years, indemnities paid by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation on wheat contracts were in excess of premiums collected. Final reports are not available for 1942, but preliminary reports show that indemnities will again exceed premiums but by a smaller amount than in previous years.

Cotton

The organization and administration of the cotton insurance program is rather like that for wheat. It was put into effect in 18 States throughout the Cotton Belt in 1942. Preliminary figures show that the crop on approximately 176,000 farming units, representing about 2,000,000 acres, or approximately 11 percent of the 1942 cotton acreage allotment, were covered by insurance this year.

The number of farming units insured and the premiums to be collected (expressed in pounds of cotton), by States, for the crop harvested in 1942 are shown in table 1.

Table 1.- Cotton crop insurance: Number of farming units insured and amount of premiums collected on the 1942 crop 1/

State	Number of units <u>Number</u>	Amount of premiums <u>Pounds</u>	State	Number of units <u>Number</u>	Amount of premiums <u>Pounds</u>
Alabama	12,004	1,324,823	Missouri	3,990	530,248
Arizona	697	312,780	New Mexico	1,778	815,384
Arkansas	8,722	1,329,155	North Carolina	9,678	548,693
California	1,459	583,473	Oklahoma	9,900	1,791,766
Florida	917	55,917	South Carolina	20,712	3,242,583
Georgia	25,899	3,575,610	Tennessee	3,882	261,258
Illinois	307	30,293	Texas	54,355	13,986,475
Kentucky	339	17,920	Virginia	655	30,697
Louisiana	11,659	1,940,809	Total	176,497	31,635,791
Mississippi	9,544	1,257,907			

1/ Interim report as of January 16, 1943, subject to revision.

An interesting adjustment was made in the crop insurance plan to include cottonseed. The general plan is based on lint, but cottonseed is included by increasing lint premiums and indemnities 19 percent.

As in wheat, claims for indemnities are filed with the county Agricultural Adjustment Administration committees. Present data regarding losses to be paid are preliminary, but they indicate that indemnities will equal or exceed premiums.

## TRENDS IN SHORT-TERM LOANS TO FARMERS

The volume of short-term loans<sup>1</sup> to farmers held by insured commercial banks, agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration, and the Farm Security Administration (appendix table 2) continued to increase from July 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942, the rate of increase being 2.9 percent, as compared with 2.4 percent in the year ended July 1, 1941 and 2.1 percent in the year ended July 1, 1940.

The volume of loans to farmers held by insured commercial banks decreased slightly in each of the 3 years. The volume of short-term loans to farmers held by agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration increased in the same years by 2.6, 4.6, and 5.4 percent respectively, and the volume of such loans as held by the Farm Security Administration, by 14.2, 13.3, and 9.7 percent respectively. In each of these 3 years the increases in the volume of loans held by agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration and the Farm Security Administration outweighed the decreases in the loan volume of commercial banks.

The relative importance of the various kinds of institutions providing short-term credit to farmers (exclusive of the Commodity Credit Corporation) changed only slightly from 1941 to 1942. In the main this development was a continuation of trends which have prevailed since the middle of 1939. Within that period the share of the insured commercial banks in the volume of short-term farm loans of these three groups of agencies decreased from 63.1 to 57.2 percent; that of the regional agricultural credit corporations and the Emergency Crop and Feed Loan Office decreased from 10.1 to 8.9 percent; that of loans of the Federal intermediate credit banks to private financing institutions remained about the same; that of the production credit associations increased from 9.9 to 12.1 percent; and that of rural rehabilitation loans of the Farm Security Administration increased from 14.8 to 19.5 percent.

Shifts in the importance of the various lender groups in important agricultural regions are shown in table 2.

Commodity Credit Corporation loans held by banks and other lenders under purchase agreements increased from \$115,036,000 on July 1, 1941 to \$165,459,000 on July 1, 1942 (table 3). The seasonal reduction during the first half of 1942 was of much larger proportion than usual as a result of the substantial volume of wheat loans liquidated by transfer to the Commodity Credit Corporation.

1/ This term, as commonly used, includes all non-real-estate loans irrespective of the fact that many of them are made for intermediate terms and some even for long terms.

Table 1.- Short-term loans to farmers held by insured commercial banks, agencies supervised by Farm Credit Administration, and Farm Security Administration, July 1, 1937 to date

July 1	Insured commercial banks	Agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration 1/		Farm Security Administration	Total
		1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars		
1937	726,400	418,152		171,394	1,315,946
1938	925,705	425,443		207,239	1,558,387
1939	1,193,466	416,786		280,528	1,890,780
1940	1,182,721	427,819		320,324	1,930,864
1941	1,167,204	447,500		362,911	1,977,615
1942	1,164,452	471,772		398,283	2,034,507

1/ Data for various types of these agencies are shown in appendix table 2.

Table 2.- Amount of short-term loans held by insured commercial banks, agencies supervised by Farm Credit Administration, and Farm Security Administration, showing indexes, by selected agricultural regions, July 1, 1937 to date

CORN BELT STATES 1/

July 1	Insured commercial banks		Agencies supervised by the Farm Credit Administration		Farm Security Administration	
	Amount	Index (1937=100)	Amount	Index (1937=100)	Amount	Index (1937=100)
			1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars
1937	228,317	100.0	285,213	100.0	34,659	100.0
1938	289,146	126.8	349,379	122.5	43,092	124.3
1939	435,565	190.8	500,840	175.6	57,428	165.7
1940	474,113	207.7	612,460	214.7	64,400	185.8
1941	426,883	187.0	501,817	175.9	68,262	197.0
1942	419,033	183.5	497,036	174.3	68,485	197.6

COTTON GROWING STATES 2/

1937	95,670	100.0	163,764	100.0	44,817	100.0
1938	157,238	164.4	226,623	138.4	53,495	119.4
1939	199,607	208.6	268,871	164.2	79,139	176.6
1940	142,626	149.1	216,235	132.0	90,802	202.6
1941	138,599	144.9	221,883	135.5	111,293	248.3
1942	141,666	148.1	230,235	140.6	132,810	296.3

RANGE STATES 3/

1937	68,644	100.0	140,730	100.0	18,803	100.0
1938	76,287	111.1	148,037	105.2	25,779	137.1
1939	81,110	118.2	147,059	104.5	35,681	189.8
1940	87,387	127.3	153,971	109.4	40,350	214.6
1941	97,179	141.6	161,861	115.0	43,532	231.5
1942	97,145	141.5	159,957	113.7	48,030	255.4

1/ Ill., Ind., Iowa., Minn., Mo., Nebr., and Ohio.

2/ Ala., Ark., Ga., La., Miss., N. C., Okla., and S. C.

3/ Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. Mex., Utah, and Wyo.

Table 3.- Loans to farmers under price support programs of the Commodity Credit Corporation, 1937 to date

Date	Loans held by the Commodity Credit Corporation	Loans held by banks and others	Total 1,000 dollars
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	
July 1, 1937	116,800	43	116,843
Jan. 1, 1938	173,134	139,390	312,524
July 1, 1938	228,900	144,099	372,999
Jan. 1, 1939	308,951	310,600	619,551
July 1, 1939	330,130	388,559	718,689
Jan. 1, 1940	173,027	237,065	410,092
July 1, 1940	150,196	227,856	378,052
Jan. 1, 1941	252,287	377,175	629,462
July 1, 1941	213,431	115,036	328,467
Jan. 1, 1942 1/	132,614	477,538	610,152
July 1, 1942 1/	159,671	165,459	325,130

1/ In the 1941 cotton program, all producers' notes except those held by co-operative marketing associations have been placed in a pool, so that they may be readily available for collection whenever a producer, or his assignee, wishes to redeem the pledged cotton. Certificates of interest, indicating the extent of the holder's participation in the pool of notes, have been issued to the banks and other lending agencies making loans. On January 1 and July 1, 1942, banks and other lending agencies held such certificates in the amounts of \$86,282,700 and \$48,500,000 respectively. In this table these amounts are included with loans held by banks and other lenders, but in appendix table 2 they are included with loans held by Commodity Credit Corporation.

Farm Land Values Rise Moderately.- According to a preliminary index prepared by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, average value per acre of farm real estate in the United States (1912-14 = 100) rose from 91 on July 1 to 93 on November 1. The figure for last March was 91, compared with 85 in 1941, 84 in 1940, and a low of 73 in 1933. Although farm land values per acre on November 1 were reported 27 percent higher than at the low point of 1933, they are still 7 percent below the 1912-14 base and 45 percent under the 1920 peak.

Largest regional gains from July 1 to November 1, approximately 3 percent, were registered in the East North Central, South Atlantic, and Mountain States. Values rose in 31 States, declined in 6, and remained unchanged in 11. From March 1 to November 1, 1942 increases of 5 percent or more in farm land values were reported for 12 States, the largest gain being 12 percent in Colorado. In 4 States, values did not change during this 6-month period.

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Table 1.- Farm-mortgage debt: Total outstanding and amounts held by selected lending agencies, United States, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1935-42 1/

Beginning of year or month	Total farm- mortgage debt- 1,000 dollars	Amounts held by selected lending agencies						Farm Security Administra- tion Construction and special real estate loans 2/ 1,000 dollars	Farm Security Administra- tion Tenant purchase and development 1,000 dollars
		Federal land banks and Land Bank Commissioner	Joint stock land banks 3/ 1,000 dollars	Life insurance companies 4/ 1,000 dollars	Commercial banks 5/ 1,000 dollars	Three State credit agen- cies 6/ 1,000 dollars			
		1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars			
1910 .....	3,207,863	296,385	60,038	386,961	406,248				
1920 .....	8,448,772		2,105,477	1,204,383					
1930 .....	9,630,768	1,185,165	626,980	957,468	93,274				
1935 .....	7,785,971	2,501,826	255,931	1,258,900	482,842	52,286			
1936 .....	7,638,867	2,853,566	175,677	1,054,770	487,505	48,091			
1937 .....	7,399,797	2,686,512	133,499	936,434	487,534	52,657			
1938 .....	7,214,138	2,835,562	104,163	855,470	501,450	24,657	3,615	0	
1939 .....	7,070,096	2,723,022	87,362	887,336	519,276	17,281	6,220	8,949	
1940 .....	6,909,794	2,583,901	65,719	883,424	534,170	14,823	6,373	38,212	
1941:									
January ...	6,824,126	2,484,232	48,766	890,516	543,408	12,380	7,400	2/ 65,524	
April ...	-	2,463,330	46,908	-	-	-	7,451	2/ 77,289	
July ...	-	2,437,087	43,630	-	551,126	-	7,487	91,396	
October ...	-	2,400,568	38,860	-	-	-	8,664	103,571	
1942:									
January ...	6,713,835	2,350,346	33,441	907,141	535,212	12,113	8,929	112,480	
April ...	-	2,300,273	31,017	-	-	-	9,276	129,073	
July ...	-	2,262,847	27,366	10/ 920,640	521,247	-	10,374	136,318	

1/ Excludes territories and possessions.

2/ Includes joint stock land banks in receivership.

3/ Estimates based upon direct reports from life insurance companies, official reports submitted to State insurance commissioners, and "Best's Life Insurance Reports."

4/ 1935-42 insured commercial banks, prior to 1935 open State and national banks.

5/ Department of Rural Credit of Minnesota, Bank of North Dakota, and Rural Credit Board of South Dakota.

6/ In addition to loans for construction of farmed-out improvements, this now includes special real estate loans except those made from State corporation trust funds, data not being available for all years. Special real estate loans from trust funds totaled \$305,000 on July 1, 1942.

7/ Includes loans from State corporation trust funds.

8/ Data not available.

9/ Revised.

10/ Preliminary.

Table 2.- Short-term loans to farmers held by selected lending agencies, United States, 1930-42 1/

Beginning of year or month	Commercial banks 2/ 1,000 dollars	Agencies supervised by Farm Credit Administration					Farm Security Administra- tion 3/ 1,000 dollars	Commodity Cred- it Corporation 4/ 1,000 dollars
		Federal inter- mediate credit banks 5/ 1,000 dollars	Production credit asso- ciations 6/ 1,000 dollars	Regional agri- cultural cred- it corporations	Emergency crop loans	Drought- relief loans		
		1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars		
1930 .....	1/ 936,360	50,018				5/ 8,946		
1931 .....	5/ 1,936,360	65,533				1/		
1932 .....	1/	74,691				49,766		
1933 .....	1/	82,518		24,373		90,353		
1934 .....	1/	60,989	27	144,636		90,853		
1935 .....	807,613	55,672	60,852	87,102	78,794	32,444	5,600	64,577
1936 .....	661,606	47,162	94,096	43,400	107,350	65,514	62,900	32,591
1937 .....	593,614	41,017	105,212	25,288	104,972	60,397	131,600	271,219
1938 .....	748,351	40,464	138,169	15,592	115,588	57,113	162,802	204,500
1939 .....	1,064,667	33,595	184,037	11,081	116,725	54,764	209,808	173,134
1940 .....	1,094,352	33,354	154,466	8,005	115,775	52,555	276,233	308,951
1941:								
January ...	1,281,275	34,102	172,312	5,855	117,980	50,458	3/ 312,877	252,287
April ...	1/	37,120	195,296	5,691	124,855	49,983	3/ 389,471	242,589
July ...	1,167,804	42,184	221,419	6,658	129,800	49,687	3/ 362,911	213,431
October ...	1/	42,631	207,887	6,833	124,765	49,222	360,856	148,693
1942:								
January ...	1,149,937	39,222	187,668	5,531	117,085	47,889	339,555	218,857
April ...	1/	42,716	219,184	3,819	10/ 126,802	47,108	367,383	206,944
July ...	1,164,452	46,384	247,895	4,249	10/ 130,410	46,655	358,283	208,171

1/ Excludes loans to farmers' cooperative organizations, which are shown in table 3. Except for commercial banks, includes loans in territories and possessions.

2/ Insured commercial banks only, except in 1931 when all open national and State banks are included. All agricultural loans except those secured by farm real estate are included.

3/ Loans to and discounts for private financing institutions.

4/ Includes data for production credit associations which have been placed in liquidation.

5/ Rural rehabilitation loans to individuals. Includes loans from funds of State rural rehabilitation corporations and loans made by Resettlement Administration. Data prior to 1939 partially estimated.

6/ Includes loans held by other financing institutions, mainly commercial banks, but covered by Commodity Credit Corporation purchase agreements.

7/ Data unavailable.

8/ June 30.

9/ Revised.

10/ Includes orchard loans.

Table 3.- Loans to farmers' cooperative organizations held by selected lending agencies,  
United States, 1929-42

Beginning of year or month	Agencies supervised by Farm Credit Administration			Rural Elec- trification Administra- tion	Farm Security Administra- tion <sup>1/</sup>	Commodity Credit Corporation
	Federal intermediate credit banks	Banks for cooperatives	Agricultural Marketing Act revolving fund			
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars
1929 .....	36,174					
1930 .....	26,073		14,510			
1931 .....	64,377		136,698			
1932 .....	45,177		156,280			
1933 .....	9,866		158,885			
1934 .....	15,211	15,697	157,752			0
1935 .....	33,969	27,851	54,863		0	0
1936 .....	2,731	50,013	44,433	10	1,515	0
1937 .....	1,641	69,647	53,754	2,456	2,603	7,532
1938 .....	1,813	87,633	30,982	30,015	3,732	9,677
1939 .....	920	87,496	23,723	79,350	8,412	49,498
1940 .....	1,835	76,252	20,547	169,122	11,550	26,812
1941:						
January .....	1,490	74,741	16,461	232,086	15,125	27,931
April .....	1,332	70,231	15,967	252,913	2/ 16,082	26,189
July .....	689	73,747	15,644	2/ 269,867	2/ 16,798	23,567
October .....	1,034	94,097	15,732	1/	20,756	23,476
1942:						
January .....	2,152	113,444	16,914	304,807	25,385	14,370
April .....	2,569	106,461	16,252	1/	30,604	10,872
July .....	1,054	101,226	12,625	323,991	35,009	11,279

<sup>1/</sup> In addition to loans to cooperative associations, this now includes loans to defense reactivation corporations, but excludes loans to individuals to participate in cooperative enterprises. Loans to defense reactivation corporations totaled \$9,908,000 on July 1, 1942. Includes loans from State corporation trust funds.

<sup>2/</sup> Revised.

<sup>3/</sup> Not available.

Table 4.- Amount of Federal land bank and Land Bank Commissioner loans closed and estimated amount of farm  
mortgages recorded by other lenders, United States, 1934-42

Period	Loans closed <sup>1/</sup>		Estimated amount of mortgages recorded by other lenders <sup>2/</sup>					Total all lenders Million dollars
	Federal land banks Million dollars	Land Bank Commissioner Million dollars	Individuals	Commercial banks	Insurance companies	Miscel- laneous	Total	
			Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	Million dollars	
1934 .....	730.1	553.0	219.6	110.9	45.7	80.8	457.0	1,740.1
1935 .....	247.6	195.9	257.8	164.9	76.4	71.7	570.8	1,014.3
1936 .....	108.6	76.9	255.3	186.1	115.1	60.4	616.9	802.4
1937 .....	62.8	39.7	262.9	212.8	126.2	51.3	655.2	757.7
1938 .....	51.3	29.1	234.1	210.0	137.4	61.3	642.8	723.2
1939 .....	51.5	27.2	226.7	217.8	138.0	67.8	650.3	729.0
1940 .....	63.9	36.4	225.6	219.9	145.5	51.2	672.2	772.5
1941: <sup>3/</sup> .....	64.7	37.3	247.7	221.3	160.5	102.5	732.0	834.0
Jan.-March ..	21.2	12.1	72.7	64.0	55.7	25.7	218.1	251.4
Apr.-June ..	16.8	9.7	58.4	55.1	36.9	24.5	174.9	201.4
July-Sept. ..	12.8	7.4	48.0	47.2	30.7	24.3	150.2	170.4
Oct.-Dec. ..	13.9	8.2	68.5	55.0	37.1	23.1	168.7	210.8
1942:								
Jan.-March ..	17.4	9.3	74.8	60.7	57.5	30.7	223.7	250.4
Apr.-June ..	17.4	9.8	60.8	47.6	39.8	21.1	169.3	196.5

<sup>1/</sup> Excluding Puerto Rico.

<sup>2/</sup> Based on reports from counties including from 31 to 49 percent of the farms in the United States.

<sup>3/</sup> Sum of quarterly figures will not always equal annual total because of rounding of figures.

Farm Credit Administration.

Table 5.- Estimated amount of farm-mortgage debt, by States.  
Jan. 1, 1910, 1923, 1930, 1935, and 1939-42.]

State and division	1910	1923	1930	1935	1939	1940	1941	1942
	1,000 dol.							
Maine . . . . .	13,055	27,950	27,613	30,626	30,907	30,427	30,732	29,636
New Hampshire . . . . .	5,647	9,320	11,726	12,423	13,551	13,738	13,920	14,390
Vermont . . . . .	14,716	31,537	35,365	31,390	33,538	34,085	34,640	35,017
Massachusetts . . . . .	20,206	34,283	48,984	49,613	53,846	54,497	55,120	55,328
Rhode Island . . . . .	1,977	2,583	4,632	4,065	4,597	4,548	4,537	4,480
Connecticut . . . . .	14,601	36,456	45,358	47,886	50,135	51,030	51,952	53,202
New England . . . . .	70,202	142,129	171,708	176,003	186,574	188,325	190,901	192,053
New York . . . . .	145,737	242,511	233,791	213,634	209,085	206,112	202,754	198,286
New Jersey . . . . .	30,555	48,671	54,180	49,206	50,018	50,215	50,869	51,267
Pennsylvania . . . . .	93,424	172,200	168,492	150,738	141,578	139,530	138,553	138,561
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	269,716	463,382	456,463	413,578	400,681	395,857	392,176	388,114
Ohio . . . . .	118,874	271,081	272,738	224,261	208,005	207,308	205,549	204,061
Indiana . . . . .	113,276	293,448	269,913	224,169	201,480	198,996	197,129	190,384
Illinois . . . . .	267,361	705,644	614,059	483,342	432,070	420,927	414,318	403,581
Michigan . . . . .	113,278	251,664	221,432	187,493	177,394	173,959	171,901	168,358
Wisconsin . . . . .	193,219	569,846	505,472	415,741	390,097	382,687	374,561	364,378
East North Central . . . . .	807,008	2,091,683	1,883,614	1,535,006	1,409,046	1,383,877	1,363,458	1,330,762
Minnesota . . . . .	144,477	606,134	476,210	411,162	351,030	343,512	338,578	334,279
Iowa . . . . .	430,690	1,535,943	1,196,197	787,159	684,751	657,368	645,094	642,547
Missouri . . . . .	207,279	511,571	442,820	286,460	249,673	244,183	245,730	246,034
North Dakota . . . . .	97,830	312,870	239,772	203,958	164,862	153,459	144,253	137,983
South Dakota . . . . .	64,943	451,281	293,080	216,592	165,750	151,910	144,125	139,066
Nebraska . . . . .	148,366	691,732	510,453	431,686	355,417	334,560	317,491	305,542
Kansas . . . . .	163,359	527,397	411,747	357,123	319,404	309,602	301,753	288,042
West North Central . . . . .	1,276,944	4,636,928	3,570,279	2,694,140	2,290,887	2,195,094	2,137,024	2,093,493
Delaware . . . . .	5,775	9,564	9,581	8,668	8,150	7,979	8,038	8,261
Maryland 1/ . . . . .	28,733	62,247	50,377	43,166	43,135	43,339	42,415	41,024
Virginia . . . . .	22,181	83,374	91,000	75,093	71,613	70,566	69,464	67,950
West Virginia . . . . .	7,771	26,322	26,177	24,459	22,710	22,064	21,749	21,147
North Carolina . . . . .	17,028	81,386	111,880	93,905	85,631	84,923	85,569	83,204
South Carolina . . . . .	20,583	98,154	64,433	49,336	44,921	43,243	42,457	42,093
Georgia . . . . .	24,383	139,878	113,060	82,866	80,115	79,286	78,559	78,263
Florida . . . . .	3,580	29,532	52,840	44,151	40,749	40,666	40,923	40,406
South Atlantic . . . . .	130,334	530,457	519,748	421,644	397,024	392,066	390,174	382,348
Kentucky . . . . .	36,296	115,793	116,250	105,225	105,299	105,729	107,364	107,980
Tennessee . . . . .	21,687	83,091	115,280	92,316	87,922	87,047	85,442	81,243
Alabama . . . . .	21,456	67,569	97,890	72,182	69,095	69,309	71,204	71,236
Mississippi . . . . .	29,338	139,942	103,312	84,489	78,080	78,585	79,454	77,801
East South Central . . . . .	108,777	406,395	432,732	354,212	340,396	340,670	343,464	338,260
Arkansas . . . . .	17,485	117,784	99,085	68,593	66,078	66,213	67,135	67,264
Louisiana . . . . .	16,683	57,354	63,838	59,750	54,495	53,299	52,993	52,332
Oklahoma . . . . .	64,166	284,766	274,971	202,160	167,305	162,189	161,229	159,928
Texas . . . . .	160,171	555,786	671,434	604,184	543,928	530,172	525,678	522,461
West South Central . . . . .	260,505	1,015,690	1,109,328	934,687	831,806	811,873	807,035	801,985
Montana . . . . .	16,952	192,092	129,744	110,179	99,308	96,504	95,497	92,326
Idaho . . . . .	21,423	158,737	115,547	98,457	89,963	87,441	85,994	83,716
Wyoming . . . . .	7,363	59,514	43,337	36,709	37,202	37,023	36,728	35,355
Colorado . . . . .	35,492	203,064	138,248	109,359	97,117	94,965	94,143	92,457
New Mexico . . . . .	4,301	32,297	38,954	27,492	27,325	26,768	26,094	25,648
Arizona . . . . .	4,338	48,748	41,690	30,797	31,576	31,506	32,002	32,162
Utah . . . . .	6,609	52,095	51,875	43,757	45,932	45,635	45,722	44,992
Nevada . . . . .	2,977	25,053	15,617	17,464	17,492	17,782	16,989	16,802
Mountain . . . . .	99,455	771,600	575,012	474,214	445,915	437,624	433,169	421,258
Washington . . . . .	44,203	152,920	161,557	133,375	120,711	118,522	117,738	114,665
Oregon . . . . .	33,304	133,368	135,917	116,408	104,756	103,957	103,319	101,167
California . . . . .	107,415	441,069	614,810	532,704	543,100	541,929	545,668	547,730
Pacific . . . . .	184,922	727,357	912,284	782,487	768,567	764,408	766,725	763,562
UNITED STATES . . . . .	3,207,863	10,785,621	9,630,768	7,785,971	7,070,896	6,909,794	6,824,126	6,713,835

1/ Data for omitted years in Agricultural Finance Review, Nov. 1939.

2/ Revised.

2/ Including District of Columbia.

Table 6. Farm real estate loans held by selected lending agencies, by States, January 1, 1940-42 1/

APR 27 1943

State and division	Federal land banks and Land Bank Commissioner 2/			Joint stock land banks 2/ 3/			Life insurance companies 4/		
	1940 1,000 dollars	1941 1,000 dollars	1942 1,000 dollars	1940 1,000 dollars	1941 1,000 dollars	1942 1,000 dollars	1940 1,000 dollars	1941 1,000 dollars	1942 1,000 dollars
Maine . . . . .	10,020	9,411	8,317	0	0	0	1	1	1
New Hampshire . . . . .	2,087	1,999	1,894	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vermont . . . . .	6,082	5,887	5,517	0	0	0	4	4	4
Massachusetts . . . . .	10,991	10,588	10,026	0	0	0	8	7	7
Rhode Island . . . . .	1,808	1,776	1,712	0	0	0	0	0	0
Connecticut . . . . .	9,408	9,398	9,162	0	0	0	3	3	5
New England . . . . .	40,486	39,059	36,628	0	0	0	16	15	20
New York . . . . .	46,982	47,619	45,162	2,385	2,027	1,455	234	212	326
New Jersey . . . . .	13,677	13,808	13,671	377	317	294	169	158	86
Pennsylvania . . . . .	26,588	25,606	24,174	2,035	1,688	627	811	1,112	1,591
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	89,247	87,033	83,007	4,737	3,972	2,376	1,214	1,482	2,007
Ohio . . . . .	72,926	69,379	63,994	4,383	2,731	2,069	30,429	30,679	31,072
Indiana . . . . .	88,941	84,417	77,685	10,089	8,709	6,924	55,556	58,206	59,152
Illinois . . . . .	174,920	158,003	158,966	6,726	5,064	3,978	103,762	107,423	109,399
Michigan . . . . .	69,946	66,922	62,532	896	791	499	3,056	2,962	2,462
Wisconsin . . . . .	117,851	111,209	103,794	0	0	0	5,879	9,084	9,164
West North Central . . . . .	524,586	499,930	466,971	22,094	17,295	13,480	201,712	208,354	211,949
Minnesota . . . . .	154,141	147,733	140,121	327	260	208	50,489	53,575	56,404
Iowa . . . . .	254,223	247,679	239,573	1,966	3,794	2,879	197,516	196,066	204,810
Missouri . . . . .	57,234	55,273	52,094	1,775	757	308	5/ 55,366	57,293	59,391
North Dakota . . . . .	88,617	81,227	76,188	39	27	16	4,050	3,673	3,474
South Dakota . . . . .	68,130	63,805	60,384	352	312	277	17,681	16,431	16,252
Nebraska . . . . .	147,574	140,358	134,796	5/ 1,460	1,136	797	44,822	41,465	40,307
Kansas . . . . .	127,352	125,763	112,858	2,124	18	0	53,319	52,599	46,036
West North Central . . . . .	897,280	857,438	816,024	5/ 11,043	6,384	4,485	5/ 423,243	421,102	429,276
Delaware . . . . .	1,242	1,156	1,087	0	0	0	27	29	27
Maryland . . . . .	11,248	10,758	9,982	299	75	0	2,281	2,302	2,393
Virginia . . . . .	33,082	31,172	28,360	1,226	202	56	3,575	3,696	4,146
West Virginia . . . . .	10,467	9,966	9,269	517	471	405	602	612	630
North Carolina . . . . .	33,627	33,055	30,333	4,853	3,626	563	6,982	9,868	9,803
South Carolina . . . . .	23,627	22,640	21,365	1,014	841	593	2,384	2,289	2,440
Georgia . . . . .	37,590	36,219	33,857	1,686	1,452	790	10,981	10,247	10,184
Florida . . . . .	17,011	17,083	16,499	0	0	0	800	628	906
South Atlantic . . . . .	167,894	162,049	150,730	9,605	6,667	2,407	29,572	29,901	30,589
Kentucky . . . . .	47,334	44,002	39,328	302	132	118	13,494	15,354	16,369
Tennessee . . . . .	40,578	38,203	33,893	0	0	0	12,907	12,288	11,008
Alabama . . . . .	35,935	36,111	34,250	1,026	881	85	2,473	2,213	2,510
Mississippi . . . . .	33,888	33,869	31,878	621	439	278	5/ 15,211	18,519	18,196
East South Central . . . . .	157,735	152,185	139,349	1,949	1,452	481	5/ 47,085	48,374	48,083
Arkansas . . . . .	23,388	22,618	20,668	5/ 1,466	1,220	903	12,246	13,364	14,662
Louisiana . . . . .	24,166	23,979	23,055	139	105	93	6,785	6,094	5,785
Oklahoma . . . . .	50,188	48,079	45,297	795	246	188	25,923	25,817	25,894
Texas . . . . .	240,659	234,386	225,635	9,758	6,995	5,658	85,460	87,489	91,084
West South Central . . . . .	338,401	329,062	314,655	5/ 12,198	8,566	6,842	130,414	132,764	137,425
Montana . . . . .	26,952	26,696	24,583	189	132	105	2,220	2,188	2,202
Idaho . . . . .	35,457	34,869	33,083	14	2	2	6,791	6,762	6,731
Wyoming . . . . .	13,761	13,464	13,204	976	877	650	140	145	171
Colorado . . . . .	35,371	34,510	33,173	1,507	1,404	1,222	3,101	2,791	2,802
New Mexico . . . . .	11,578	11,102	10,634	0	0	0	1,354	1,297	1,191
Arizona . . . . .	10,483	10,738	10,431	0	0	0	1,238	1,582	1,684
Utah . . . . .	19,733	18,994	17,662	6/	6/	0	371	301	316
Nevada . . . . .	1,682	1,921	2,190	0	0	0	340	341	309
Mountain . . . . .	157,017	153,884	145,921	2,686	2,415	1,979	15,555	15,407	16,074
Washington . . . . .	39,896	39,269	36,853	304	221	158	14,190	14,188	13,910
Oregon . . . . .	36,129	35,400	33,436	1,103	869	560	7,189	6,764	6,783
California . . . . .	135,228	132,947	126,772	0	0	0	13,224	12,165	11,385
Pacific . . . . .	211,255	207,612	197,061	1,407	1,090	718	34,603	33,117	32,078
UNITED STATES . . . . .	2,583,901	2,485,232	2,350,346	65,739	5/ 48,766	5/ 33,441	893,414	890,516	907,181
Puerto Rico . . . . .	11,634	11,282	10,855						

1/ Data back to 1930 available in earlier issues of the Agricultural Finance Review.

2/ From reports of Farm Credit Administration.

3/ Including joint stock land banks in receivership.

4/ Estimates based upon direct reports from life insurance companies, official reports submitted to State insurance commissioners, and Best's Life Insurance Reports.

5/ Revised.

6/ Less than \$500.

7/ Includes loans called for foreclosure amounting to \$985,133 which are not distributable by States.

8/ Includes loans called for foreclosure amounting to \$673,151 which are not distributable by States.

Table 7 - Federal Land Bank and Land Bank Commissioner loans: Amount outstanding, principal repayments, other deductions, and loans closed, 1933-42 1/

Year and quarter	Loans outstanding at beginning of year or quarter 1,000 dollars	Decreases in loans			Loans closed 1,000 dollars	Net change in outstanding loans 1,000 dollars	Loans outstanding at end of year or quarter 1,000 dollars
		Principal repayments 1,000 dollars	Other deductions (net) 2/ 1,000 dollars	Total 1,000 dollars			
1933	1,126,564	19,954	27,538	47,492	151,635	+104,143	1,232,707
1934	1,232,707	26,847	18,439	47,282	730,367	+683,085	1,915,792
1935	1,915,792	41,391	50,546	92,537	248,670	+150,133	2,071,925
1936	2,071,925	51,592	65,346	116,937	109,170	- 7,767	2,064,158
1937	2,064,158	67,380	24,561	91,941	63,092	- 26,851	2,035,307
1938	2,035,307	69,586	34,916	104,502	51,419	- 53,083	1,982,224
1939	1,982,224	92,451	36,700	129,151	51,582	- 77,569	1,904,655
1940	1,904,655	3/ 97,413	3/ 20,299	3/ 117,712	3/ 64,275	- 53,437	1,851,218
1941:							
Jan.-March	1,851,218	29,777	7,256	37,033	21,319	- 15,714	1,835,504
Apr.-June	1,835,504	27,393	7,053	34,446	16,880	- 17,566	1,817,938
July-Sept.	1,817,938	30,159	5,302	35,461	12,849	- 22,612	1,795,386
Oct.-Dec.	1,795,386	41,375	3,573	45,948	18,020	- 30,928	1,764,398
1942:							
Jan.-March	1,764,398	43,309	7,470	50,779	17,506	- 33,273	1,731,125
Apr.-June	1,731,125	37,104	5,794	42,898	17,579	- 25,319	1,705,806
Land Bank Commissioner							
1933		51	24	75	70,813	+ 70,738	70,738
1934	70,738	4,210	2,838	7,046	553,135	+46,087	616,825
1935	616,825	11,955	6,540	18,495	196,396	+177,901	794,726
1936	794,726	23,556	11,650	35,206	77,258	+ 42,052	836,778
1937	836,778	46,513	17,536	64,049	40,020	- 24,029	812,749
1938	812,749	57,825	31,468	89,293	29,395	- 59,893	752,851
1939	752,851	64,005	25,383	89,388	27,417	- 61,971	690,880
1940	690,880	3/ 61,183	3/ 16,065	3/ 73,248	3/ 36,664	- 42,584	648,296
1941:							
Jan.-March	648,296	17,683	3,087	20,730	12,117	- 8,613	639,683
Apr.-June	639,683	15,108	4,191	19,299	3/ 9,735	3/ - 9,564	630,119
July-Sept.	630,119	18,481	3,021	21,502	7,423	- 14,079	616,040
Oct.-Dec.	616,040	25,181	2,355	27,536	8,258	- 19,238	596,802
1942:							
Jan.-March	596,802	23,797	2,419	26,216	9,362	- 16,854	579,948
Apr.-June	579,948	19,327	2,789	22,116	9,913	- 12,203	567,745

1/ Including Puerto Rico.

2/ Includes foreclosures, voluntary deeds, loans in process of foreclosure, etc., less increases in loans by reason of reamortizations, reinstatements, etc.

3/ Revised.

Farm Credit Administration

Table 8 - Estimated amount of interest charges payable on farm-mortgage debt, by geographic divisions, 1910, 1923, 1930, 1935, and 1938-41 1/

Geographic division	1910	1923	1930	1935	1938	1939	1940	1941 2/
	1,000 dollars							
New England . . . . .	3,392	8,444	10,092	9,535	9,582	9,739	9,867	9,954
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	14,715	26,526	26,890	22,477	21,097	20,868	20,588	20,372
East North Central . . . . .	46,373	125,586	107,082	78,940	68,129	67,151	65,982	64,991
West North Central . . . . .	77,492	282,608	198,276	136,501	110,581	106,482	102,518	100,076
South Atlantic . . . . .	8,710	33,833	32,082	27,399	20,259	20,115	19,772	19,680
East South Central . . . . .	8,052	25,459	25,804	17,958	16,825	16,996	17,040	17,247
West South Central . . . . .	21,358	73,596	72,675	51,601	44,557	43,714	43,094	43,206
Mountain . . . . .	8,566	53,704	38,972	27,134	24,084	23,659	23,350	22,992
Pacific . . . . .	13,530	49,472	59,200	44,419	42,066	41,389	42,007	41,380
United States . . . . .	203,188	679,220	571,776	410,964	357,180	350,713	344,218	340,500

1/ Payable during calendar year. Excludes amounts paid by Secretary of the Treasury to Federal land banks, 1935-41 and Land Bank Commissioner, 1938-41, as reimbursement for interest reductions granted borrowers. Data for omitted years in Agricultural Finance Review, May 1940.

2/ Preliminary.

Table 9 - Agricultural loans held by insured commercial banks, by States, on specified dates, 1941-42 1/

State and division	Farm real estate loans				Personal and collateral loans			
	1941		1942		1941		1942	
	January 1	July 1	January 1	July 1	January 1	July 1	January 1	July 1
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars
Maine	1,741	1,815	1,802	1,806	1,808	1,927	1,952	1,921
New Hampshire	623	628	665	639	887	899	914	874
Vermont	8,133	7,800	7,764	7,584	3,271	3,338	3,297	3,385
Massachusetts	1,304	1,264	1,197	1,194	1,943	1,858	1,810	1,926
Rhode Island	127	450	224	223	95	90	128	143
Connecticut	1,309	1,431	1,365	1,216	1,858	1,787	1,282	1,240
New England	13,237	13,386	13,017	12,662	3,862	3,839	9,413	9,489
New York	14,808	14,728	14,246	13,999	30,792	29,548	31,743	33,649
New Jersey	4,503	4,702	4,889	4,807	5,366	6,155	5,527	5,722
Pennsylvania	26,975	26,296	27,078	26,022	20,603	19,659	19,941	17,198
Middle Atlantic	46,286	46,416	46,213	44,826	55,761	55,362	57,211	56,599
Ohio	41,381	42,265	40,940	40,398	30,734	29,506	32,679	27,502
Indiana	22,869	23,161	22,861	22,965	31,494	31,610	33,175	27,783
Illinois	24,254	24,579	24,565	23,590	79,025	70,713	82,131	72,456
Michigan	15,827	16,742	16,772	15,996	20,554	21,681	20,778	20,125
Wisconsin	25,298	26,163	26,027	26,174	24,219	26,621	24,498	24,665
East North Central	129,629	133,210	131,165	129,123	186,026	180,131	193,261	172,531
Minnesota	20,153	20,339	20,407	19,807	81,663	63,962	83,487	56,984
Iowa	46,425	47,390	46,814	45,481	100,244	116,710	118,713	117,572
Missouri	19,779	19,975	21,241	19,098	59,183	54,120	55,548	55,460
North Dakota	1,165	1,128	985	891	28,335	14,636	43,985	12,605
South Dakota	2,047	2,059	2,014	2,010	26,843	26,554	35,487	25,781
Nebraska	7,627	7,657	7,396	6,973	61,485	60,262	84,587	61,276
Kansas	10,821	10,751	10,013	9,825	69,389	51,759	90,599	55,748
West North Central	108,017	109,299	108,870	104,085	437,072	388,003	542,246	385,426
Delaware	3,402	3,464	3,468	3,662	614	682	1,148	1,481
Maryland	9,853	10,137	9,959	9,987	4,250	4,366	5,967	4,040
District of Columbia	77	59	55	39	15	2	10	0
Virginia	16,699	16,653	16,615	15,854	13,477	14,207	12,622	14,601
West Virginia	5,530	6,525	5,458	5,497	3,006	3,161	2,757	2,975
North Carolina	8,493	9,348	10,784	12,039	7,970	10,653	5,718	10,858
South Carolina	1,674	1,805	1,740	1,790	6,028	6,672	6,032	7,833
Georgia	7,238	7,649	7,193	7,273	25,756	27,418	24,612	20,884
Florida	3,033	2,798	3,119	2,849	5,004	3,631	5,091	3,153
South Atlantic	55,299	58,612	58,591	58,990	66,120	60,732	66,157	66,425
Kentucky	24,054	24,553	24,245	23,674	17,262	16,266	16,298	16,096
Tennessee	12,907	13,405	12,493	12,151	39,866	36,782	46,009	19,636
Alabama	5,303	5,520	5,212	5,084	18,521	19,819	19,346	19,135
Mississippi	6,271	6,373	7,489	7,475	11,379	13,126	15,336	15,763
East South Central	50,535	51,851	49,439	48,384	87,028	85,991	96,989	70,530
Arkansas	3,511	3,920	3,599	3,666	17,156	15,304	16,652	15,903
Louisiana	6,314	7,015	6,516	6,604	25,131	17,818	10,123	9,793
Oklahoma	4,321	4,387	4,230	4,345	40,227	37,791	44,783	41,497
Texas	10,707	10,601	10,168	9,916	137,610	109,158	144,076	134,622
West South Central	24,851	25,923	24,613	24,521	220,326	180,071	215,634	201,615
Montana	1,001	1,033	865	968	23,354	16,508	30,917	15,854
Idaho	1,303	1,305	1,235	1,401	14,443	12,246	15,950	11,906
Wyoming	948	1,090	1,000	999	12,188	13,635	13,949	12,748
Colorado	2,598	2,416	2,272	2,160	28,687	24,541	46,814	25,966
New Mexico	561	606	498	426	6,557	8,038	8,075	8,444
Arizona	872	691	669	594	9,670	10,962	12,683	10,079
Utah	2,562	2,995	2,634	2,711	10,459	9,492	11,255	10,082
Nevada	395	381	313	303	1,763	1,757	2,076	2,067
Mountain	10,523	10,517	9,486	9,522	107,121	97,179	142,352	97,145
Washington	5,009	5,459	4,997	5,172	18,883	17,407	29,061	17,004
Oregon	2,089	2,086	1,911	1,669	12,809	11,725	20,392	10,692
California	97,231	94,365	86,910	82,891	79,267	80,764	79,211	76,726
Pacific	104,329	101,910	93,818	89,132	110,999	109,896	128,664	104,422
UNITED STATES	543,408	551,126	535,212	521,247	1,281,275	1,167,204	1,149,937	1,164,452
Possessions 2/	118	98	88	69	7	5	4	2

1/ Loans are classified according to location of bank and therefore are not strictly comparable by States with data for other lenders, which are classified according to location of security or borrower. Data back to 1935 available in earlier issues of the Agricultural Finance Review.

2/ Alaska, Hawaii, and Virgin Islands.

Based on reports to the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Table 10a.- Short-term and intermediate-term loans to farmers by production credit associations, private financing institutions discounting with Federal intermediate credit banks, and regional agricultural credit corporations, outstanding on specified dates, 1941-42, by States

State and division	Production credit associations				Private financing institutions 1/				Regional agricultural credit corporations July 1, 1942	
	1941		1942		1941		1942			
	January 1	July 1	January 1	July 1	January 1	July 1	January 1	July 1		
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	
Maine .....	855	1,030	980	1,055	352	463	433	469	0	
New Hampshire .....	193	226	211	255	0	0	0	0	0	
Vermont .....	1,106	1,172	1,129	1,267	208	239	230	248	0	
Massachusetts .....	626	768	649	978	0	0	0	0	1	
Rhode Island .....	419	388	443	401	0	0	0	0	0	
Connecticut .....	1,487	1,502	1,469	1,248	35	24	39	21	0	
New England .....	6,586	6,866	6,881	5,207	595	726	702	698	1	
New York .....	5,975	7,381	6,471	6,700	14	2/	15	70	9	
New Jersey .....	1,234	1,676	1,230	1,864	2	50	0	56	111	
Pennsylvania .....	3,049	3,474	3,491	4,023	0	2/	6	0	0	
Middle Atlantic .....	10,258	12,531	11,192	14,587	16	50	21	126	120	
Ohio .....	6,893	6,877	6,582	6,801	993	1,001	935	880	0	
Indiana .....	7,068	7,862	7,501	8,360	678	575	758	587	0	
Illinois .....	10,739	10,630	10,973	11,776	1,018	991	1,208	1,085	0	
Michigan .....	2,408	2,643	2,303	2,644	202	168	153	96	4	
Wisconsin .....	5,533	6,159	5,373	5,653	956	1,052	1,006	1,003	1	
West North Central .....	32,941	36,371	32,732	35,234	3,847	3,787	4,060	3,591	11	
Minnesota .....	6,233	6,209	6,157	6,087	1,737	1,715	1,718	1,751	55	
Iowa .....	5,562	5,495	6,230	5,862	540	530	612	799	1	
Missouri .....	6,362	7,328	6,688	8,653	706	711	704	736	0	
North Dakota .....	1,090	1,110	1,394	1,823	1,241	1,263	1,108	916	1,218	
South Dakota .....	3,247	3,794	3,928	4,304	152	216	181	217	95	
Nebraska .....	3,687	4,501	4,679	5,030	289	292	546	399	13	
Kansas .....	6,158	6,203	5,316	2,144	152	162	265	341	5	
West North Central .....	30,349	32,936	34,392	36,903	4,824	4,652	5,334	5,159	1,350	
Delaware .....	265	332	321	425	0	0	0	0	0	
Maryland .....	1,709	1,909	1,746	2,316	0	0	0	0	0	
District of Columbia .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Virginia .....	2,957	3,222	2,657	3,912	112	117	92	99	0	
West Virginia .....	1,012	1,146	1,058	1,197	0	0	0	0	8	
North Carolina .....	1,338	7,219	1,780	8,455	0	263	39	274	0	
South Carolina .....	661	4,539	1,514	5,392	0	51	0	61	0	
Georgia .....	2,176	6,750	3,186	8,052	0	0	0	0	3	
Florida .....	4,355	3,029	4,274	3,296	358	40	314	51	11	
South Atlantic .....	13,973	26,146	16,536	33,045	470	472	645	485	24	
Kentucky .....	3,924	3,987	4,046	4,906	44	66	41	36	0	
Tennessee .....	3,230	3,609	2,971	4,168	117	247	68	995	0	
Alabama .....	1,673	3,056	1,639	4,196	247	298	174	219	0	
Mississippi .....	2,670	7,804	2,437	9,544	650	1,132	1,599	3,401	1	
West South Central .....	11,487	18,456	11,093	22,814	1,058	1,750	1,882	4,651	1	
Arkansas .....	2,095	5,152	1,816	5,823	260	1,266	349	488	3	
Louisiana .....	2,389	5,376	2,620	6,855	568	1,354	512	1,582	0	
Oklahoma .....	4,047	4,678	4,219	5,489	1,942	2,310	2,465	2,830	1	
Texas .....	15,871	23,637	23,160	27,643	10,919	11,745	13,698	14,129	60	
West South Central .....	24,402	38,843	31,815	45,810	13,689	16,675	17,024	19,029	64	
Montana .....	7,287	8,347	6,097	8,569	363	366	264	289	153	
Idaho .....	5,202	4,861	5,113	5,189	297	288	152	248	245	
Wyoming .....	1,717	2,137	1,708	1,948	702	810	709	848	0	
Colorado .....	4,441	5,410	4,807	5,997	512	804	503	794	40	
New Mexico .....	2,400	3,173	2,619	3,033	569	1,359	978	1,475		
Arizona .....	1,859	2,316	2,182	2,260	55	794	145	1,424	0	
Utah .....	3,873	1,984	2,102	1,996	2,345	3,050	2,591	2,890	0	
Nevada .....	1,358	1,202	1,394	1,332	21	318	2	3	0	
Mountain .....	26,137	30,030	25,382	30,324	4,664	7,509	5,144	7,971	438	
Washington .....	2,198	2,419	1,822	2,505	998	574	574	383	2,200	
Oregon .....	4,916	5,437	4,762	5,444	48	89	34	2	0	
California .....	9,169	11,846	10,402	13,973	2,707	3,687	2,519	3,520	0	
Pacific .....	16,463	19,702	16,986	21,922	3,753	4,290	3,127	3,905	2,200	
UNITED STATES .....	170,686	219,903	185,611	245,846	33,116	48,106	37,939	45,635	4,249	
Puerto Rico .....	1,626	1,516	2,057	2,049	986	78	1,283	1,309	0	

1/ Includes only loans from and discounts with Federal intermediate credit banks.

2/ Less than \$500.

Farm Credit Administration.

Table 11.- Emergency crop and feed loans held by the Farm Credit Administration, and rural rehabilitation loans held by the Farm Security Administration, by States, for selected dates, 1941-42

State and division	Emergency crop and feed loans <sup>1/</sup>				Rural rehabilitation loans <sup>2/</sup>			
	1941		1942		1941		1942	
	January 1 1,000 dollars	July 1 1,000 dollars	January 1 1,000 dollars	July 1 1,000 dollars	January 1 1,000 dollars	July 1 1,000 dollars	January 1 1,000 dollars	July 1 1,000 dollars
Maine . . . . .	679	800	718	841	4,471	5,071	4,748	5,279
New Hampshire . . . . .	29	37	31	36	926	994	995	1,181
Vermont . . . . .	43	64	46	78	867	922	911	1,018
Massachusetts . . . . .	68	67	69	71	508	536	485	604
Rhode Island . . . . .	4/	1	4/	0	155	158	157	187
Connecticut . . . . .	24	34	21	32	122	207	107	185
New England . . . . .	823	1,003	875	1,060	7,249	7,388	7,603	8,654
New York . . . . .	203	300	395	342	4,301	4,604	4,489	5,266
New Jersey . . . . .	53	93	60	93	1,113	1,284	1,149	1,462
Pennsylvania . . . . .	576	725	618	755	3,059	3,502	3,222	4,447
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	832	1,119	873	1,200	8,473	9,390	9,393	11,193
Ohio . . . . .	346	391	387	390	6,759	7,377	6,935	7,661
Indiana . . . . .	378	403	364	408	5,535	5,818	5,137	5,389
Illinois . . . . .	299	295	289	281	7,054	7,302	6,719	6,874
Michigan . . . . .	606	634	596	627	6,285	7,014	6,889	7,755
Wisconsin . . . . .	1,631	1,621	1,537	1,512	7,633	8,173	7,286	8,018
East North Central . . . . .	3,216	3,384	3,073	3,218	33,206	35,684	32,768	35,697
Minnesota . . . . .	7,943	8,041	7,690	7,745	11,013	12,204	11,835	13,279
Iowa . . . . .	518	529	486	548	7,416	7,174	6,591	7,132
Missouri . . . . .	2,374	2,376	2,280	2,306	13,442	14,405	12,614	13,880
North Dakota . . . . .	42,778	43,362	42,272	42,748	10,166	10,945	9,664	10,366
South Dakota . . . . .	29,117	29,124	28,226	28,087	15,311	16,950	16,317	17,400
Nebraska . . . . .	7,910	8,071	7,653	7,510	12,815	13,982	13,253	14,270
Kansas . . . . .	3,653	3,692	3,143	3,272	11,456	12,605	11,727	12,265
West North Central . . . . .	100,293	101,195	97,750	98,216	81,639	88,265	82,001	89,992
Delaware . . . . .	64	78	71	86	132	161	167	214
Maryland . . . . .	350	410	358	431	5/ 770	5/ 951	5/ 874	5/ 1,213
Virginia . . . . .	1,936	2,475	1,917	2,532	2/ 3,536	2/ 4,202	2/ 3,697	2/ 3,657
West Virginia . . . . .	385	422	340	432	2,935	3,347	3,097	2,956
North Carolina . . . . .	1,561	2,577	1,521	2,855	5,100	7,991	5,693	9,195
South Carolina . . . . .	2,108	3,577	2,588	3,387	7,155	8,086	8,377	10,360
Georgia . . . . .	2,406	3,901	2,382	4,258	14,129	16,574	16,586	21,176
Florida . . . . .	1,626	1,590	1,666	1,649	5,605	5,928	5,986	6,724
South Atlantic . . . . .	10,430	15,130	11,093	16,640	39,362	47,280	44,437	56,095
Kentucky . . . . .	1,156	1,219	1,073	1,161	4,075	4,757	4,873	4,811
Tennessee . . . . .	967	1,239	914	1,178	2,452	3,199	2,765	2,902
Alabama . . . . .	1,863	2,517	1,884	2,582	14,982	17,895	18,866	22,803
Mississippi . . . . .	1,765	2,293	1,843	2,474	11,360	16,732	14,757	19,394
East South Central . . . . .	5,751	7,368	5,715	7,339	32,869	42,543	41,261	49,910
Arkansas . . . . .	3,291	3,997	3,287	4,007	12,219	16,049	13,375	16,944
Louisiana . . . . .	1,472	2,178	1,608	2,580	6,616	10,288	9,522	13,537
Oklahoma . . . . .	2,721	2,777	2,635	2,813	15,736	17,678	16,587	18,801
Texas . . . . .	11,437	12,843	11,356	12,736	22,756	27,846	26,153	31,179
West South Central . . . . .	18,921	21,795	18,846	22,116	57,327	71,861	65,577	80,461
Montana . . . . .	13,627	13,777	13,014	13,064	7,425	8,294	7,976	9,819
Idaho . . . . .	913	973	813	911	5,417	6,338	5,691	6,595
Wyoming . . . . .	2,120	2,139	1,829	1,824	6,701	7,684	7,358	8,772
Colorado . . . . .	3,968	4,076	3,826	3,983	10,386	11,602	11,206	12,677
New Mexico . . . . .	2,723	2,911	2,727	2,877	3,050	3,487	3,226	3,792
Arizona . . . . .	226	262	243	274	1,246	1,535	1,516	1,596
Utah . . . . .	1,317	1,324	1,170	1,135	3,901	4,282	3,996	4,105
Nevada . . . . .	43	42	35	31	423	470	435	474
Mountain . . . . .	24,233	25,504	23,657	24,079	38,549	51,518	41,404	48,030
Washington . . . . .	1,774	1,230	1,021	1,094	4,978	5,585	4,993	5,924
Oregon . . . . .	368	413	351	359	3,226	3,488	3,131	3,980
California . . . . .	504	706	500	666	5,839	7,089	6,715	7,336
Pacific . . . . .	2,646	2,349	1,872	2,159	16,043	16,042	16,839	17,242
UNITED STATES . . . . .	5/ 167,862	2/ 178,818	5/ 163,792	2/ 176,062	312,717	362,545	339,083	397,274
Possessions <sup>10/</sup> . . . . .	576	669	1,162	1,003	160	366	472	1,009

<sup>1/</sup> Includes drought-relief loans made in 1934 and 1935 and orchard-rehabilitation loans made in 1942.<sup>2/</sup> Loans to individuals on and off projects, water-facility loans, and project equipment loans. Includes loans from State corporation trust funds and from the Resettlement Administration, the predecessor of the Farm Security Administration.<sup>3/</sup> Revised to exclude small amount of special real estate loans.<sup>4/</sup> Less than \$500.<sup>5/</sup> Includes small amount of loans made in the District of Columbia.<sup>6/</sup> Includes \$17,000 not allocable by States.<sup>7/</sup> Includes \$11,000 not allocable by States.<sup>8/</sup> Includes \$39,000 not allocable by States.<sup>9/</sup> Includes \$15,000 not allocable by States.<sup>10/</sup> Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.

Farm Credit Administration and Farm Security Administration.

Table 12.- Farm Security Administration loans outstanding: Number of individual borrowers and amount of various types of loans, by States, July 1, 1942 1/

State and division	Loans to individuals				Loans to cooperatives 2/	Total loans		
	Number of individual borrowers	Rural rehabil- itation 3/		Tenant purchase and development				
		Number	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars				
Maine .....	4,201	5,279	93	89	5	5,466		
New Hampshire .....	1,205	1,181	10	48	34	1,333		
Vermont .....	1,131	1,018	39	133	0	1,190		
Massachusetts .....	863	604	0	70	0	674		
Rhode Island .....	247	187	0	10	0	197		
Connecticut .....	108	385	0	72	0	157		
New England .....	8,055	8,554	142	422	99	9,317		
New York .....	5,469	5,264	168	910	652	6,988		
New Jersey .....	1,419	1,482	8	311	254	2,055		
Pennsylvania .....	5,661	4,447	69	1,712	770	6,398		
Middle Atlantic .....	12,569	11,193	232	2,933	1,676	16,041		
Ohio .....	23,848	7,661	157	3,734	1,046	12,598		
Indiana .....	11,058	5,389	104	3,135	1,366	9,994		
Illinois .....	14,366	6,874	42	5,385	706	13,007		
Michigan .....	13,364	7,755	284	1,746	52	9,637		
Wisconsin .....	26,515	8,018	985	2,271	46	11,320		
East North Central .....	89,051	35,097	1,572	16,271	3,216	56,756		
Minnesota .....	33,640	13,279	1,237	3,748	47	18,311		
Iowa .....	13,538	7,132	63	5,745	1,015	13,955		
Missouri .....	54,393	33,880	201	5,438	2,603	22,122		
North Dakota .....	36,950	10,366	12	1,532	318	12,228		
South Dakota .....	37,916	17,800	13	1,658	101	19,566		
Nebraska .....	17,526	14,270	0	2,813	191	17,274		
Kansas .....	17,778	13,265	53	3,256	427	16,901		
West North Central .....	211,741	83,992	1,579	24,186	1,502	120,359		
Delaware .....	313	214	0	158	0	372		
Maryland 4/ .....	1,716	1,213	0	592	10	1,815		
Virginia 4/ .....	13,223	3,657	0	3,016	302	6,975		
West Virginia .....	10,612	2,956	6	1,207	2,689	6,818		
North Carolina .....	21,369	9,195	543	7,571	1,686	18,995		
South Carolina .....	18,973	10,960	118	5,792	612	17,512		
Georgia .....	38,422	21,176	182	9,568	1,542	32,268		
Florida .....	15,143	6,724	130	710	1,052	8,619		
South Atlantic .....	119,772	56,095	979	28,114	7,886	93,374		
Kentucky .....	20,410	4,811	227	4,609	0	9,647		
Tennessee .....	13,652	2,902	123	5,675	1,382	10,082		
Alabama .....	43,334	22,803	253	8,004	2,350	33,410		
Mississippi .....	38,090	19,394	660	5,379	1,706	30,339		
East South Central .....	115,486	49,910	1,463	26,667	5,438	83,478		
Arkansas .....	47,328	16,944	1,280	6,353	2,398	26,975		
Louisiana .....	47,842	13,537	175	4,479	1,782	19,973		
Oklahoma .....	33,723	18,801	372	6,877	90	26,100		
Texas .....	61,059	31,179	609	15,348	1,968	49,104		
West South Central .....	191,952	80,462	2,436	33,057	6,198	122,152		
Montana .....	7,695	9,819	951	558	963	12,291		
Idaho .....	6,177	5,595	299	633	257	7,784		
Wyoming .....	5,395	8,772	105	207	43	9,127		
Colorado .....	13,063	12,877	318	1,192	339	14,726		
New Mexico .....	18,340	3,792	5	410	204	4,411		
Arizona .....	1,867	1,596	1	168	241	2,006		
Utah .....	5,489	4,105	45	214	113	4,477		
Nevada .....	687	474	0	43	274	789		
Mountain .....	58,733	48,030	1,724	3,423	2,434	55,611		
Washington .....	6,189	5,924	242	782	897	7,845		
Oregon .....	4,854	3,980	286	593	286	5,145		
California .....	7,505	7,338	17	1,570	2,064	10,989		
Pacific .....	18,648	17,242	546	2,945	3,247	23,979		
UNITED STATES .....	826,606	397,274	10,679	138,318	34,796	581,067		
Possessions 5/ .....	5,224	1,009	0	2,450	213	3,672		

1/ Includes loans from State corporation trust funds and from the Resettlement Administration, the predecessor of the Farm Security Administration.

2/ Loans to individuals on and off projects, water facility loans, and project equipment loans.

3/ In addition to loans for construction of farmstead improvements, this now includes special real estate loans which totaled \$3,880,000 on July 1, 1942.

4/ In addition to loans to cooperative associations, this now includes loans to defense relocation corporations.

5/ Includes small amount of loans in the District of Columbia.

6/ Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.

Table 13.- Tenant-purchase loans approved by Farm Security Administration: Number of borrowers, acreage, cost of properties, and amount of loans, by States, from organization to July 1, 1942 1/

State and division	Borrowers	Acreage	Cost of properties			Cost borne by borrowers	Tenant-purchase loans
			Original purchase price 2/	Cost of added improvements	Total cost		
	Number	Acres	Dollars	Dollars	Dollars	Dollars	Dollars
Maine .....	32	4,246	116,486	28,085	144,571	790	143,781
New Hampshire .....	6	1,094	45,037	14,412	60,049	0	60,049
Vermont .....	26	5,076	131,914	25,575	157,489	0	157,489
Massachusetts .....	17	1,632	53,073	22,200	105,273	386	104,887
Rhode Island .....	3	75	11,019	3,714	14,733	0	14,733
Connecticut .....	11	1,123	80,569	11,957	92,526	605	91,721
New England .....	97	13,846	468,598	105,943	574,541	1,381	572,660
New York .....	212	32,477	1,064,168	229,579	1,293,747	1,415	1,292,332
New Jersey .....	45	4,019	311,296	51,484	362,780	0	362,780
Pennsylvania .....	365	42,281	1,758,211	421,452	2,189,663	1,602	2,188,061
Middle Atlantic .....	622	78,737	3,143,675	702,515	3,846,190	3,017	3,843,173
Ohio .....	490	53,993	3,379,686	637,114	4,016,800	23,344	3,993,456
Indiana .....	355	41,001	2,788,009	515,863	3,303,872	8,329	3,295,513
Illinois .....	559	78,772	4,898,432	817,230	5,715,662	29,506	5,686,156
Michigan .....	263	31,615	1,634,855	373,747	2,008,602	3,972	2,004,630
Wisconsin .....	341	30,100	2,059,928	425,060	2,494,988	12,922	2,481,766
East North Central .....	2,008	235,481	14,770,610	2,769,014	17,539,624	76,073	17,461,551
Minnesota .....	429	83,042	3,475,217	522,977	3,998,194	29,410	3,968,784
Iowa .....	663	91,620	5,384,275	734,411	6,118,686	76,180	6,042,506
Missouri .....	920	144,045	4,394,076	1,301,988	5,696,062	6,349	5,689,713
North Dakota .....	277	145,030	1,400,874	470,279	1,871,153	1,905	1,869,248
South Dakota .....	278	128,050	1,697,321	399,549	2,096,870	3,496	2,093,374
Nebraska .....	358	107,409	3,065,831	473,359	3,539,190	11,110	3,528,080
Kansas .....	430	112,158	3,101,420	661,465	3,762,885	4,886	3,757,999
West North Central .....	3,385	811,354	22,519,012	4,564,028	27,083,940	133,336	26,949,704
Delaware .....	35	6,542	164,819	40,295	205,114	1,100	204,014
Maryland .....	125	18,245	662,837	156,262	819,099	300	818,799
Virginia .....	626	85,275	2,469,397	681,117	3,350,514	3,832	3,346,682
West Virginia .....	284	39,080	1,065,727	325,539	1,391,266	900	1,390,366
North Carolina .....	1,973	180,280	6,048,955	2,761,818	8,810,773	5,882	8,804,891
South Carolina .....	1,682	184,586	4,390,068	2,653,830	7,043,898	6,620	7,037,278
Georgia .....	2,924	356,296	6,444,971	4,789,380	11,233,877	7,760	11,226,117
Florida .....	252	37,905	545,810	458,473	1,004,283	510	1,003,773
South Atlantic .....	7,904	908,189	21,792,110	12,056,714	33,858,824	26,904	33,831,920
Kentucky .....	679	82,536	3,819,312	1,066,366	4,885,678	9,883	4,875,795
Tennessee .....	1,203	184,411	4,542,920	1,933,445	6,476,365	4,093	6,472,272
Alabama .....	2,562	257,047	5,966,493	4,285,762	10,252,255	14,966	10,237,289
Mississippi .....	2,622	226,176	6,637,971	4,590,056	11,228,027	355	11,227,672
West South Central .....	7,066	710,170	20,966,696	11,875,629	32,842,325	29,297	32,813,028
Arkansas .....	1,818	169,666	4,592,777	3,279,033	7,871,810	712	7,871,798
Louisiana .....	1,303	98,155	3,781,662	2,736,245	6,517,907	1,645	6,516,262
Oklahoma .....	1,220	227,728	5,674,431	1,855,289	7,529,720	18,195	7,511,525
Texas .....	2,153	478,500	11,819,854	4,214,956	16,034,810	26,452	16,008,358
West South Central .....	6,494	974,049	25,868,724	12,085,523	37,954,247	47,004	37,907,243
Montana .....	66	22,955	443,914	194,253	638,167	0	638,167
Idaho .....	71	8,616	563,287	138,057	701,344	650	700,694
Wyoming .....	28	5,017	188,611	65,683	254,294	2,380	251,914
Colorado .....	137	29,858	1,129,160	258,712	1,387,872	5,672	1,382,200
New Mexico .....	47	14,478	306,494	122,837	429,331	0	429,331
Arizona .....	20	1,292	151,501	17,956	169,457	0	169,457
Utah .....	32	2,878	207,201	45,208	252,409	0	252,409
Nevada .....	5	1,321	38,931	3,869	42,800	0	42,800
Mountain .....	406	86,419	3,029,099	846,575	3,875,674	8,702	3,866,972
Washington .....	97	15,363	668,050	142,401	810,451	1,650	808,801
Oregon .....	69	9,313	485,373	128,180	613,553	195	613,358
California .....	189	10,570	1,381,729	301,135	1,682,864	1,240	1,681,624
Pacific .....	355	35,246	2,535,152	572,716	3,106,868	3,085	3,103,783
UNITED STATES .....	28,337	3,853,487	115,093,776	45,587,657	160,681,433	331,399	160,350,034
Possessions 3/ .....	608	20,563	2,052,116	899,002	2,951,118	4,175	2,946,943

1/ Includes supplemental loans and loans from State corporation trust funds.

2/ Includes fees incidental to the purchase of properties, amounting to \$1,222,470 in the United States and \$28,694 in the possessions.

3/ Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

Farm Security Administration.

Table 14.- Commodity Credit Corporation: Cotton, corn, wheat, and other loans made, by States, 1941 and cumulative since organization.<sup>1/</sup>

State and division	Calendar year 1941					Cumulative, 1933 through 1941							
	Cotton		Corn		Wheat	Other	Cotton		Corn		Wheat	Other	Total
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	
Massachusetts .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,656	10,656	
New York .....	-	-	119	-	-	119	-	-	-	412	-	412	
Pennsylvania .....	-	-	502	-	-	502	-	-	-	607	21	628	
North Atlantic .....	-	-	621	-	-	621	-	-	-	1,019	10,677	11,696	
Ohio .....	-	259	7,196	9	7,504	-	-	2,415	12,078	9	14,502		
Indiana .....	-	767	7,653	19	8,439	-	10,174	11,175	27,282	32,183	21,571		
Illinois .....	2	9,354	12,370	27	21,753	-	133,964	131,411	1,130	4,235	193,131		
Michigan .....	-	3	657	1	651	-	-	-	-	189	1,175	1,572	
Wisconsin .....	-	12	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	4,235		
West North Central .....	2	10,435	27,876	56	34,369	-	2	146,747	55,900	32,607	235,256		
Minnesota .....	-	6,002	7,150	1,468	14,620	-	-	45,575	28,214	2,727	76,516		
Iowa .....	-	37,856	850	13	34,729	-	-	265,804	4,980	165	273,949		
Missouri .....	2,404	1,956	5,741	1	10,102	15,076	10,111	20,383	1,029	46,599	46,599		
North Dakota .....	-	49	58,756	1,523	60,428	-	-	87	126,053	3,519	129,659		
South Dakota .....	-	2,893	20,016	1,759	24,668	-	-	13,059	76,237	2,696	51,992		
Nebraska .....	-	9,286	24,286	3,088	36,600	-	-	52,512	43,354	3,229	99,095		
Kansas .....	-	382	77,253	317	77,250	-	-	4,278	131,305	518	136,192		
West North Central .....	2,404	58,434	194,050	8,266	263,157	15,076	394,720	390,326	13,883	814,005			
Delaware .....	-	-	571	-	571	-	-	-	-	572	572		
Maryland .....	-	-	1,925	-	1,925	-	-	-	1,971	-	1,971		
Virginia .....	37	0	430	640	1,107	2,352	-	704	3,474	5,530			
West Virginia .....	-	-	37	52	89	-	-	76	52	128			
North Carolina .....	2,046	-	10	-	2,456	28,691	-	10	1,885	30,586			
South Carolina .....	3,908	-	2	-	3,910	45,378	-	2	-	45,380			
Georgia .....	9,305	-	-	1,642	11,147	94,004	-	-	37,838	131,842			
Florida .....	35	-	-	-	35	318	-	-	-	318			
South Atlantic .....	15,731	-	2,975	2,534	21,240	170,743	-	-	3,335	43,249	217,327		
Kentucky .....	-	54	1,160	4,681	5,895	-	193	2,172	7,933	10,318			
Tennessee .....	2,377	-	612	1,475	4,468	52,866	-	1,123	8,215	62,204			
Alabama .....	10,395	-	-	-	10,395	112,195	-	-	-	112,195			
Mississippi .....	4,310	-	-	-	4,310	100,172	-	-	-	100,172			
West South Central .....	17,082	54	1,772	6,156	25,064	265,160	193	3,295	16,168	284,816			
Arkansas .....	8,737	-	1	-	8,738	100,772	-	11	-	100,783			
Louisiana .....	1,469	-	-	-	1,469	46,785	-	-	-	46,785			
Oklahoma .....	15,982	-	17,155	60	33,197	44,574	-	40,355	71	85,000			
Texas .....	56,168	-	16,805	474	75,443	298,556	-	47,284	3,795	349,596			
West South Central .....	84,352	-	33,961	534	118,847	490,687	-	87,690	3,827	582,164			
Montana .....	-	-	29,704	103	29,807	-	-	-	-	64,628	64,628		
Idaho .....	-	-	7,543	44	7,591	-	-	-	-	17,147	17,147		
Wyoming .....	-	-	1,949	27	1,976	-	-	-	-	2,787	2,787		
Colorado .....	-	-	10,078	100	10,198	-	87	13,994	415	14,495			
New Mexico .....	1,090	-	617	1	1,708	6,049	-	1,131	494	7,634			
Arizona .....	5,223	-	-	-	5,223	16,672	-	-	-	16,672			
Utah .....	-	-	1,228	19	1,247	-	-	-	2,661	594	3,185		
Nevada .....	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	2	-	2			
Mountain .....	6,313	-	51,141	298	57,752	22,721	87	102,350	1,995	127,153			
Washington .....	-	-	19,146	12	19,158	-	-	-	-	29,709	29,709		
Oregon .....	-	-	13,614	12	13,626	-	-	-	-	24,368	24,368		
California .....	14,972	-	681	5,246	20,859	37,283	-	-	553	19,055	57,191		
Pacific .....	14,972	-	33,841	5,270	53,683	37,283	-	64,926	19,164	121,373			
Unallocated:													
1933-34 Cotton pool loans .....	-	-	-	-	-	51,416	-	-	-	-	51,416		
Tobacco program .....	-	-	-	30,824	30,824	-	-	-	-	102,668	102,668		
Grass 1/ .....	-	-	-	1,922	1,922	-	-	-	-	1,922	1,922		
Dairy products program .....	-	-	-	381,762	321,762	-	-	-	-	321,762	321,762		
Other purchases 1/	-	-	-	4/ 303	4/ 303	5/ 105,907	6/ 9,952	-	-	6,980	5/ 6/ 124,839		
Other unallocated	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
UNITED STATES .....	140,856	68,923	346,837	377,928	933,544	1,158,995	551,699	705,801	576,902	2,996,397			

1/ Includes face amounts of loans made directly by the Corporation, guaranteed loans made by banks and other lending agencies, and purchases of commodities by the Corporation. Excludes renewals, extensions, and storage advances. Guaranteed loans made by cooperatives on 1940 and 1941 cotton are distributed according to location of producer receiving the loan, whereas loans made directly to cooperative associations are distributed according to location of the association.

2/ Represents purchases for the Corporation under repurchase options granted to exporters, and also loans to exporters. Excludes loans to cooperatives, which are included in distribution by States.

3/ Represents expenditures for purchasing, handling, and transporting commodities, principally foodstuffs, bought for lend-lease operations or domestic distribution.

4/ Seed purchase programs.

5/ Includes \$99,498,000 of 1933 loans.

6/ Includes \$7,980,000 of 1938 loans made on 1937 corn.

Commodity Credit Corporation.

Table 10.- Commodity Credit Corporation: Loan and purchase operations from organization to July 1, 1942, and loans outstanding and commodities owned on July 1, 1942

Commodity program	Loans outstanding July 1, 1942				Unit	Commodities				
	Held by Corporation		Held by banks and others			Held July 1, 1942		Owned by Corporation July 1, 1942		
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars		1,000 units	1,000 units	1,000 units	1,000 dollars	
Cotton:										
1941	153,646	4,378	6/ 60,381	64,758	Bales	2,291	971	0	0	
1940	153,140	26	0	26	do.	1,180	1	2	19	
Previous	6/ 689,263	23	0	23	do.	6/ 16,766	6/ 1	3,990	241,013	
Total	1,196,049	5,657	60,381	64,838	do.	22,167	972	3,992	241,032	
Corn:										
1941	80,463	954	76,206	77,160	Bushels	110,250	105,768	0	0	
1940	62,909	955	23,863	22,618	do.	103,248	37,416	10/	10/	
Previous	11/ 479,890	53,150	0	53,150	do.	11/ 911,754	80,644	10/	10/	
Total	623,262	56,152	98,069	153,508	do.	1,129,246	223,830	62,267	46,728	
Wheat:										
1940	1,426	681	946	1,485	do.	1,384	1,294	0	0	
Resealed 1941	0	9,706	0	9,706	do.	0	1,297	0	0	
1941	360,589	82,257	5,681	87,708	do.	366,853	91,518	205,603	229,813	
Previous	357,188	795	0	795	do.	531,465	1,052	115,086	115,575	
Total	729,201	93,252	6,596	99,555	do.	893,935	104,598	319,589	345,528	
Tobacco 1/										
1941, flue-cured 1/	29,965	0	0	0	Pounds	105,771	0	105,555	32,493	
1941, other 1/	3,399	1,409	0	1,409	do.	22,191	7,480	14,139	2,406	
1940, flue-cured	37,718	2,793	0	2,793	do.	201,087	14,436	96,258	23,749	
1940, other	6,687	1,593	0	1,593	do.	66,233	18,697	46	105	
Previous	44,513	141	0	141	do.	15/ 259,183	2,423	4,054	814	
Total	123,276	6,540	0	6,540	do.	624,550	41,304	221,128	59,568	
Barley:										
Resealed 1941	0	227	0	227	Bushels	0	523	0	0	
1941	6,877	1,571	280	1,851	do.	16,251	4,217	4	2	
Resealed 1940	0	15	0	15	do.	0	47	0	0	
1940	2,380	2	0	2	do.	7,467	25	4	2	
Total	2,857	1,681	280	2,101	do.	23,718	4,812	6	2	
Butter:										
1940	19	0	0	0	Pounds	66	0	0	0	
Previous	32,137	0	0	0	do.	127,100	0	0	0	
Total	32,156	0	0	0	do.	127,166	0	0	0	
Dates: 1937	51	0	0	0						
Figs: 1937-39	260	0	0	0						
Planned: 1941	1,221	72	20	92						
Other: sorghums:										
1941	109	46	15	61	Bushels	323	173	10	4	
1940	22	0	0	0	do.	78	0	0	0	
Total	131	46	15	61	do.	400	173	10	4	
Hops: 1938	1,368	0	0	0	Pounds	7,077	0	0	0	
Peanuts:										
1940	1,867	0	0	0	Tons	29.4	0	0	0	
Previous	13,119	0	0	0	do.	220.8	0	0	0	
Total	14,986	0	0	0	do.	250.2	0	0	0	
Pecans: 1938	371	0	0	0	Pounds	3,705	0	0	0	
Prunes:										
1940	5,383	0	0	0	Tons	91.1	0	0	0	
Previous	2,754	0	0	0	do.	78.9	0	0	0	
Total	8,137	0	0	0	do.	170.0	0	0	0	
Raisins:										
1940	5,186	0	0	0	do.	109.8	0	0	0	
Previous	3,933	0	0	0	do.	128.1	0	0	0	
Total	9,079	0	0	0	do.	237.3	0	0	0	
Rye:										
Resealed 1941	0	16	0	16	Bushels	0	31	0	0	
1941	1,217	714	27	741	do.	2,442	1,475	0	0	
Resealed 1940	0	116	0	116	do.	0	257	0	0	
1940	1,618	2	0	2	do.	4,243	5	18	10	
1939	567	2/	0	2/	do.	1,500	2/	1	9/	
Total	3,402	616	27	615	do.	6,185	1,758	19	10	
Soybeans: 1941	151	13	71	84	do.	146	81	0	0	
Wool and mohair: 1938-39	16,830	0	0	0	Pounds	93,978	0	0	0	
Naval stores:										
1942, resin	669	670	0	670	Barrels	42	42	0	0	
1942, turpentine	516	516	0	516	Gallons	933	933	0	0	
1941, resin	1,576	1,564	0	1,564	Barrels	133	138	0	0	
Previous, resin	28,853	5,103	0	5,103	do.	2,502	446	0	0	
Previous, turpentine	7,466	6	0	6	Gallons	26,885	0	0	0	
Total naval stores	35,710	7,653	0	7,653		-	-	0	0	
Miscellaneous commodities 1/	939,637	416	0	416		-	-	-	399,135	
Grand total	3,745,567	170,950	165,459	336,409		-	-	-	1,091,869	

1/ Loans and purchases made by the Commodity Credit Corporation and guaranteed loans made by banks and other lending agencies. Excludes renewals, extensions, and most storage and transportation advances.

2/ Includes disbursements by the Corporation for certain charges, such as storage, but excludes unpaid accrued charges.

3/ Represents collateral for loans held by the Corporation and by banks and others.

4/ Includes commodities in process of sale.

5/ Includes unpaid accrued charges.

6/ Includes \$44,500,000 of certificates of participation.

7/ In process of final liquidation with inventory adjustments pending.

8/ Second-lien loans of \$51,416,000 to the cotton producers' pool in 1933 and 1934 are included, but the number of bales involved is not included with collateral pledged.

9/ Less than 1,000.

10/ Breakdown by years not available.

11/ Partly estimated.

12/ Tobacco figures include purchases as follows: 342,616,000 pounds green weight of 1939 and 1940 flue-cured, \$66,155,000; 106,771,000 pounds dry weight of 1939 and 1941 flue-cured, \$29,965,000; 3,380,000 pounds green weight of 1939 dark tobacco, \$453,000; 18,779,000 pounds dry weight of 1939, 1940, and 1941 dark tobacco, \$2,187,000; and 183,000 pounds dry weight of 1941 cigar leaf, \$22,000.

13/ Includes a small amount of 1939 crop purchased in 1941.

14/ Includes 168,851,000 pounds green weight.

15/ Includes 182,886,000 pounds green weight.

16/ Includes purchases of seed for winter cover crops, dairy products, agricultural supplies, and expenditures for commodities bought for lend-lease operations or domestic distribution.

Commodity Credit Corporation.

Table 16.- Rural Electrification Administration: Loans made and number of rural consumers connected, from organization to January 1, 1942

State and division	Number of borrowers	Loans made						Rural consumers connected	
		Total	Classified by type of borrower			Classified by purpose			
			Cooperative associations	Public bodies <sup>1</sup>	Private utilities	Construction <sup>2</sup>	Wiring, plumbing, and other <sup>3</sup>		
		1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars		
Maine .....	8	422	422	0	0	475	13	706	
New Hampshire .....	1	1,273	1,273	0	0	1,247	28	2,261	
Vermont .....	3	757	757	0	0	768	19	1,489	
Massachusetts .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Rhode Island .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Connecticut .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
New England .....	8	2,548	2,548	0	0	2,490	58	4,478	
New York .....	7	2,067	0	0	2,067	2,066	1	5,720	
New Jersey .....	2	474	474	0	0	471	3	1,188	
Pennsylvania .....	13	9,192	9,192	0	0	9,104	88	25,287	
Middle Atlantic .....	22	11,733	9,666	0	2,067	11,641	92	32,195	
Ohio .....	25	15,653	15,653	0	0	15,532	121	47,807	
Indiana .....	19	19,200	18,770	430	19,126	78	62,817		
Illinois .....	25	17,681	17,600	0	81	17,540	141	44,372	
Michigan .....	13	12,084	12,084	0	0	11,827	297	28,184	
Wisconsin .....	33	15,512	15,422	90	0	15,209	303	29,460	
East North Central .....	147	80,130	79,589	90	511	79,236	894	212,640	
Minnesota .....	52	22,664	22,664	0	0	22,100	564	48,661	
Iowa .....	53	21,460	21,382	95	37	21,324	146	48,330	
Missouri .....	37	18,235	18,123	0	112	18,041	194	33,356	
North Dakota .....	8	2,915	2,915	0	0	2,818	97	4,198	
South Dakota .....	11	1,671	1,671	0	0	1,641	30	2,933	
Nebraska .....	22	9,940	0	9,940	0	9,547	323	15,562	
Kansas .....	25	7,191	7,156	0	35	7,115	76	13,826	
West North Central .....	208	80,076	69,857	10,035	184	78,586	1,490	166,886	
Delaware .....	1	952	952	0	0	949	3	2,686	
Maryland .....	2	1,437	1,437	0	6	1,437	0	2,830	
Virginia .....	17	8,429	7,954	0	475	8,355	74	21,855	
West Virginia .....	2	613	613	0	0	608	5	1,188	
North Carolina .....	34	10,649	10,193	247	209	10,372	277	34,065	
South Carolina .....	26	7,267	5,339	1,928	0	7,125	142	26,143	
Georgia .....	45	15,421	15,314	0	107	14,814	607	58,595	
Florida .....	14	2,849	2,637	0	212	2,771	78	7,092	
South Atlantic .....	141	47,517	44,439	2,175	1,003	46,431	1,186	154,434	
Kentucky .....	27	10,032	9,961	0	71	9,891	141	31,436	
Tennessee .....	31	11,292	10,277	1,015	0	11,281	11	56,100	
Alabama .....	23	6,939	6,666	273	0	6,824	115	26,340	
Mississippi .....	24	9,729	9,729	0	0	9,581	218	42,234	
East South Central .....	105	36,062	36,634	1,357	71	37,577	485	156,112	
Arkansas .....	18	7,373	6,850	0	523	7,266	107	18,626	
Louisiana .....	14	3,632	3,582	0	50	3,586	46	11,370	
Oklahoma .....	24	8,877	8,690	0	187	8,781	96	20,401	
Texas .....	74	26,019	25,500	519	0	25,581	438	74,729	
West South Central .....	130	45,301	44,622	519	760	45,214	687	125,126	
Montana .....	13	2,963	2,963	0	0	2,927	36	6,463	
Idaho .....	9	2,955	2,955	0	0	2,906	49	5,882	
Wyoming .....	12	2,077	2,007	0	70	1,996	81	3,821	
Colorado .....	19	5,045	5,009	0	36	4,979	68	10,420	
New Mexico .....	6	1,073	958	0	115	997	76	1,997	
Arizona .....	3	750	519	142	69	742	8	1,129	
Utah .....	6	908	903	0	5	857	51	1,762	
Nevada .....	2	210	0	210	0	205	5	417	
Mountain .....	68	15,981	15,314	352	315	15,509	372	31,891	
Washington .....	19	5,305	4,492	813	0	5,273	32	9,649	
Oregon .....	13	2,501	2,501	0	0	2,442	59	6,732	
California .....	5	1,869	1,169	700	0	1,869	0	3,819	
Pacific .....	37	9,675	8,162	1,513	0	9,584	91	18,200	
UNITED STATES .....	866	331,723	310,771	16,041	4,911	326,368	5,355	901,962	
Alaska .....	2	133	133	0	0	133	0	0	
Virgin Islands .....	1	177	177	0	0	177	0	304	

<sup>1</sup>/ Municipalities, public power districts, and irrigation districts.

<sup>2</sup>/ Principally line construction, but includes amounts for working capital and for generating plants.

<sup>3</sup>/ These funds were loaned to borrowers for relending to individuals.

Rural Electrification Administration.

Table 17.- Taxes levied on farm property and automotive taxes paid by farmers, United States, average 1909-13, annual 1924-41.

Year	Property taxes levied <sup>1/</sup>		Licenses and permits	Automotive taxes paid		
	Farm real estate			Motor fuel taxes <sup>3/</sup>		
	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars		State	Federal	
1909-13 average	184,315	28,437	4/ 1,195			
1924	511,370	62,938	36,084	11,612		
1925	516,790	62,622	41,127	21,896		
1926	525,566	63,786	45,446	28,209		
1927	534,690	65,417	47,626	37,294		
1928	555,635	69,594	50,310	42,680		
1929	567,493	73,323	52,808	55,626		
1930	566,756	71,082	55,092	63,108		
1931	526,954	58,678	53,237	61,873		
1932	461,670	42,779	49,831	56,895	8,953	
1933	399,168	34,377	44,743	56,687	22,827	
1934	384,242	35,146	41,815	60,586	18,621	
1935	393,878	36,758	46,948	65,749	20,604	
1936	396,277	39,886	50,630	70,570	21,438	
1937	421,967	41,203	50,181	74,959	23,199	
1938	401,998	42,169	55,702	76,057	23,354	
1939	408,565	43,441	56,472	77,771	28,126	
1940	401,954	5/ 44,000	5/ 59,000	5/ 80,000	5/ 25,000	
1941	402,791	-	-	-	-	

1/ Levies rather than payments are shown for property taxes because data for payments are not available for many States. For the country as a whole levies and payments probably are about equal over long periods. Some figures revised from those in Agricultural Finance Review, May 1941.

2/ Includes taxes levied on motor vehicles under general property tax laws.

3/ State taxation of motor fuel began in 1919. Federal in 1932.

4/ 1910-14 average.

5/ Preliminary.

Table 18.- Tax levies on farm real estate: Amount per acre, index numbers of amount per acre, and amount per \$100 of value, United States, 1909-1941.

Year	Taxes per acre <sup>1/</sup>		Year	Taxes per acre		Taxes per \$100 of value <sup>2/</sup>		
	Amount	Index <sup>1/</sup> (1909-13 = 100)		Amount	Index <sup>1/</sup> (1909-13 = 100)			
				Dollars	Percent			
1890	0.13	63	1916	0.28	136	0.57		
1891	.13	63	1917	.31	151	.58		
1892	.13	64	1918	.33	160	.57		
1893	.13	65	1919	.41	200	.59		
1894	.13	64	1920	.51	244	.79		
1895	.14	65	1921	.54	259	.94		
1896	.13	63	1922	.54	261	.96		
1897	.13	64	1923	.55	266	1.01		
1898	.13	63	1924	.55	265	1.03		
1899	.13	63	1925	.56	270	1.07		
1900	.13	62	1926	.56	271	1.12		
1901	.13	64	1927	.57	277	1.15		
1902	.14	65	1928	.58	279	1.18		
1903	.15	71	1929	.58	281	1.19		
1904	.15	72	1930	.57	277	1.10		
1905	.15	74	1931	4/ .53	254	1.04		
1906	.15	75	1932	4/ .46	220	1.54		
1907	.16	79	1933	.39	188	1.28		
1908	.17	84	1934	.37	178	1.19		
1909	.19	90	1935	.37	180	1.15		
1910	.19	91	1936	.38	181	1.16		
1911	.21	99	1937	.39	186	1.19		
1912	.21	103	1938	4/ .38	183	1.19		
1913	.24	117	1939	.39	186	1.23		
1914	.24	118	1940	.38	183	1.16		
1915	.26	126	1941	.38	183	1.10		

1/ Index numbers computed before rounding tax-per-acre data to nearest cent.

2/ Derived from the tax-per-acre figures in column 1 and value-per-acre figures based on Census reports and the farm real estate value index of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

4/ Unavailable.

5/ Revised.

Table 19.- Tax levies on farm real estate: Amount per acre, by States, 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930, and 1932-41<sup>1/</sup>

State and division															
	1910	1915	1920	1925	1930	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
	Dol.														
Maine . . . . .	.027	.033	.055	.062	.081	.076	.068	.075	.075	.078	.080	.082	.083	.084	.084
New Hampshire . . . . .	.29	.35	.57	.69	.78	.75	.61	.64	.75	.80	.83	.87	.89	.87	.87
Vermont . . . . .	.20	.25	.45	.51	.58	.52	.46	.43	.45	.48	.50	.51	.53	.53	.54
Massachusetts . . . . .	.78	.98	1.55	2.00	2.16	2.29	2.26	2.44	2.62	2.61	2.63	2.67	2.75	2.70	2.68
Rhode Island . . . . .	.44	.58	.81	1.03	1.35	1.37	1.29	1.33	1.36	1.35	1.36	1.42	1.62	1.68	1.69
Connecticut . . . . .	.46	.61	1.08	1.36	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.66	1.79	1.78	1.77	1.80	1.87	1.85	1.85
New England . . . . .	.36	.44	.74	.90	1.03	1.02	.97	1.02	1.09	1.10	1.12	1.14	1.17	1.16	1.16
New York . . . . .	.38	.53	.87	1.04	1.04	.97	.89	.90	.95	.99	1.04	1.07	1.11	1.09	1.09
New Jersey . . . . .	2/	.81	1.50	2.18	2.74	2.38	2.12	2.01	2.03	2.03	2.15	2.19	2.31	2.21	2.20
Pennsylvania . . . . .	.47	.51	.82	1.11	1.30	1.22	1.09	1.01	.97	.98	.98	.97	.97	.99	1.00
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	.44	.54	.89	1.13	1.24	1.15	1.04	1.01	1.02	1.04	1.07	1.09	1.12	1.11	1.11
Ohio . . . . .	.45	.60	1.07	1.31	1.36	1.02	.91	.68	.65	.64	.65	.66	.68	.68	.69
Indiana . . . . .	.48	.66	1.26	1.40	1.47	1.03	.68	.64	.69	.71	.69	.76	.75	.77	.77
Illinois . . . . .	.35	.52	.99	1.15	1.16	.92	.72	.72	.79	.83	.87	.91	.95	.97	.97
Michigan . . . . .	.37	.63	1.23	1.26	1.34	.86	.58	.54	.46	.43	.43	.45	.46	.46	.46
Wisconsin . . . . .	.29	.49	1.04	.96	1.05	.73	.71	.69	.75	.76	.80	.81	.78	.75	.81
East North Central . . . . .	.39	.57	1.10	1.21	1.26	.91	.72	.66	.69	.70	.71	.73	.75	.76	.77
Minnesota . . . . .	.20	.35	.76	.78	.87	.67	.67	.59	.61	.64	.66	.68	.66	.67	.67
Iowa . . . . .	.33	.60	1.10	1.15	1.24	1.02	.20	.85	.94	.97	.99	.99	1.04	.99	1.00
Missouri . . . . .	.13	.16	.28	.43	.45	.36	.32	.32	.32	.32	.32	.32	.32	.32	.32
North Dakota . . . . .	.13	.20	.44	.37	.38	.27	.25	.24	.23	.22	.23	.23	.22	.22	.20
South Dakota . . . . .	.12	.17	.45	.44	.44	.32	.19	.22	.23	.22	.25	.25	.23	.22	.21
Nebraska . . . . .	.15	.19	.42	.42	.44	.35	.29	.28	.29	.29	.32	.32	.31	.30	.30
Kansas . . . . .	.17	.23	.42	.52	.55	.40	.36	.36	.37	.39	.40	.39	.36	.39	.39
West North Central . . . . .	.18	.27	.54	.58	.61	.47	.41	.39	.41	.42	.42	.43	.44	.42	.42
Delaware . . . . .	.24	.32	.68	.73	.50	.43	.41	.38	.36	.34	.33	.31	.31	.31	.32
Maryland . . . . .	.40	.42	.72	.68	.93	.85	.66	.60	.66	.69	.71	.73	.78	.80	.80
Virginia . . . . .	.10	.13	.23	.34	.34	.26	.24	.25	.25	.25	.25	.26	.26	.27	.27
West Virginia . . . . .	.11	.17	.31	.43	.46	.38	.16	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.17	.16	.16
North Carolina . . . . .	.06	.12	.34	.55	.59	.47	.33	.32	.32	.32	.35	.36	.37	.37	.37
South Carolina . . . . .	.13	.15	.35	.39	.40	.37	.33	.30	.30	.30	.30	.28	.29	.29	.29
Georgia . . . . .	.10	.15	.28	.29	.30	.26	.23	.22	.23	.22	.22	.24	.16	.14	.15
Florida . . . . .	.09	.23	.46	.95	.70	.59	.58	.58	.61	.62	.41	.45	.47	.51	.48
South Atlantic . . . . .	.11	.16	.33	.46	.46	.38	.30	.29	.29	.30	.28	.28	.29	.30	.30
Kentucky . . . . .	.15	.17	.38	.40	.43	.39	.34	.28	.30	.29	.29	.30	.32	.32	.32
Tennessee . . . . .	.14	.17	.40	.43	.47	.40	.36	.36	.37	.38	.39	.39	.38	.38	.40
Alabama . . . . .	.08	.11	.19	.21	.25	.23	.21	.21	.22	.22	.21	.20	.20	.21	.21
Mississippi . . . . .	.13	.16	.50	.59	.64	.53	.56	.52	.53	.57	.58	.40	.39	.42	.42
East South Central . . . . .	.12	.15	.30	.41	.46	.30	.37	.34	.35	.36	.37	.32	.32	.33	.34
Arkansas . . . . .	.13	.17	.33	.34	.32	.30	.29	.29	.28	.29	.29	.29	.29	.29	.29
Louisiana . . . . .	.14	.19	.55	.57	.57	.49	.49	.46	.46	.49	.33	.37	.33	.32	.35
Oklahoma . . . . .	.14	.23	.38	.42	.47	.34	.25	.23	.23	.24	.23	.24	.24	.24	.24
Texas . . . . .	.05	.09	.16	.20	.23	.17	.16	.16	.14	.15	.14	.13	.14	.14	.13
West South Central . . . . .	.08	.13	.24	.27	.30	.23	.21	.20	.19	.19	.18	.18	.18	.18	.18
Montana . . . . .	.06	.08	.14	.13	.14	.13	.13	.11	.11	.10	.11	.11	.11	.11	.10
Idaho . . . . .	.17	.30	.53	.58	.64	.54	.50	.48	.45	.42	.46	.46	.45	.44	.44
Wyoming . . . . .	.03	.05	.09	.07	.09	.08	.07	.07	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06
Colorado . . . . .	.10	.13	.27	.28	.28	.22	.19	.20	.19	.19	.19	.19	.19	.19	.19
New Mexico . . . . .	.02	.03	.05	.06	.07	.06	.06	.06	.04	.05	.04	.05	.04	.04	.04
Arizona . . . . .	.06	.09	.18	.19	.20	.16	.13	.13	.13	.11	.07	.08	.08	.07	.07
Utah . . . . .	.13	.20	.47	.46	.52	.47	.40	.39	.38	.31	.32	.31	.31	.30	.30
Nevada . . . . .	.06	.11	.21	.22	.15	.15	.16	.15	.17	.16	.17	.17	.16	.15	.15
Mountain . . . . .	.07	.10	.20	.18	.19	.10	.15	.14	.13	.13	.13	.12	.13	.12	.12
Washington . . . . .	.25	.32	.67	.61	.71	.60	.53	.50	.41	.37	.41	.31	.32	.32	.30
Oregon . . . . .	.13	.17	.37	.40	.33	.33	.32	.32	.32	.32	.33	.33	.33	.33	.25
California . . . . .	.32	.47	.93	1.07	1.14	.95	.66	.64	.63	.67	.79	.80	.82	.83	.81
Pacific . . . . .	.26	.36	.73	.78	.84	.70	.54	.52	.49	.50	.57	.55	.57	.57	.56
UNITED STATES . . . . .	.19	.26	.51	.56	.57	.46	.39	.37	.37	.38	.39	.38	.39	.38	.38

<sup>1/</sup> Includes some revised figures for 1930-39.<sup>2/</sup> Not available.

Table 20.- Tax levies on farm real estate: Index numbers of amount per acre, by States, 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930, and 1932-41<sup>1/</sup>  
(1909-13 = 100)

State and division	1910	1915	1920	1925	1930	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Maine .....	97	116	194	219	288	267	240	265	265	274	284	289	294	298	298
New Hampshire .....	92	112	182	220	248	237	195	205	239	254	263	276	282	277	276
Vermont .....	95	121	219	247	281	254	225	207	217	232	240	247	255	258	261
Massachusetts .....	96	121	191	248	268	284	280	302	324	323	326	330	341	335	331
Rhode Island .....	98	119	178	227	298	301	283	293	298	297	299	311	357	369	372
Connecticut .....	96	126	223	282	337	338	337	344	371	368	365	372	388	383	385
New England .....	96	119	198	242	277	275	259	273	292	296	300	306	314	311	311
New York .....	93	127	211	252	252	236	216	219	230	240	253	259	269	264	265
New Jersey .....	2/	112	208	303	381	331	295	279	282	282	299	305	321	308	305
Pennsylvania .....	96	106	168	227	267	250	224	207	200	201	201	199	202	202	206
Middle Atlantic .....	94	116	191	244	268	249	225	218	220	225	232	235	241	240	241
Ohio .....	97	128	229	280	292	218	194	145	140	138	140	142	146	147	148
Indiana .....	92	126	241	269	282	197	123	122	132	137	131	132	146	144	145
Illinois .....	98	132	249	289	291	231	182	181	199	208	220	229	239	244	244
Michigan .....	86	146	284	292	310	198	135	125	106	100	99	104	105	107	107
Wisconsin .....	84	144	306	280	309	214	208	203	221	223	235	237	239	239	237
East North Central .....	90	134	257	281	293	212	168	154	160	162	166	170	175	177	179
Minnesota .....	88	151	329	337	375	288	289	252	261	274	276	283	291	283	286
Iowa .....	83	150	272	285	308	253	223	210	233	240	245	245	259	245	247
Missouri .....	97	116	207	311	328	266	232	232	231	234	232	231	237	230	231
North Dakota .....	93	139	309	265	265	191	175	168	161	157	162	161	159	156	159
South Dakota .....	91	133	352	349	349	250	154	176	183	177	199	196	181	172	166
Nebraska .....	92	121	261	266	277	221	180	173	184	183	199	203	197	189	190
Kansas .....	91	121	224	275	292	214	190	193	199	206	212	206	208	193	208
West North Central .....	89	134	269	290	304	235	205	198	207	210	217	217	220	210	212
Delaware .....	95	130	275	292	201	172	165	155	146	138	131	124	118	126	130
Maryland .....	107	111	191	233	245	226	175	160	175	183	188	193	206	211	212
Virginia .....	88	120	210	308	305	234	221	223	226	229	231	233	235	240	243
West Virginia .....	97	143	271	371	395	329	136	131	134	136	137	139	143	139	138
North Carolina .....	82	146	424	700	748	600	418	406	405	406	449	456	455	463	473
South Carolina .....	100	118	272	300	310	290	252	235	228	232	236	216	222	230	226
Georgia .....	94	157	254	263	272	236	212	200	206	201	221	142	128	129	135
Florida .....	84	211	424	875	652	547	536	533	411	392	382	420	435	476	448
South Atlantic .....	94	132	274	379	375	315	250	241	237	238	250	234	236	244	245
Kentucky .....	98	115	252	268	284	257	225	189	196	191	193	201	213	212	215
Tennessee .....	97	121	285	309	339	285	261	260	267	272	280	283	276	277	288
Alabama .....	93	121	212	236	286	259	242	239	239	245	232	230	229	230	235
Mississippi .....	23	117	361	426	469	385	409	380	386	416	423	292	287	307	305
East South Central .....	96	118	281	314	347	298	286	266	272	281	283	251	252	257	261
Arkansas .....	91	115	227	232	217	203	200	197	195	200	197	195	196	196	201
Louisiana .....	92	130	366	379	384	330	330	306	301	263	258	248	218	211	231
Oklahoma .....	74	122	204	221	248	181	133	122	125	121	129	129	127	126	128
Texas .....	83	161	274	352	409	298	285	276	251	255	239	236	247	237	235
West South Central .....	82	136	252	290	319	242	219	209	198	198	189	189	191	186	188
Montana .....	91	125	223	205	217	198	194	176	176	161	171	167	169	167	159
Idaho .....	72	128	267	248	273	229	212	204	190	177	195	171	197	192	187
Wyoming .....	104	145	277	217	275	245	213	209	172	168	172	180	176	172	173
Colorado .....	95	117	245	253	256	198	176	179	170	171	170	172	175	173	172
New Mexico .....	71	130	242	291	333	302	268	205	212	209	211	204	211	202	207
Arizona .....	89	145	293	298	315	259	210	214	200	168	105	122	135	115	113
Utah .....	89	130	311	304	346	311	265	256	250	202	212	209	208	203	202
Nevada .....	89	168	340	348	238	242	257	236	263	252	213	269	248	238	245
Mountain .....	88	123	244	226	237	201	153	173	165	154	155	151	157	152	149
Washington .....	90	114	240	216	252	212	187	177	147	130	144	110	113	115	107
Oregon .....	92	120	251	255	275	223	226	217	220	219	219	227	228	226	169
California .....	30	132	262	301	321	267	187	179	178	189	223	225	232	233	234
Pacific .....	90	126	253	269	290	241	186	178	171	171	196	191	195	196	186
UNITED STATES .....	91	128	244	270	277	220	188	178	180	181	186	183	186	183	183

<sup>1/</sup> Index numbers computed before rounding tax-per-acre data. Includes some revised figures for 1930-39.

<sup>2/</sup> Not available.

Table 21.- Tax levies on farm real estate: Amount per \$100 of value, by States, 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, and 1941.<sup>1/</sup>

State and division	1910	1915	1920	1925	1930	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
	Dol.														
Maine .....	1.06	1.29	1.54	1.57	1.97	2.44	2.22	2.47	2.48	2.55	2.67	2.82	2.82	2.87	2.81
New Hampshire .....	1.08	1.29	1.64	1.76	2.00	2.31	1.92	2.02	2.32	2.40	2.50	2.59	2.51	2.46	
Vermont .....	.82	.88	1.17	1.42	1.59	1.74	1.59	1.50	1.55	1.62	1.71	1.73	1.75	1.78	
Massachusetts .....	1.13	1.37	1.59	1.76	1.65	1.99	1.94	2.10	2.28	2.29	2.32	2.41	2.51	2.48	2.45
Rhode Island .....	.70	.82	.99	1.06	1.09	1.22	1.14	1.16	1.18	1.15	1.17	1.22	1.36	1.40	1.36
Connecticut .....	.70	.85	1.08	1.15	1.07	1.19	1.20	1.22	1.30	1.28	1.30	1.33	1.38	1.33	1.30
New England .....	.97	1.12	1.38	1.91	1.56	1.77	1.66	1.75	1.88	1.90	1.97	2.05	2.11	2.08	2.04
New York .....	.70	.96	1.33	1.46	1.53	1.72	1.59	1.61	1.68	1.74	1.84	1.92	2.01	1.97	1.94
New Jersey .....	2/	.91	1.29	1.46	1.70	1.77	1.65	1.64	1.64	1.74	1.79	1.90	1.76	1.65	
Pennsylvania .....	.83	.88	1.14	1.49	1.77	2.21	2.04	1.86	1.70	1.70	1.67	1.64	1.56	1.60	
Middle Atlantic .....	.77	.92	1.25	1.48	1.65	1.92	1.77	1.72	1.69	1.71	1.75	1.80	1.85	1.82	1.75
Ohio .....	.54	.74	1.11	1.53	1.90	2.00	1.68	1.22	1.07	1.00	1.03	1.02	1.03	.99	.91
Indiana .....	.62	.75	1.08	1.73	2.29	2.23	1.61	1.26	1.24	1.20	1.12	1.12	1.20	1.15	1.03
Illinois .....	.31	.42	.55	.88	1.21	1.46	1.07	1.03	1.08	1.06	1.08	1.15	1.16	1.17	1.03
Michigan .....	.76	1.14	1.62	1.81	2.09	1.94	1.29	1.21	1.00	.86	.85	.89	.89	.79	
Wisconsin .....	.50	.71	1.04	1.18	1.50	1.37	1.35	1.30	1.39	1.34	1.44	1.51	1.50	1.54	1.49
East North Central .....	.50	.65	.91	1.29	1.67	1.72	1.35	1.17	1.16	1.11	1.11	1.15	1.16	1.16	1.05
Minnesota .....	.42	.55	.70	1.00	1.45	1.65	1.58	1.40	1.41	1.44	1.42	1.50	1.54	1.48	1.43
Iowa .....	.33	.44	.52	.81	1.15	1.60	1.31	1.19	1.21	1.23	1.25	1.26	1.32	1.25	1.18
Missouri .....	.25	.28	.34	.75	.98	1.16	1.01	1.02	1.00	.98	1.00	1.03	1.00	.98	.90
North Dakota .....	.44	.61	1.11	1.30	1.72	1.56	1.38	1.33	1.27	1.25	1.39	1.58	1.78	1.70	1.46
South Dakota .....	.30	.38	.66	1.05	1.42	1.59	.98	1.18	1.24	1.22	1.50	1.76	1.80	1.74	1.60
Nebraska .....	.31	.37	.52	.70	.85	1.04	.85	.84	.87	.91	1.07	1.16	1.29	1.34	1.25
Kansas .....	.41	.51	.68	1.06	1.24	1.33	1.18	1.17	1.17	1.19	1.23	1.23	1.32	1.21	1.26
West North Central .....	.35	.44	.60	.90	1.20	1.42	1.20	1.14	1.16	1.18	1.23	1.29	1.37	1.31	1.24
Delaware .....	.46	.60	1.04	1.05	.69	.80	.75	.68	.62	.57	.54	.50	.47	.48	.48
Maryland .....	.82	.97	1.12	1.19	1.49	1.18	1.08	1.13	1.12	1.10	1.13	1.20	1.17	1.10	
Virginia .....	.36	.38	.43	.68	.77	.80	.74	.74	.69	.64	.63	.65	.63	.62	.63
West Virginia .....	.41	.58	.77	1.10	1.29	1.48	.61	.60	.60	.58	.55	.54	.56	.51	.50
North Carolina .....	.28	.41	.71	.99	1.48	1.68	1.14	1.02	.94	.86	.90	.93	.92	.96	.87
South Carolina .....	.51	.56	.66	.96	1.27	1.92	1.55	1.30	1.23	1.13	1.06	.96	.96	.93	.84
Georgia .....	.55	.72	.79	1.09	1.28	1.79	1.45	1.30	1.33	1.15	1.24	.81	.69	.65	.66
Florida .....	.38	.45	.86	.88	.58	.58	.06	1.04	1.09	.88	.86	.91	1.09	1.21	1.17
South Atlantic .....	.44	.56	.70	.97	1.14	1.42	1.07	1.00	.95	.88	.89	.83	.82	.83	.81
Kentucky .....	.51	.50	.73	.92	1.09	1.43	1.22	.93	.99	.87	.83	.82	.84	.83	.74
Tennessee .....	.56	.58	.89	1.02	1.28	1.56	1.32	1.24	1.17	1.16	1.16	1.06	1.01	1.01	.97
Alabama .....	.56	.73	.82	.81	.98	1.38	1.18	1.12	1.07	1.10	.98	.94	.94	.91	.92
Mississippi .....	.70	.72	1.69	1.99	2.19	2.93	3.01	2.76	2.70	2.67	2.41	1.64	1.57	1.61	1.46
East South Central .....	.55	.59	.95	1.15	1.35	1.72	1.51	1.40	1.38	1.34	1.29	1.10	1.06	1.06	1.00
Arkansas .....	.72	.82	.91	1.01	1.12	1.56	1.40	1.37	1.23	1.24	1.16	1.17	1.18	1.09	.98
Louisiana .....	.59	.74	1.41	1.44	1.42	1.76	1.75	1.63	1.56	1.28	1.16	1.10	.93	.90	.93
Oklahoma .....	.54	.64	.92	1.22	1.41	1.60	1.12	1.04	.98	1.03	.95	1.00	1.00	.98	.93
Texas .....	.29	.46	.55	.70	.90	.99	.86	.86	.74	.78	.72	.70	.74	.75	.65
West South Central .....	.42	.61	.76	.88	1.07	1.24	1.07	1.00	.92	.84	.86	.85	.85	.85	.79
Montana .....	.32	.45	.75	.99	1.22	1.70	1.69	1.39	1.36	1.25	1.43	1.45	1.46	1.42	1.19
Idaho .....	.37	.70	.98	1.30	1.45	1.84	1.68	1.55	1.41	1.27	1.40	1.40	1.36	1.23	
Wyoming .....	.26	.46	.55	.80	1.04	1.41	1.21	1.18	1.01	1.01	1.03	1.05	1.06	1.01	.92
Colorado .....	.31	.46	.81	1.19	1.32	1.56	1.36	1.43	1.36	1.36	1.42	1.48	1.58	1.50	1.37
New Mexico .....	.21	.40	.64	.96	1.04	1.27	1.23	.81	.99	.80	1.01	.82	1.04	.80	.74
Arizona .....	.16	.34	.71	1.32	1.21	1.43	1.26	1.37	1.46	1.32	.94	1.20	1.34	1.15	1.09
Utah .....	.38	.61	1.19	1.19	1.36	1.83	1.55	1.54	1.52	1.26	1.36	1.44	1.47	1.46	1.36
Nevada .....	.38	.58	.84	1.37	.96	1.38	1.41	1.28	1.38	1.27	1.37	1.36	1.27	1.18	1.13
Mountain .....	.32	.50	.84	1.12	1.25	1.58	1.48	1.37	1.26	1.27	1.32	1.26	1.40	1.26	1.17
Washington .....	.50	.62	1.01	1.06	1.28	1.60	1.45	1.33	1.06	.92	1.03	.79	.82	.82	.71
Oregon .....	.33	.42	.73	.89	1.07	1.30	1.31	1.24	1.22	1.17	1.18	1.25	1.24	1.23	.87
California .....	.57	.64	.86	.94	1.04	1.27	.89	.84	.82	.86	1.04	1.10	1.16	1.16	1.10
Pacific .....	.53	.59	.87	.95	1.08	1.33	1.04	.98	.91	.91	1.06	1.06	1.12	1.11	.99
UNITED STATES .....	.47	.57	.79	1.07	1.30	1.54	1.28	1.19	1.15	1.16	1.19	1.19	1.23	1.18	1.10

1/ Derived from the tax-per-acre figures in table 19 and value-per-acre figures based on census reports and the farm real estate value indexes of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Includes some revised figures for 1930-40.

2/ Not available.

Table 22.- Farmers' mutual fire insurance, United States, 1914-39 1/

Year	Companies 2/	Amount of insurance in force at end of year 1,000 dollars	Cost per \$100 of insurance			Surplus and reserves at end of year 3/
			Losses	Expenses	Total	
			Cents	Cents	Cents	
1914	1,947	5,264,119	20.4	6.0	26.4	-
1915	1,879	5,366,760	17.5	6.0	23.5	-
1916	1,883	5,635,968	19.6	5.9	25.5	-
1917	1,829	5,876,853	18.2	6.4	24.6	-
1918	1,866	6,391,522	18.8	6.3	25.1	-
1919	1,922	6,937,523	17.3	7.8	25.1	-
1920	1,944	7,865,988	17.4	8.4	25.8	-
1921	1,951	8,409,683	19.4	7.8	27.2	-
1922	1,918	8,769,948	20.9	5.8	26.7	-
1923	1,907	9,057,938	19.8	6.6	26.4	-
1924	1,929	9,487,029	20.4	6.5	26.9	-
1925	1,839	9,477,139	21.1	6.7	27.8	-
1926	1,911	9,988,580	19.4	6.9	26.3	-
1927	1,889	10,345,463	19.0	6.3	25.3	-
1928	1,884	10,781,212	20.5	6.6	27.1	-
1929	1,876	11,118,510	21.8	6.6	28.4	-
1930	1,886	11,382,104	24.8	6.8	31.6	-
1931	1,863	11,292,339	24.1	6.9	31.0	-
1932	1,847	10,974,082	24.9	7.1	32.0	-
1933	1,826	10,466,384	21.2	7.3	28.5	-
1934	1,852	10,571,508	19.7	7.2	26.9	-
1935	1,941	11,083,300	15.7	7.5	23.2	33,656
1936	1,936	11,339,510	20.7	7.4	28.0	35,083
1937	1,924	11,569,476	16.5	7.6	24.1	37,479
1938	1,914	11,868,569	18.0	8.0	26.0	40,105
1939	1,904	12,143,881	18.4	8.2	26.6	41,819

1/ Data for 1914-33 include companies with more than 65 percent of their insurance on farm property. Data for later years include companies with more than 50 percent of their insurance on farm property.

2/ Number of companies for which data could be obtained. Variations from year to year may not represent real variations in the number of companies operating.

3/ Excess of assets over liabilities. Farm mutuals, as assessment companies, not required to set up unearned premium reserves. Data not compiled prior to 1935.

Data for 1934-39 from Farm Credit Administration. All data compiled from published State reports, supplemented by information from State insurance officials, officers of farmers' mutuals, and others.

Table 23.- Farmers' mutual fire insurance, by States, 1939

State and division	Companies	Amount of insurance in force at end of year 1,000 dollars	Cost per \$100 of insurance			Surplus and reserves at end of year 1/ 1,000 dollars
			Losses	Expenses	Total	
			Cents	Cents	Cents	
Maine .....	39	70,726	44.1	20.2	64.3	150
New Hampshire .....	15	25,199	33.0	25.8	58.8	130
Vermont .....	4	83,373	52.6	7.5	60.1	78
Massachusetts 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
Rhode Island .....	2	3,992	12.4	12.3	24.7	112
Connecticut .....	5	78,208	11.6	14.2	25.8	2,985
New England .....	65	261,496	35.5	14.8	50.3	3,465
New York .....	130	608,352	30.0	8.3	38.3	820
New Jersey .....	13	148,578	19.0	17.3	36.3	1,666
Pennsylvania .....	166	1,256,173	16.1	9.8	25.9	5,078
Middle Atlantic .....	309	2,013,203	20.5	9.9	30.4	7,564
Ohio .....	101	923,481	18.6	4.2	22.8	1,095
Indiana .....	65	649,576	19.3	6.6	25.9	1,749
Illinois .....	209	749,600	16.5	5.2	21.7	1,115
Michigan .....	63	712,805	24.0	10.0	34.0	2,035
Wisconsin .....	194	1,210,277	16.6	4.3	20.9	1,401
West North Central .....	632	4,245,579	18.7	5.7	24.4	7,395
Minnesota .....	158	985,500	13.0	7.0	20.0	1,859
Iowa .....	149	1,214,199	15.0	6.0	21.0	2,553
Missouri .....	150	328,625	32.0	7.2	39.2	834
North Dakota .....	33	107,418	13.4	7.2	20.6	389
South Dakota .....	42	232,666	11.1	5.1	16.2	734
Nebraska .....	49	734,782	7.6	5.8	13.4	1,772
Kansas .....	18	683,953	16.7	13.9	30.6	3,755
West North Central .....	599	4,287,183	14.6	7.5	22.1	11,896
Delaware .....	4	21,178	14.0	17.1	31.1	453
Maryland .....	16	306,169	24.1	18.2	42.3	2,829
Virginia .....	42	149,119	20.6	12.4	33.0	1,372
West Virginia .....	14	62,777	15.4	15.9	31.3	544
North Carolina .....	30	47,471	27.9	9.7	37.6	376
South Carolina .....	9	8,098	37.6	22.7	60.3	158
Georgia .....	18	21,064	44.8	15.6	60.4	247
Florida 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
South Atlantic .....	133	615,876	23.2	15.8	39.0	5,979
Kentucky .....	17	70,061	33.6	15.6	49.2	898
Tennessee .....	28	40,526	31.0	14.9	45.9	88
Alabama .....	3	1,735	19.5	14.0	33.5	24
Mississippi 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
East South Central .....	48	112,322	32.5	15.3	47.8	1,010
Arkansas .....	14	18,412	44.4	25.3	69.7	125
Louisiana 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
Oklahoma .....	6	36,600	48.0	10.3	58.3	289
Texas .....	37	109,088	29.2	6.8	36.0	673
West South Central .....	57	164,100	35.0	9.6	44.6	1,067
Montana .....	13	17,020	26.1	10.7	36.8	74
Idaho .....	9	52,783	24.0	13.4	37.4	139
Wyoming .....	3	2,292	12.7	17.7	30.4	19
Colorado .....	5	40,715	13.1	11.6	24.7	155
New Mexico 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
Arizona 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
Utah .....	1	16,004	10.5	6.2	16.7	223
Nevada 2/ .....	0	-	-	-	-	-
Mountain .....	31	128,814	18.9	11.7	30.6	610
Washington .....	5	61,855	23.7	10.8	34.5	614
Oregon .....	5	31,956	29.0	14.1	43.1	257
California .....	20	221,395	11.6	14.8	26.4	1,942
Pacific .....	30	315,246	15.6	14.0	29.6	2,813
UNITED STATES .....	1,904	12,143,881	18.4	8.2	26.6	41,819

1/ Excess of assets over liabilities. Farm mutuals, as assessment companies, not required to set up unearned premium reserves.

2/ No mutual insurance companies with more than 50 percent of their insurance on farm property.

Farm Credit Administration. Compiled from published State reports, supplemented by data supplied by State insurance officials, officers of farmers' mutuals, and others.

Table 24.- Wheat crop insurance, by States, crops of 1941, 1942, and 1943 <sup>1/</sup>

Wheat area and State <sup>2/</sup>	Crop harvested in 1941				Crop harvested in 1942				Crop for harvest in 1943		
	Number of contracts	Amount of premiums <sup>3/</sup>	Indemnities		Number of contracts <sup>4/</sup>		Interests insured by con- tract in force <sup>5/</sup>	Amount of premiums <sup>3/</sup>	Amount of indem- nities <sup>3/</sup>	Number of con- tracts written <sup>6/</sup>	
			Number	Bushels	Number	Bushels					
	Number	Bushels	Number	Bushels	Number	Bushels	Number	Bushels	Number	Number	
Soft red winter:											
New York .....	965	7,024	159	9,243	1,930	1,783	1,883	12,861	5,594	9,108	
New Jersey .....	155	959	23	1,299	285	265	267	1,423	640	206	
Pennsylvania .....	7,173	44,513	1,162	57,843	7,094	6,713	7,056	42,648	56,478	8,606	
Ohio .....	31,256	289,715	3,221	110,628	38,985	35,232	39,702	328,132	333,962	42,179	
Indiana .....	30,540	301,513	1,090	35,771	32,313	27,629	32,029	287,162	1,287,946	41,348	
Illinois .....	32,897	417,577	5,549	453,141	35,223	24,578	29,601	308,691	1,856,828	46,110	
Michigan .....	13,190	83,087	2,116	83,543	32,783	26,613	28,210	173,746	192,387	33,488	
Missouri .....	20,883	267,819	13,549	1,639,770	34,812	20,279	24,034	264,000	1,224,931	39,635	
Delaware .....	584	5,202	69	4,330	724	650	730	6,069	2,086	373	
Maryland .....	1,690	18,262	152	9,758	2,241	2,190	2,310	23,539	15,924	1,771	
Virginia .....	2,481	20,530	468	20,440	2,582	2,380	2,546	20,401	5,000	1,637	
West Virginia .....	58	892	15	897	530	497	516	3,817	5,754	889	
North Carolina .....	447	2,543	39	1,320	1,809	1,550	1,745	6,825	3,686	3,422	
Kentucky .....	605	8,339	29	999	889	742	803	10,288	11,637	2,810	
Tennessee .....	158	1,618	18	473	1,810	1,568	1,670	7,925	3,831	1,503	
Arkansas .....	38	352	17	1,445	39	33	39	314	1,952	41	
Area total ..	143,180	1,470,671	27,676	2,420,900	194,055	152,718	173,136	1,497,821	5,008,638	278,126	
Hard red winter:											
Iowa .....	6,094	88,218	5,144	689,226	8,698	6,054	6,691	108,500	86,487	6,183	
Nebraska .....	57,272	2,368,893	44,363	7,080,521	54,028	49,485	66,945	2,031,164	419,886	33,079	
Kansas .....	53,991	3,073,994	20,867	2,795,470	41,962	31,854	42,165	1,774,475	1,892,246	33,696	
Oklahoma .....	22,852	751,323	10,153	1,235,862	21,369	17,913	23,263	653,925	951,568	15,902	
Texas .....	9,377	958,692	5,583	1,789,624	9,331	6,906	9,782	559,735	1,054,797	10,809	
Wyoming .....	1,293	126,680	108	17,264	572	520	739	55,436	15,134	1/	
Colorado .....	4,975	353,307	759	103,427	3,571	2,915	4,135	179,099	110,108	7,403	
New Mexico .....	232	31,929	94	55,632	352	301	423	37,429	7,727	315	
Utah .....	2,285	60,352	366	24,322	5,034	4,098	4,478	73,025	69,161	2,686	
Area total ..	159,071	7,813,988	87,437	13,791,348	144,917	120,046	158,621	4,972,788	4,607,114	105,073	
Hard red spring and durum:											
Wisconsin .....	640	3,817	339	11,615	2,851	2,190	2,303	14,040	4,808	1,934	
Minnesota .....	13,584	226,256	5,668	404,639	18,059	14,681	17,938	294,411	95,182	5,961	
North Dakota .....	18,938	1,046,824	966	192,789	9,351	8,972	13,772	127,138	10,166	150	
South Dakota .....	12,585	846,831	3,847	537,149	5,808	5,652	9,683	459,246	141,800	1,198	
Montana .....	3,009	415,648	280	59,102	1,595	1,474	2,795	285,400	42,860	833	
Area total ..	48,750	2,539,376	11,176	1,205,294	37,664	32,969	46,491	1,550,235	330,446	10,136	
White:											
Idaho .....	9,430	204,770	1,328	379,579	7,500	6,513	7,815	168,348	113,352	2,026	
Arizona .....	140	2,450	93	29,559	183	162	185	4,222	3,868	8	
Ne. ....	102	1,913	20	1,007	94	85	93	1,556	1,051	14	
Washington .....	3,878	230,632	460	117,259	3,355	2,994	4,605	244,251	44,622	2,229	
Oregon .....	4,657	216,240	1,302	155,775	3,809	3,140	4,007	160,850	77,324	2,415	
California .....	2,210	163,758	1,299	732,752	2,354	1,968	2,657	240,883	467,347	119	
Area total ..	20,417	819,763	4,508	1,416,531	17,295	14,862	19,362	820,108	708,164	6,811	
UNITED STATES ..	371,424	12,643,798	130,747	18,834,073	393,931	320,595	397,610	8,840,952	10,654,362	350,146	

<sup>1/</sup> Interim report as of November 1, 1942, subject to revision.<sup>2/</sup> Based on principal class of wheat grown.<sup>3/</sup> Premiums and indemnities are determined in bushels of wheat, although transactions are usually made in the cash equivalent.<sup>4/</sup> Differences between "contracts written" and "contracts in force" represents principally cases in which no wheat was seeded.<sup>5/</sup> Comparable to "number of contracts" in previous year.<sup>6/</sup> Preliminary. Contracts still being written for spring wheat.<sup>1/</sup> No report.

Table 25.- Farm real estate: Index numbers of estimated value per acre, by States, 1912, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1933, 1935, 1938-42<sup>1</sup>,  
(1912-14 = 100)

State and division	1912	1915	1920	1925	1930	1933	1935	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942 <sup>2</sup>
Maine . . . . .	100	96	142	124	124	94	94	96	94	95	95	97
New Hampshire . . . . .	97	101	129	111	111	92	90	93	93	94	95	97
Vermont . . . . .	101	104	150	125	123	101	101	100	100	101	101	102
Massachusetts . . . . .	98	98	140	132	131	112	111	113	113	113	113	114
Rhode Island . . . . .	100	102	130	128	124	118	118	119	118	120	121	126
Connecticut . . . . .	98	100	137	137	140	124	123	124	124	124	125	133
New England . . . . .	99	99	140	127	127	105	104	106	105	106	107	109
New York . . . . .	98	100	133	111	103	82	84	87	86	86	86	87
New Jersey . . . . .	98	100	130	124	125	110	111	116	116	116	121	128
Pennsylvania . . . . .	98	100	140	114	107	78	82	88	88	90	90	95
Middle Atlantic . . . . .	98	100	136	114	106	82	85	90	89	90	91	94
Ohio . . . . .	98	107	159	110	90	59	66	74	76	77	80	89
Indiana . . . . .	97	102	161	102	80	53	61	73	73	74	77	88
Illinois . . . . .	97	102	160	115	91	54	61	73	72	75	76	86
Michigan . . . . .	98	105	154	133	121	80	83	92	92	91	93	105
Wisconsin . . . . .	97	104	171	130	117	80	82	88	86	84	82	88
East North Central . . . . .	97	104	161	116	96	62	68	78	77	78	80	89
Minnesota . . . . .	95	107	213	159	133	79	83	88	86	86	86	90
Iowa . . . . .	96	112	213	136	113	58	67	74	74	74	75	80
Missouri . . . . .	97	102	167	112	92	55	58	60	58	59	60	66
North Dakota . . . . .	97	103	145	109	95	66	67	64	57	52	52	55
South Dakota . . . . .	96	101	181	115	93	55	54	51	44	41	40	42
Nebraska . . . . .	98	101	179	123	113	69	72	69	65	58	55	59
Kansas . . . . .	101	103	152	115	113	70	73	78	76	71	71	74
West North Central . . . . .	97	105	184	126	109	64	68	70	67	65	65	69
Delaware . . . . .	100	100	139	112	111	80	82	89	89	89	93	96
Maryland . . . . .	97	104	156	131	123	90	91	101	100	100	105	111
Virginia . . . . .	97	97	189	154	134	88	97	111	110	112	115	118
West Virginia . . . . .	97	101	154	120	105	74	78	84	85	85	89	90
North Carolina . . . . .	97	102	223	187	158	86	111	138	138	138	136	150
South Carolina . . . . .	101	94	230	138	104	57	76	87	88	89	95	103
Georgia . . . . .	98	94	217	116	100	57	72	79	80	82	87	93
Florida . . . . .	96	97	178	172	172	121	126	132	132	133	134	140
South Atlantic . . . . .	98	98	198	148	128	80	93	106	106	107	110	117
Kentucky . . . . .	97	100	200	140	127	80	87	103	107	113	114	129
Tennessee . . . . .	96	100	200	137	123	79	91	102	104	108	113	123
Alabama . . . . .	98	98	177	154	143	88	110	123	122	122	125	129
Mississippi . . . . .	97	97	218	156	122	73	90	106	106	106	111	122
East South Central . . . . .	97	99	199	141	128	79	93	107	109	112	115	126
Arkansas . . . . .	98	95	222	150	141	80	88	97	95	95	100	111
Louisiana . . . . .	99	95	198	141	132	89	103	117	117	121	121	129
Oklahoma . . . . .	98	95	166	131	127	76	86	94	93	93	96	101
Texas . . . . .	95	103	174	146	138	83	91	99	97	99	98	105
West South Central . . . . .	96	100	177	144	136	82	91	99	97	99	99	105
Montana . . . . .	97	100	126	75	72	48	50	53	54	55	57	62
Idaho . . . . .	100	96	172	123	116	76	80	85	85	86	87	94
Wyoming . . . . .	97	103	176	100	98	62	62	66	66	68	71	78
Colorado . . . . .	98	93	141	92	83	54	53	60	61	61	63	69
New Mexico . . . . .	100	100	144	108	110	75	76	83	83	84	87	95
Arizona . . . . .	95	97	165	121	123	90	91	95	94	95	96	102
Utah . . . . .	100	98	167	130	126	83	84	89	89	89	89	93
Nevada . . . . .	96	102	135	102	99	65	65	69	69	70	71	73
Mountain . . . . .	98	98	151	105	102	69	70	75	75	76	78	84
Washington . . . . .	98	100	140	113	110	74	76	84	83	84	84	91
Oregon . . . . .	97	99	130	110	107	72	74	82	82	84	85	91
California . . . . .	93	111	167	164	160	109	115	123	121	121	122	128
Pacific . . . . .	94	107	156	146	142	96	101	109	107	108	109	115
UNITED STATES . . . . .	97	103	170	127	115	73	79	85	84	84	84	91

1/ All farm lands including improvements, as of March 1.

2/ Preliminary.

3/ Revised.

Table 26.- Farm real estate: Land transfers and values, United States, 1926-42

Year	Estimated number of farms changing ownership per 1,000 farms <sup>1/</sup>				Index of estimated value per acre <sup>1/</sup> (1912-14 = 100)
	Voluntary sales and trades		Forced sales and related defaults	Others <sup>2/</sup>	
	Number	Number	Number	Number	Percent
1926	29.6	21.6	10.2	61.4	124
1927	28.3	23.3	16.9	68.5	119
1928	26.3	22.6	16.9	66.0	117
1929	23.5	19.5	15.0	58.0	116
1930	23.7	20.8	17.0	61.5	115
1931	19.0	26.1	16.8	61.9	106
1932	16.2	41.7	15.8	76.7	89
1933	16.8	54.1	22.7	93.6	73
1934	17.8	39.1	21.7	78.6	76
1935	19.4	28.3	21.4	69.1	79
1936	24.8	26.2	21.9	72.9	82
1937	31.5	22.4	20.1	74.0	85
1938	30.5	17.4	17.5	65.4	85
1939	4/ 29.7	17.0	17.1	4/ 63.8	84
1940	4/ 30.2	4/ 15.9	16.9	4/ 63.0	84
1941	34.1	13.9	15.7	63.7	85
1942	41.7	9.3	15.1	66.1	91

<sup>1/</sup> Year ending March 15.<sup>2/</sup> Largely inheritance, gift, and sales in settlement of estates; also includes a small number of miscellaneous and unclassified transfers.<sup>3/</sup> As of March 1.<sup>4/</sup> Revised.Table 27.- Real estate, sheriffs' certificates, judgments, etc., acquired and held by the Federal land banks and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, 1925-41 <sup>1/</sup>

Year	Acquired during year <sup>2/</sup>				Held as of December 31			
	Federal land banks		Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation		Federal land banks		Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation	
	Number	Investment	Number	Investment	Number	Investment	Number	Investment
	Number	1,000 dollars	Number	1,000 dollars	Number	1,000 dollars	Number	1,000 dollars
1925	2,250	5,232			2,758	11,048		
1926	2,285	9,621			4,023	16,596		
1927	2,090	9,190			5,174	21,892		
1928	2,652	14,598			6,010	26,478		
1929	3,109	13,340			6,641	29,517		
1930	4,318	17,177			6,516	36,865		
1931	7,036	27,320			12,609	53,588		
1932	10,102	43,045			18,449	83,158		
1933	6,488	26,941			21,895	96,632		
1934	4,766	16,067	2	5	22,918	96,655	2	11
1935	11,459	43,219	252	486	27,465	119,409	236	455
1936	12,510	49,730	2,624	5,809	28,954	128,893	2,379	5,861
1937	8,586	32,576	4,396	10,469	25,776	117,932	5,107	14,106
1938	7,186	29,233	6,576	17,267	23,974	115,345	6,245	23,884
1939	10,236	44,654	7,679	22,177	25,774	125,800	9,625	29,437
1940	5,242	23,029	3,790	12,626	21,337	109,066	7,503	25,113
1941	4,129	17,592	3,201	10,191	14,578	73,600	5,204	18,217

<sup>1/</sup> Excluding Puerto Rico except for acquisitions by the Federal land banks during years 1931-34.<sup>2/</sup> Excluding reacquisitions.<sup>3/</sup> Excluding prior liens.

Farm Credit Administration.

Table 25.- Federal land bank and Land Bank Commissioner loans: Number delinquent as a percentage of number outstanding, by States, as of Jan. 1, for selected years, 1930-42<sup>1/</sup>

State and division	Federal land banks				Land Bank Commissioner		
	1930		1934		1938	1942	1934
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Maine . . . . .	4.6	47.6	32.3	40.2	0.0	41.1	49.3
New Hampshire . . .	.6	14.8	7.9	5.8	.0	11.3	17.2
Vermont . . . . .	7.5	32.6	8.6	10.2	.0	15.1	15.9
Massachusetts . . .	1.6	14.4	5.9	5.6	1.0	10.0	15.4
Rhode Island . . .	.0	10.8	5.9	6.5	3.6	11.8	15.0
Connecticut . . . .	1.5	19.2	4.4	4.8	.7	6.7	10.1
New England . . .	3.6	29.1	13.6	14.5	.5	19.7	22.5
New York . . . . .	4.6	27.2	8.0	10.5	.8	9.8	17.0
New Jersey . . . .	3.6	26.9	7.8	7.7	.8	10.0	15.2
Pennsylvania . . .	6.1	32.0	8.4	12.8	.0	9.0	10.7
Middle Atlantic . .	5.1	29.0	8.1	10.9	.3	9.5	14.7
Ohio . . . . .	.9	29.6	4.9	4.3	4.5	7.2	5.7
Indiana . . . . .	1.5	35.5	5.2	3.4	2.2	5.3	3.9
Illinois . . . . .	2.9	46.1	10.2	5.1	.1	6.8	6.9
Michigan . . . . .	7.4	50.6	10.3	10.0	.0	13.2	12.2
Wisconsin . . . . .	7.8	51.5	19.4	16.3	.1	30.9	22.9
East North Central	3.9	42.1	10.2	8.2	.9	14.5	11.4
Minnesota . . . . .	6.5	42.8	15.9	13.1	.2	25.6	17.3
Iowa . . . . .	1.2	36.0	12.3	8.2	.1	15.7	10.0
Missouri . . . . .	12.6	45.9	20.9	9.1	.1	18.6	7.3
North Dakota . . .	9.3	67.4	72.9	58.8	.0	81.3	59.4
South Dakota . . .	3.9	65.9	42.3	26.6	.0	60.2	31.3
Nebraska . . . . .	2.4	36.8	33.8	34.7	.1	42.9	38.6
Kansas . . . . .	3.8	39.8	30.2	23.0	.0	36.8	27.5
West North Central	4.2	46.0	30.5	22.9	.1	39.3	25.4
Delaware . . . . .	3.6	36.4	1.9	7.0	.0	6.9	10.9
Maryland . . . . .	4.2	30.1	7.8	10.4	.0	10.4	12.8
Virginia . . . . .	5.1	44.4	7.4	13.5	.0	8.6	12.6
West Virginia . . .	4.8	42.3	7.7	8.5	.0	8.7	9.1
North Carolina . . .	8.3	56.6	19.1	15.2	2.4	7.8	12.9
South Carolina . . .	20.6	57.1	31.1	31.5	5.2	19.6	34.1
Georgia . . . . .	10.2	61.5	27.3	24.1	1.9	13.4	22.4
Florida . . . . .	6.4	52.9	21.0	17.1	.3	6.4	12.2
South Atlantic . .	8.9	52.3	18.8	18.4	1.9	11.6	19.1
Kentucky . . . . .	2.0	43.9	7.9	5.9	11.7	9.0	7.0
Tennessee . . . . .	1.6	40.3	10.8	4.4	5.1	10.7	4.7
Alabama . . . . .	12.7	60.8	23.4	19.0	.0	26.9	21.9
Mississippi . . . . .	11.9	73.8	30.3	25.4	.0	28.7	29.7
East South Central	9.1	58.9	19.3	15.0	3.9	18.6	16.5
Arkansas . . . . .	3.3	67.2	33.8	5.9	.0	16.6	4.3
Louisiana . . . . .	11.5	69.0	25.3	24.9	.0	25.4	27.8
Oklahoma . . . . .	6.9	39.5	23.9	11.6	.0	25.6	13.8
Texas . . . . .	.7	42.2	20.2	15.5	.0	14.8	14.4
West South Central	3.2	49.0	22.6	14.9	.0	18.4	14.3
Montana . . . . .	9.3	61.5	40.5	22.7	.0	53.1	19.0
Idaho . . . . .	6.7	55.5	16.0	13.5	.0	20.8	17.3
Wyoming . . . . .	3.0	43.4	25.2	16.8	1.3	36.6	19.9
Colorado . . . . .	5.6	55.0	34.5	20.3	.0	30.1	21.3
New Mexico . . . .	5.2	36.1	21.2	10.1	.0	16.8	12.2
Arizona . . . . .	1.9	61.5	21.0	17.9	.6	11.7	19.2
Utah . . . . .	4.1	70.0	29.4	22.2	1.5	23.8	28.9
Nevada . . . . .	2.0	56.1	26.5	12.5	.0	12.0	8.3
Mountain . . . . .	5.9	55.5	27.5	17.7	.4	31.1	19.9
Washington . . . . .	6.8	46.4	15.8	9.4	.4	19.5	11.5
Oregon . . . . .	6.4	49.6	15.1	10.8	.0	16.7	12.1
California . . . . .	1.4	40.0	7.5	10.3	.5	11.3	11.7
Pacific . . . . .	5.1	44.9	11.7	10.1	.4	13.7	11.7
UNITED STATES . . .	5.5	48.5	20.6	15.6	1.0	23.1	17.8

1/ Includes all loans with unpaid matured installments even though such installments may have been extended or deferred.

Farm Credit Administration.

Table 29.- Farm-debt adjustment activities, by States, September 1, 1935 through June 30, 1942

State and division	Individual cases adjusted	Indebtedness			Taxes paid <sup>1/</sup>	
		Prior to adjustment		After adjustment		
		Number	1,000 dollars	1,000 dollars	Percent	1,000 dollars
Maine .....	1,976	9,857	7,909	19.8	62	
New Hampshire .....	272	1,042	900	13.6	16	
Vermont .....	481	2,425	1,917	21.0	24	
Massachusetts .....	834	5,852	5,411	7.5	80	
Rhode Island .....	118	620	609	1.7	3	
Connecticut .....	578	4,664	4,128	11.5	57	
New England .....	4,259	24,460	20,874	14.7	242	
New York .....	2,654	13,353	11,337	15.1	87	
New Jersey .....	655	4,101	3,499	14.7	49	
Pennsylvania .....	2,548	10,687	9,075	15.1	175	
Middle Atlantic .....	5,857	28,141	23,911	15.0	311	
Ohio .....	6,321	11,257	9,920	11.9	92	
Indiana .....	4,302	11,477	10,009	12.8	90	
Illinois .....	4,490	18,602	16,074	24.3	125	
Michigan .....	2,126	4,423	3,518	20.5	47	
Wisconsin .....	2,875	10,651	7,242	32.0	80	
East North Central .....	20,714	56,410	44,763	20.7	434	
Minnesota .....	4,172	14,569	10,683	26.7	131	
Iowa .....	7,659	47,035	38,216	18.8	308	
Missouri .....	7,958	13,917	10,348	21.3	34	
North Dakota .....	3,848	20,740	15,992	22.9	383	
South Dakota .....	8,280	26,987	15,509	42.5	635	
Nebraska .....	8,293	25,988	19,456	25.1	297	
Kansas .....	6,560	20,640	14,621	29.2	154	
West North Central .....	46,770	159,876	125,425	26.2	1,949	
Delaware .....	281	856	666	22.2	4	
Maryland .....	1,032	5,545	4,305	22.4	49	
Virginia .....	1,976	4,803	3,631	24.4	28	
West Virginia .....	1,767	4,972	4,001	19.5	69	
North Carolina .....	4,093	5,945	4,805	19.2	111	
South Carolina .....	3,463	3,131	2,532	19.1	48	
Georgia .....	5,138	6,870	5,784	15.8	91	
Florida .....	2,759	5,514	4,658	15.5	122	
South Atlantic .....	20,809	37,636	30,382	19.3	522	
Kentucky .....	2,151	6,445	5,300	17.8	29	
Tennessee .....	2,370	4,624	4,166	9.9	80	
Alabama .....	8,606	6,664	4,974	23.0	25	
Mississippi .....	7,272	5,544	7,212	15.4	123	
East South Central .....	20,399	26,077	21,572	16.9	257	
Arkansas .....	9,023	10,812	8,214	24.0	174	
Louisiana .....	7,836	9,130	6,789	25.6	121	
Oklahoma .....	8,401	20,041	16,178	19.3	306	
Texas .....	16,169	42,337	33,987	19.7	610	
West South Central .....	41,629	82,320	65,168	20.8	1,211	
Montana .....	1,994	5,267	3,983	24.4	50	
Idaho .....	2,535	9,214	7,344	20.3	105	
Wyoming .....	2,034	8,420	6,056	28.1	74	
Colorado .....	3,336	6,902	4,976	27.9	88	
New Mexico .....	2,191	3,297	2,504	24.0	34	
Arizona .....	1,016	2,202	2,034	7.7	26	
Utah .....	1,277	5,449	4,778	12.3	80	
Nevada .....	93	609	495	18.7	6	
Mountain .....	14,476	41,360	32,170	22.2	495	
Washington .....	2,535	11,261	8,324	26.1	52	
Oregon .....	1,543	7,238	6,159	14.9	107	
California .....	2,600	16,066	14,063	12.5	93	
Pacific .....	6,675	34,565	28,546	17.4	252	
UNITED STATES .....	181,591	500,845	392,911	21.6	5,666	
Hawaii .....	6	12	4	63.7	0	

<sup>1/</sup> Included in indebtedness prior to adjustment. Usually paid from proceeds of loans which are included in indebtedness after adjustment.

Table 30.- Index numbers of demand deposits of country banks, for selected States, 1929-42 <sup>1/</sup>  
(1924-29 = 100)

Year and month	Twenty leading agricultural States <sup>2/</sup>		Seven Corn Belt States <sup>3/</sup>	Eight cotton-growing States <sup>4/</sup>	Eight range States <sup>5/</sup>
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for seasonal variations			
1929	99.0		97.2	93.0	103.6
1930	89.4		90.7	77.2	91.3
1931	75.4		78.1	59.6	75.2
1932	57.3		59.6	51.8	54.7
1933	48.6		44.6	41.8	46.8
1934	66.0		70.7	59.1	63.9
1935	6/		6/	6/	6/
1936	97.6		105.9	95.7	101.1
1937	105.7		115.4	105.0	110.4
1938	102.7		112.4	93.3	106.4
1939	110.3		122.1	108.9	114.9
1940	121.1		135.6	115.2	125.0
1941	134.1		161.8	139.6	141.0
1941:					
August	144.3	146.0	163.4	133.9	135.2
September	151.0	153.6	170.4	143.2	142.5
October	156.4	153.5	174.2	155.1	153.4
November	160.9	157.0	178.0	168.5	163.5
December	164.7	162.4	183.3	167.2	169.2
1942:					
January	168.8	165.8	190.2	168.9	160.7
February	169.9	167.6	191.9	169.5	158.6
March	170.9	169.4	192.9	171.0	157.0
April	171.7	171.9	197.0	172.0	157.2
May	173.0	175.5	198.3	172.4	159.7
June	176.2	180.5	203.1	173.0	161.5
July	182.5	187.6	209.2	177.7	165.2
August	196.5	191.6	218.3	187.8	173.7

<sup>1/</sup> Member banks of the Federal Reserve System located in places of less than 15,000 population. Each State weighted according to cash farm income during base period. Annual figures are simple averages of monthly indexes.

<sup>2/</sup> Ark., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Nebr., N. Y., N. C., N. Dak., Ohio, Okla., Pa., S. Dak., Texas, and Wis.

<sup>3/</sup> Ill., Ind., Iowa, Minn., Mo., Nebr., and Ohio.

<sup>4/</sup> Ala., Ark., Ga., La., Miss., N. C., Okla., and S. C.

<sup>5/</sup> Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. Mex., Utah, and Wyo.

<sup>6/</sup> Five months in 1935 are unavailable.

Table 31.- Cash farm income, and indexes of prices paid by farmers, prices received by farmers, and rural retail sales, 1929-42

Year and month	Cash farm income <sup>1/</sup>	Prices paid by farmers (1910-14 = 100)	Prices received by farmers (Aug. 1909-July 1914 = 100)	Rural retail sales <sup>2/</sup> (1929-31 = 100)		
					Million dollars	Percent
1929	3/ 11,296	3/ 154	146	125		
1930	3/ 9,021	3/ 146	126	99		
1931	3/ 6,371	3/ 126	87	78		
1932	3/ 4,743	3/ 104	65	63		
1933	3/ 5,445	3/ 104	70	58		
1934	3/ 6,780	3/ 122	90	84		
1935	3/ 7,650	125	108	99		
1936	3/ 8,654	124	114	115		
1937	3/ 9,237	3/ 131	121	122		
1938	3/ 8,168	3/ 123	95	114		
1939	3/ 8,684	3/ 121	1/ 92	127		
1940	3/ 9,145	3/ 122	98	134		
1941	3/ 11,830	3/ 131	122	169		
1941:						
September	3/ 1,136	3/ 136	139	174		
October	1,645	139	139	167		
November	1,301	141	135	167		
December	1,235	140	143	163		
1942:						
January	1,116	146	149	193		
February	912	147	145	147		
March	982	150	146	211		
April	1,063	151	150	191		
May	1,030	152	152	180		
June	1,112	152	151	176		
July	1,289	152	154	188		
August	1,435	152	163	197		
September	1,753	153	163	203		

<sup>1/</sup> Includes Government payments beginning with 1933.

<sup>2/</sup> Adjusted for seasonal variations. Department of Commerce.

<sup>3/</sup> Revised.

<sup>4/</sup> Preliminary.

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Table 32.- Interest rates charged on new loans and discounts by institutions under the supervision of the Farm Credit Administration, December 31, 1933-41

Item	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
	Percent								
<b>Federal land banks:</b>									
National farm loan associations:									
Contract rate .....	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Reduced rate 1/ .....	4 1/2	4 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2
Direct (including loans made in Puerto Rico):									
Contract rate .....	5 1/2	5 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Reduced rate 1/ .....	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Land Bank Commissioners:									
Contract rate .....	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Reduced rate 1/ .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Production credit associations 2/	6	5	5	5	5	5	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Federal intermediate credit banks 2/	3/3	2	2	2	2	2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
Banks for cooperatives: 2/									
Commodity loans .....	-	-	2	2	2	2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
Operating capital loans .....	4	3	3	3	3	3	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2
Facility loans .....	4 1/2	4 1/2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Emergency crop and feed loans .....	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2
Drought-relief loans (1934-35) .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Regional agricultural credit corporations .....	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2
Agricultural Marketing Act revolving fund:									
Operating capital loans .....	4	3	3	3	3	3	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2
Facility loans .....	4 1/2	4 1/2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Joint stock land bank liquidation fund .....	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

1/ Temporarily reduced rates to borrowers on Federal land bank and Land Bank Commissioner loans have been in effect since July 7, 1933 and July 22, 1937, respectively. Under existing legislation, the reduced rates to borrowers will continue until July 1, 1944.

2/ Interest rate in Puerto Rico, one-half of 1 percent higher.

3/ One bank charged 2 1/2 percent interest on this date; the rate was increased to 3 percent on January 15, 1934.

NOTE: The interest rate on mortgage loans made by joint stock land banks varies from 4 percent to 6 percent per annum, the latter rate being the maximum allowed by law. The interest rate on loans made by Federal credit unions may not exceed 1 percent per month.

Farm Credit Administration.

Table 33.- Bond rates and yields and money rates, 1930-42

Year	Federal land bank bonds 1/		Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds 1/		Federal intermediate credit bank debenture rates 2/ 5/		United States Government bond yields 6/ 1/	Industrial bond yields 8/	Rates on prime commercial paper (4-6 months) 9/ 10/	Federal reserve bank discount rates, New York 6/
	Rates 2/	Yields 3/	Rates 2/	Yields 4/	Percent	Percent				
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
1930 .....	4.53	4.58			3.39	3.29	5.25	5.25	10/ 3.59	10/ 2-4
1931 .....	4.52	5.13			3.21	3.34	10/ 6.06	2.63	1-3	
1932 .....	4.53	5.32			3.33	3.68	6.71	2.73	28-38	
1933 .....	4.45	5.18			2.55	3.31	10/ 5.34	1.72	2-38	
1934 .....	4.24	4.17	2.99	3.11	1.83	3.12	4.52	1.02	1-2	
1935 .....	3.86	3.13	2.67	2.77	1.50	2.79	4.02	.76	1	
1936 .....	3.60	2.81	2.67	2.42	1.50	2.65	3.50	.75	1	
1937 .....	3.54	2.75	2.67	2.42	1.50	2.68	3.55	.95	1-12	
1938 .....	3.53	2.37	2.65	1.75	1.24	2.56	3.50	.81	1	
1939 .....	3.53	1.90	2.98	1.07	.88	2.36	3.30	.59	1	
1940 .....	3.53	1.70	3.00	.59	.75	2.21	3.10	.56	1	
1941 .....	3.53	11/	3.00	12/ .70	.70	1.95	2.95	.54	1	
Jan.-March	3.53	1.28	3.00	12/ .78	.75	2.03	2.99	.56	1	
Apr.-June	3.53	11/	3.00	12/ .68	.75	1.93	3.01	.56	1	
July-Sept.	3.53	11/	3.00	12/ .52	.65	1.93	2.89	.50	1	
Oct.-Dec...	3.53	11/	3.00	12/ .83	.65	1.90	2.88	.52	1	
1942:										
Jan.-March	3.53	11/	12/ 2.55	12/ .91	.85	2.03	2.98	.61	1	
Apr.-June	3.53	11/	12/ 2.58	.89	.71	1.97	2.97	.65	1	

1/ Farm Credit Administration.

2/ Based on bonds outstanding at end of each year or quarter.

3/ Average of daily yields on asked prices of all long-term issues, except those callable in 5 years or less.

4/ Average of daily yields on all outstanding issues with a minimum original term of 7 years or more.

5/ Based on debentures issued during each year or quarter.

6/ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

7/ Average of daily yields on all outstanding partially tax-exempt issues due or callable in more than 12 years.

8/ Moody's Investors Service.

9/ Prevailing open-market rates in New York City.

10/ Revised.

11/ After May 1, 1941 all bonds were callable in 5 years or less.

12/ Excludes two issues quoted on a negative yield basis.

13/ Includes some 1-percent bonds held by United States Treasury.



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